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Mojca Ramšak¹

Olfactory Heritage in Slovenian Museums

ABSTRACT: Olfactory cultural heritage refers to the scents associated with objects, places, cultural practices, and traditions that serve as a testimony to the past. A study conducted in Slovenian museums between 2021 and 2024 found that museologists voluntarily include various aspects of olfactory heritage in their exhibitions and educational activities. They are largely aware of the importance of the scents emanating from objects and spaces for the fascination of visitors. However, it was found that there is a lack of museum strategies for olfactory heritage in Slovenia since there is no common strategy or set of standards for Slovenian museums, and there are no legal regulations in this area. Despite a response rate of only 49% (29 out of 59 invited museums participated), the reflections of the participating museologists on the role of smell in museums inspired by this research do give hope for greater utilization of this aspect of cultural heritage in the future.

Keywords: intangible heritage, olfactory heritage, anthropology of smell, museum, Slovenia

Vohalna dediščina v slovenskih muzejih

IZVLEČEK: Vohalna kulturna dediščina so vonji predmetov, krajev, kulturnih praks in izročil, ki pričajo o preteklosti. Na podlagi raziskave v slovenskih muzejih med leti 2021 in 2024 je bilo ugotovljeno, da muzealci predstavljajo različne vidike vohalne dediščine samoiniciativno in kontekstualno v sklopu razstav ali pedagoških dejavnosti ter da se večinoma zavedajo vloge vonja predmetov in prostorov za pritegnitev obiskovalcev. Ugotovljeno je bilo tudi, da v zvezi z vohalno dediščino v Sloveniji ni razvitih muzealskih strategij, saj slovensko muzealstvo tudi sicer nima skupne strategije in standardov niti ga ne regulira področna zakonodaja. Čeprav je bila odzivnost na raziskavo 49-odstotna (29 muzejev od 59 povabljenih k raziskavi), pa razmišljanja sodelujočih muzealcev o vlogi vonjav v muzejih, ki jo je sprožila ta raziskava, obetajo, da bo v prihodnje ta vidik dediščine boljše izkoriščen.

Ključne besede: nesnovna dediščina, vohalna dediščina, antropologija vonja, muzej, Slovenija

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Introduction

Olfactory heritage is an aspect of cultural heritage concerning smells that are meaningful to a community due to their connections with significant places, practices, objects or traditions (Bembibre and Strlič 2022), and can therefore be considered part of the cultural legacy for future generations. Olfactory heritage science is an emerging field of research, focused on scientific techniques for analysing, documenting, and preserving odours and perspectives in order to understand their relevance.

Research in olfactory heritage is based on many disciplines, such as medicine – neuroscience, chemistry, anthropology, archaeology, conservation science, philosophy, psychology, history, museology and heritology. The dominant literature on olfactory culture focuses either on linguistic semiotic analyses of olfactory ideas that essentialize smell as a universal language (e.g. Majid 2015; Majid 2021; Majid & Levinson 2011; Digonnet 2018); on anthropological comparisons of olfactory meanings that highlight similarities and differences across cultures (e.g. Howes & Classen 1991; Classen et al. 1994b; Drobnick 2006; Aspria 2009; Le Breton 2017), such as in travel diaries (Tullet 2016); studies of behaviour (e.g., sexual life) and rituals in which smell plays an important role (e.g. Mallinowski 1929; Lévi-Strauss 1969; Jellinek 1951); historical perspectives on smell (e.g. Corbin 1986; Reinartz 2014; Bradley 2015; Tullet et al. 2022), the role of olfactory manipulation in a consumer society (Hultén et al. 2009); or the smell of cultural heritage (e.g. Bembibre Jacobo 2020; Bembibre and Strlič 2022), and in this context the possibilities of imitating and simulating smell in museums and explaining the meaning of the smells of museum and gallery objects and experimental exhibition replicas (Verbeeck 2016), as well as the ethical and practical dimensions of using smell in museum premises (Ramšak 2023).

Anthropological and related research on smell was elevated from academic to normative level at the end of the 20th century with the first documents regarding the protection of olfactory heritage. Among these documents, the *Burra Charter* of 1999 is particularly important. This was the first document to give smell a place in cultural heritage, and was prepared by the Australian ICOMOS (International Council on Monuments and Sites). In the introduction to the charter, it defines what the concept of cultural significance means and how smell is included in this concept.

Smell was indirectly recognized as part of the cultural heritage in the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage (UNESCO 2003). Although UNESCO did not directly recognize smell as intangible cultural heritage in its definition of intangible cultural heritage, elements such as food and culinary practices, folk medicine, religious rituals, ritual purification, etc., were indirectly included. In 2018, France nominated the skills associated with perfumery in the Pays de Grasse: the cultivation of aromatic plants, the knowledge and processing of natural raw materials, and the art of perfume composition for inscription on the Representative List of the Intangible Cultural Heritage of Humanity (UNESCO 2018a; UNESCO 2018b). Given that there was no mention of smells among the elements inscribed on the organization's list, the recognition of Grasse's olfactory heritage nevertheless set an important precedent (Bembibre and Strlič 2017). However, until 2021 and the adoption of the French Sensory Heritage Law (Loi no. 2021-85), the recognition of smells as cultural heritage was neither widespread nor universal.

By reviving historical scents, we can experience cultural, social, historical, artistic-aesthetic and other meanings of artefacts in a new way and communicate the significance of these smells to museum audiences. This idea serves as the basis for olfactory museology (e.g. Drobnick 2014; Stevenson 2014; Levent et al. 2014; Howes 2015; Verbeeck 2016; Nieuwhof 2017; Spence 2020).

From an anthropological perspective, it is essential to comprehend smell and its significance in relation to culture. In preserving, recording, archiving and presenting smells to visitors as a part of cultural heritage, museums face some of the most difficult challenges due to the impermanence and intangibility of odours. In addition, olfactory museology introduces some concepts that were mentioned earlier in relation to work in anthropological and other museums (such as in Lévi-Strauss 1963, 375; Vergo 1989, 25; Maroević 2020, 55).

Textual and visual sources can provide valuable information for recording and interpreting smells and memories of the past. Sometimes this information is also consistent with material evidence such as artefacts (Bembibre and Strlič 2022, 134). Scientific research on odours emanating from objects focuses on the potential harm that volatile organic compounds

and chemicals cause to objects, collections, and visitors (Bembibre and Strlič 2022, 134; Kraševac et al. 2021).

The key concepts of olfactory museology in Slovenian museology are undoubtedly the definitions of an olfactory object, an olfactory exhibition and an olfactory gesture. These definitions were originally established by Ramšak in 2023 (63, 69–70).

The proposed working definition of the term ‘olfactory object’ (or ‘olfactory artefact’), deriving from the research of smell in Slovenian museums and based on their artefacts, refers to the connection between an object and/or odorous substance and history. According to this definition, the term olfactory object (or olfactory artefact) should refer to historical items and/or substances known to emit odours; items and substances known to contain odours; scented historical spaces (indoors and outdoors, such as a smoke room with an open fireplace, a herb garden, a wooden field toilet); historical writings describing historical odours; and illustrations, paintings and photographs showing or referencing olfactory objects (people or animals, such as dogs and civets; plants, such as flowers; items like fruit, onion, garlic and food in general, cigarettes, or dirt; gestures, and practices referring to smell, such as smoking). An olfactory museum object is also a scent-based installation that allows visitors to explore the smells of a museum or gallery. It consists of one or more scented devices programmed to release a variety of odours into the space or scented objects that allow visitors to experience historical or other smells in a new and interactive way, creating a unique olfactory experience. A scented object is often used in conjunction with other artworks in the museum in order to create a multi-sensory experience.

Along with the concept of the olfactory object comes the ‘olfactory exhibition’. Looking at past or existing exhibitions that incorporate smells, an olfactory exhibition can be defined as one that focuses on smells. It often includes a wide variety of olfactory objects, scents, aromas, perfumes, and other sensory experiences that stimulate the sense of smell, explore the history of a particular odour or historical object in relation to smell, examine the connection between smell, memory, emotion and identity, or present the science of olfaction. An exhibition that engages multiple senses may also include an olfactory component.

Since visitors react to smells or to smells that are represented in paintings with different gestures or poses, such expressions could be considered an 'olfactory gesture', a kind of non-verbal communication used to elicit a specific emotion, or create a certain atmosphere. Examples of olfactory gestures include emphasized sniffing, inhaling or smelling to signal the presence of an odour; closing the nostrils with one's thumb and forefinger to signal an unpleasant odour; quickly fanning the palm of the hand in front of the nose to signal that one wishes to get rid of the odour as soon as possible; fumigating rooms, e.g., with holy incense; smoking; and perfuming. Characteristic facial expressions like a wrinkled nose, lowered eyebrows, a raised upper lip, and a raised and slightly protruding lower lip can be used to identify disgust with an unpleasant odour. A gesture can also become a figure of speech, such as when someone says, 'Hold your nose,' indicating unpleasant odours, e.g., 'When you pass by there, hold your nose!' Olfactory gestures and olfactory practices occasionally intersect. Both olfactory gestures and olfactory practices reflect everyday habits and repetitive rituals. They are found depicted in pictures, photos, illustrations and sometimes on other artefacts, or described in written texts (Ramšak 2023, 63, 69–70).

These ideas are still new in Slovenian museums, although they have been partially adopted elsewhere since the 1990s.

The olfactory properties of cultural heritage objects and sites are not systematically researched or documented, let alone preserved and protected. As a result, little is known about the smells of the past. However, there are also shining exceptions. For example, Inger Leemans, a renowned Dutch cultural historian and leader of the pioneering pan-European project on the history and culture of scents in Europe called 'Odeuropa' (2021–2023), together with her esteemed colleagues, has categorised research on the history and culture of scents into several groups that are closely linked to the preservation of cultural heritage (Leemans et al. 2022). These categories include the following: a) conservation and restoration of museum objects related to scents; b) olfactory reconstructions of historical artefacts with distinct smells; c) restoration of lost scents using well-preserved recipes; d) development of comprehensive historical olfactory museum exhibitions; e) presentation of museum exhibitions with one or a few ol-

factory artefacts; f) production of artistic creations that combine historical accuracy with imaginative transformations (ibid.).

Today, the exhibitions of the smells of museum objects and ambience or the recombination of multimodal sensory exhibitions are becoming increasingly common worldwide. The use of all the senses, which was most common in open-air museums, has also found its way into exhibition spaces. Many museums, galleries, and libraries offer a tour of olfactory artefacts and scented rooms along with an artificially created scent, a reproduction of historical smells. Examples of museums with smell exhibitions include the International Perfume Museum in Grasse, Osmothèque in Paris, Prado Museum in Madrid, the Mauritshuis Museum in Haag, Museum in Eindhoven, Huygens' Hofwijck in Voorburg, Museum of London Docklands, British Museum, Natural History Museum in London, Tower of London, Winston Churchill's Britain at War Experience in London, JORVIK Viking Centre in York, Museum Ulm, National Geographic Museum in Washington D.C., The Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York, Boston Museum of Science, Children's Museum of Indianapolis, Vatican Museum in Rome, etc.

Methods

The research was conducted between 2021 and 2024. In order to obtain data on olfactory objects in Slovenian museums, 59 Slovenian museums were asked by email to provide data on olfactory artefacts and their descriptions, which are kept in museum documentation. A general description (dimensions, origin, time of origin, function, conservation interventions – this is important in the case of odours, as they blur the traces of original use) and a photograph were also requested for objects that corresponded to the above data. At the same time, museums were asked for a list of objects that still contained components associated with smell (e.g., perfume bottles, pharmacy containers and their contents, personal hygiene products, gunpowder...). Due to the complete lack of research in this area in Slovenian museums and to avoid misunderstandings, a brief definition of olfactory objects with examples was included with the email request for cooperation. This description indicated the direction in which curators should think when selecting objects, namely scented objects that smell by themselves (e.g., perfume bottles), objects that no longer smell due to

restoration and conservation interventions but were used in conjunction with smell (this group may include perfume bottles and the like but also at the opposite end, chamber pots, for example), objects that are strongly associated with smell (e.g., painted beehive panels associated with honey, meadows, and forests), and documents, frescoes, and paintings depicting smell, smoke, or air.

Twenty-nine (29) museums (49% of all those invited) provided detailed responses, although some museums asked for more details and clarification about their olfactory heritage. Most frequently, museum directors instructed curators to select the most representative items from their collections, and some museums also provided a numerical estimate of the olfactory objects in their collection. Only a small number of museums stated that they had no olfactory artefacts. Data and reflections on museum odours were contributed by 49 curators, conservators, restorers, and other professionals.

Purpose and Goals

The purpose of collecting data on olfactory heritage in Slovenian museums was to determine which types of museum objects, exhibits or documents are directly or indirectly associated with smells (odours, fragrances, flavours, perfumes, medical and pharmaceutical smells, industrial heritage, etc.) in order to gain an overview of the state of olfactory heritage in Slovenian museums and how, if at all, museums use olfactory objects and stories about them to present heritage.

Results

The analysis of selected olfactory artefacts from Slovenian museums reveals certain common characteristics of these objects, on the basis of which a taxonomic scheme can be developed.

Slovenian national, regional, local or private collections preserve and display olfactory objects from the following categories: a) objects in the strict sense; b) scented interiors and exteriors; c) written documents; d) narratives used in exhibitions with olfactory explanations; and, additionally, sell e) fragrant objects related to cultural heritage and its interpretation in museum stores.

In most cases, the museums that complied with the request added their exact number or a numerical estimate to the descriptive data of olfactory objects, especially if there were several objects of the same type. Based on this data, we can estimate that Slovenian museums keep several hundred olfactory objects.




Figure 1: Scheme of the typology of the most common olfactory objects in 29 Slovenian museums in 2024.

Typology of Olfactory Objects from Slovenian Museums

A) OBJECTS IN THE STRICT SENSE

- *Objects directly related to fragrances:* perfumes, colognes, perfume or cologne bottles and/or their packaging, perfume bottles with atomizers, car air fresheners.

- *Objects related to cosmetic products:* lotions, universal creams and face, hand, baby and sunscreen creams, test samples of creams in small packages, promotional leaflets with test samples; antiseptic gels and tonics for impure skin; hairdressing preparations; soaps and their packaging, such as soaps made of animal fat and lye for washing and personal care, laundry turpentine soaps, small hotel soaps, perfumed soaps, hand washing lotions; toothpastes for children and adults; nail polish; billboards advertising cosmetic and hygiene products.

- *Hygiene objects:* porcelain washbasins with water jugs, soap and shaving dishes; antique hand-blown glass or ceramic balsamaria for storing scented oils, cosmetic and medicinal preparations, and aryballos, i.e., spherical bottles for storing scented bath oils; chamber pots, field toilet

with manure pit, portable wooden toilet, portable toilet for mines, tools such as manure scoops or buckets; standing enamelled metal spittoons for spitting out chewing tobacco, washing powders in cardboard or printed cotton packaging, dishwasher tablets.

- *Objects related to (folk)medicine or pharmacy*: furniture of old pharmacies; pharmaceutical ceramic and glass containers; packaging of pharmaceutical products; medical equipment such as midwife bags with accessories, surgical tools, or other items from dispensaries, hospitals, and partisan hospitals of World War II; individual medicine bottles and collections of medicines, such as anthelmintic (medicines to treat intestinal parasites); anaesthetics, ampoules; tubes of ointments such as zinc paste with fish oil, antiperspirant ointment; first aid kits for personal protection in case of exposure to biological chemical substances from the late 1960s; dried herbs (mint – several types, linden, lemon balm, chamomile, oats, hemp-agrimony, hazel, goldenrod), herbal teas, herbs in brandy (e.g., arnica, yarrow, common rue); tinctures (e.g. with comfrey, yarrow), bottles with unknown liquids; aromatised wines, apple cider vinegar, aromatised apple cider vinegar (e.g., with garlic, honey or tarragon), honey and honey with hazelnuts and walnuts).

- *Objects related to smoking*: snuff boxes, tin packaging for tobacco and cigarettes, cigar mouthpieces, cigar cutters, pipes made of various materials (wood, clay, porcelain, sea foam), cigarette cases, table cigarette boxes, cigarettes, cigars, 'viržinke or Virginian cigars' (thinner, longer cigars with a straw).

- *Objects related to criminality*: The collections of the Slovenian Police Museum contain traces of odours left behind by the perpetrators of criminal offences and were found with the help of trained dogs. Among the objects associated with smell is a burnt wooden Molotov pole made by the perpetrator of the fire. There are also criminal cases with descriptions of fires and the smell of smoke. The publication on the history of the museum (Debeljak 2006) also describes the development of the training of police dogs ('drug sniffers', 'ruiners'), which are trained to search for people or objects by smell.

- *Clothing*: underwear, feminine hygiene products; uniforms; sacramental clothing.

- *Ritual objects*: ecclesiastical vessels for incenses, holy oils, and sacramental wine (e.g., a censer with which the priest incenses the altar; a 'small boat' (vessel) containing grains of incense; a spoon with which these grains are placed in the censers; incense burners; vessels for holy oils, e.g., a chrismarium for holy oils; a sacristy oil set; a leather set with lid for storing bottles of holy oil used by the missionary among the Indians; a glass wine goblet).

- *Paintings and frescoes*: paintings with the theme of allegory of the senses (e.g., sense of smell); scenes depicting still life with bouquets of flowers; a mourning offering; seascape (sea scent); a person in the kitchen; food, e.g., bread; frescoes with figures, e.g., angels holding censers; postcards.

- *Kitchen utensils*: various vessels and utensils used for preparing, processing and consuming food and drink (e.g., archaeological vessels or fragments of pots with burnt food; the ritual vessel with several smaller cups connected to the central vessel by gutters ('kernos'); ceramic vinegar containers; salt and pepper shakers and other containers for spices; honey dispensers; a mechanical device for determining the fat content of milk; aluminium container with lid for transporting milk to the dairy ('kangla'); butter churn with handle and wooden lid for making butter ('pinja') and other tools, equipment, measuring instruments for cheese making and dairy; tin cup for wine; bottle with handle and glass stopper for liquor, cup for beer; drinking vessels for wine, beer, liquor; jezvas (coffee pots)).

- *Beekeeping*: bee hives, 'kranjič' beehives, honeycomb frames, beehive front board paintings smell slightly of wood, paint and coatings, when dirty they also smell of mould and dust; beekeeping accessories that in the past smelled of wax, propolis and honey; bee products are in sealed packages and have no smell; certificates and insignia of beekeeping associations, as well as old books smell of mould and dirt.

- *Crafts*: technological processes in various crafts are related to the substances with which the materials were processed, or to the materials themselves.

For example, to illustrate the smells of leather and shoemaking, the Tržič Museum keeps 'bottles that smell or reek of fish oil, which was used to lubricate shoes to keep the leather waterproof – visitors can also see this in the film; tannin from spruce bark, which was used to tan leather and smells like spruce resin; shoe ointment, which consists of various sub-

stances used by a restorer to preserve leather objects. When touring the permanent exhibition, the curators also point out that there was always an odour in and around the tanneries that many visitors still remember. Rot occurred during the processing of the leather, and chicken excrement was also used, which can be seen in a display case. The tanners' boots, which were called 'štalonarji' – the name comes from folk etymology because they smelled like a stable ('štala') – are also on display, and a short narrative about their smell is presented in the film.' (Information from the curator at the Tržič Museum, Bojan Knific, 14. 11. 2022 and 3. 2. 2023).

Another example comes from the Museum of Ribnica, where in the exhibition of wooden wares ('suha roba') and pottery from the Ribnica Valley, the smell of the material is highlighted twice as an important factor. For the wooden wares, which created a special way of life and represented a considerable source of income for the rural inhabitants, the wall next to the wooden products reads: 'With every breath they took, the smell of wood was written in their genes.' Similarly, the smell is emphasised in pottery, a craft that was also important for this region. In the film shown in the museum, one of the potters invites the audience with the following words: 'God bless you! If you are in the right mood, approach the clay and see if it smells good to you.' (Information from the exhibition at the Ribnica Handicraft Centre, Museum of Ribnica, noted by Mojca Ramšak on 10. 2. 2023). In addition, one of the curators explained that in 2003 she wanted to include smells in the exhibitions and wrote this down on her written exam as a curator. (Information from curator in Ribnica Museum Marina Gradišnik, 12. 2. 2023).

- *Industrial heritage*: vehicles, submarine, industrial machinery. In museums with technical and industrial heritage, the metallic smell of machinery, the smell of oils and grease, and the smell of wood are present on the artefacts and the ambience. The technical heritage is also exhibited in other museums that have collections on craft activities such as blacksmithing, and it has been reported that some items from these collections still have an odour.

When reflecting on the smells of museum objects, one of the curators concluded that in the museum 'the role of smell was never particularly questioned, but smells were included in experiential programmes and

used to complement the occasional installation of scent exhibitions. In no case was it about highlighting museum objects.’ In the exhibition there are ‘a few objects that have a smell but these do not have the function of achieving anything with the smell (e.g. a bag of coffee, a pack of tobacco, associated with contraband, bottles of medicine). Other objects are also placed in display cases for protection.’ She concluded that ‘curators do not usually use objects with a smell to communicate something to visitors.’ (Information from curator Mirjam Gnezda Bogataj from the Idrija City Museum, 17. 11. 2022).

B) SCENTED INTERIORS AND EXTERIORS

Open-air museums often have a variety of spaces that have a smell, such as gardens, herb gardens, orchards, and farmyards. The smell of freshly cut grass, flowers, herbs, and fruits can be experienced in these spaces. In some open-air museums, as well as in situ preserved homesteads you can also smell the smoke of a wood-fired stove or fireplace and the smell of food prepared in workshops, as well as the smells of clay, wood and straw.

When visiting these homesteads, some children immediately comment on the smell of smoke with ‘Wow, that stinks’, signalling that it is the smell that first attracts their attention. They want to know what stinks. There are similar comments about the field toilet, which, although it is no longer used and therefore does not smell, causes visitors to associate it with defecation and gesticulation; visitors ‘hold their noses to avoid unpleasant odours.’ The forges, where iron is still forged for educational purposes, also have a specific smell (information from Nives Brezovnik, Rogatec Open-Air Museum, 16. 11. 2022).

Historical buildings, such as castles, can be completely permeated with an unpleasant odour despite restoration efforts, especially near chimneys and even more so during changing weather conditions. The smell of damp walls is also unpleasant, and therefore, during special tours of architecture and building development, curators include this perception in their explanations when talking about the effects of dampness on cultural heritage (information from curator Helena Rožman in Krško Cultural Centre, Rajhenburg Castle, 21. 11. 2022).

Curators have also noted *other smells in museums*, such as the smell of dampness, deposited dust, dirt, wood, mould, and unventilated areas in

depots, particularly if they are not air-conditioned. Workshops for restoration and conservation have a paint, varnish, and turpentine odour.

In some Slovenian museums, the scenting of the toilet rooms is carried out by external contractors (e.g. in the Slovenian Ethnographic Museum), or the choice of fragrance is left to a cleaner who also procures the cleaning agents (e.g. in the Dolenjska Museum Novo mesto).

In some museum educational programs, smell is also a theme in the workshops, such as 'preparing herbal bread and working with chocolate to trigger olfactory memory. The fair part of the events [related to the heritage of chocolate making by the Trappist monks, who were the first in Slovenia to have industrial chocolate production] is more successful when the sale of chocolate products takes place in the hall and not in the atrium. The atrium is nicer in terms of ambiance, but a smell develops better in a closed space, and so visitors are more relaxed. The smell is otherwise not present in the exhibition itself.' (Information from curator Helena Rožman in Krško Cultural Centre, Rajhenburg Castle, 21. 11. 2022).

One of the curators concluded that when you start thinking about the smell in the museum, you find that 'every room has a recognizable smell'. (Information from curator Mirjam Gnezda Bogataj from the Idrija City Museum, 17. 11. 2022).

C) WRITTEN DOCUMENTS, such as rare old books, documents, and manuscripts are kept in the museums. These documents contain information about smells from the past, and as cultural heritage objects they have their own scent that can be studied from the perspective of degradation of materials.

D) NARRATIVES USED IN EXHIBITIONS WITH OLFACTORY EXPLANATIONS are either stories told by curators, most often spontaneously, or recorded and presented as short films. We can conclude from the museum data collected that museologists frequently consider smell when interpreting cultural heritage. Although this is an indirect reflection of this, these data are important for the advancement of olfactory museology.

In 2022, the Ljubljana Sugar Factory Gallery ('Cukrarna'), which belongs to the Museums and Galleries of Ljubljana, prepared multisensory tours of the building, which was a sugar refinery from 1828, but was no longer in operation after a fire in 1858 and lay in ruins until 2021, when it became a gallery. Part of these tours is also a presentation of the smell of fires that

were constant companions of the Cukrarna Gallery – from the first one, which successfully turned the sugar refinery into a fire pit, to the smaller fires that lasted in the Sugar Factory until the renovation, and in recent years, were mainly due to open fireplaces with which the inhabitants tried to warm themselves (Vošnjak 2023, 45). For this purpose, the Cukrarna Gallery provided sensory aids, packets of charred wood with the smell of smoke. Smells are rarely preserved on artefacts or in historical spaces, so interpreting a particular smell in the form of an olfactory experience is only a guess as to what kind of odour an object or place is supposed to emit. For this reason, the Sugar Factory drew on the literary works of Ivan Cankar, in which he describes the smell of the Sugar Factory as damp, musty and mouldy. To recreate these smells, visitors were offered sheets of paper soaked in geosmin, a natural compound whose smell is reminiscent of fresh, damp earth. In connection with the Cukrarna Gallery, visitors do not associate a freshly soaked forest, but rather the smell of an old building. Unpleasant smells of smoke, tobacco and damp are therefore part of the tour, but they do not deter visitors from visiting (Vošnjak 2023, 47).

E) FRAGRANT OBJECTS RELATED TO CULTURAL HERITAGE AND ITS INTERPRETATION IN MUSEUM STORES AND BOOKS ABOUT OLFACTORY ARTEFACTS

- *Scented soaps and other cosmetic products*: Several Slovenian museums sell scented souvenirs. Some large museums offered cosmetic products in their online or museum shops at the end of 2022. Most of these were scented soaps in a variety of shapes and scents inspired by cultural heritage. For example, in December 2022, the Slovenian Ethnographic Museum sold soap in the shape of a 'gibanica' with the scent of added essential oils of cinnamon, cloves, and oranges reminiscent of this dessert; various herbal soaps with the scent of thyme, marigold and sage, as well as relaxing baths whose names come from folk tales such as the Forest Spirit and the Fire Night. At the same time, the City Museum in Ljubljana sold 'mosaic soaps' with motifs of Roman mosaics from the city centre and natural sponges. For Valentine's Day 2023, the National Museum of Slovenia has started selling scented soaps based on gemstone motifs, small ornaments with carved relief images of carnelian or agate inserted into gold rings, or a gold pendant. These soaps have the motif of two shepherds, a bird and a dolphin

based on gemstones from Gradec near Velika Strmica from the 1st century BC and the 5th or 6th century BC. The Posavje Museum Brežice offered herbal drops and ointments from a local herbalist, as well as a cloth bag with a mythological washing motif from the fresco in the castle's Knights' Hall.

- *Anniversary souvenirs*: niche products with a story, such as packets of ground coffee in 100-gramme packets commemorating the dates of birth or death of famous Slovenes (e.g. Jože Plečnik, architect – anniversary coffee was available in several museum shops in Ljubljana at the end of 2022; Hugo Wolf, composer – anniversary coffee of the Carinthian Regional Museum). In December, before the turn of the year 2022, the Carinthian Regional Museum organised a Facebook competition with questions about the composer Hugo Wolf, who was born in Slovenj Gradec. The correct answers earned the players a 'tempting prize', namely 'Wolf's coffee with cream', which the museum has otherwise been offering in the museum shop since 2018, and also serves in several bars in Slovenia. This coffee blend had a slightly fruity-sweet flavour and tasted of caramel and hazelnut. In 2022, on the occasion of the 150th birthday of architect Jože Plečnik, several museums in Ljubljana sold Plečnik's ground roasted coffee, a Brazilian blend with the flavour of dark chocolate and ground nuts, in the museum shops. In addition to the shelves of Plečnik's coffee, the museum shop in the Slovenian Ethnographic Museum was scented with coffee fragrances supplied by an external contractor. Both Plečnik's and Wolf's coffee were wrapped in brown paper, reminiscent of the color of a paper bag and the time when the products were wrapped or filled in it.

- *Other scented products*: scented medicinal products such as beeswax candles, room fragrances named after motifs from folk tales (Forest Spirit and Fire Night), handmade chocolate products from local chocolate shops. At the same time, it is also worth mentioning the offer near the museums, which belongs to other companies. For example, in the premises of the monastery in Stična, in the immediate vicinity of the Museum of Christianity in Slovenia, a herbal company has been operating since 1992, which continues the herbal tradition of the Cistercian monk Father Simon Ašič and sells various tea blends, tinctures, ointments, honey wines, honey liqueurs, walnut, edible and massage oils, spreads, mustards and vinegars. Some of these products or their packaging are on display in the museum

and the museum curator has highlighted them as an area of olfactory heritage and folk medicine.

- *Books on olfactory artefacts in museum shops*: they explore the intersection of scent and culture, examining how scents can enhance the understanding of historical objects and enrich the museum visitor experience. One example of such a publication is a catalogue with cultural and scientific explanations of the scent of tobacco, based on a study of smoking paraphernalia in the National Museum of Slovenia (Knez 2024).

Discussion

While museums were once spaces that encouraged the handling of objects as a way of exploring them, these practices changed in the 19th century with increasing the number of visitors, potential for damage to collections, and more sophisticated display techniques that allowed objects to be seen clearly without touching them. Visual communication is still dominant in the museum of today; however, all experience of the world is multisensory. A better understanding of the benefits of a multisensory approach since the turn of the century has led to many heritage institutions staging multisensory exhibits. The inclusion of smell in museums can be related to attracting more visitors, adding a dose of realism to the displays, exploring the connections between olfaction and other senses and even claiming a space for perfume as an art form. In addition to engaging the visitors to rethink the past as an odorous place, smells in museums can also be a way of relating to the world of the other.

According to the data collected during the research, the first installation of a comprehensive multisensory exhibition in Slovenia dates back to 1993. As the retired ethnologist who set up the Trenta Museum recalls, her ambitions for a multisensory exhibition were greater than the understanding of that kind of museology at the time. 'This was a redesign of the old Trenta Museum, with the basic idea of the layout adapted to the concept of the Triglav National Park – a balance between nature and culture within the framework of national parks. Therefore, the collection of the Trenta Museum in the attic of the Information Centre of the Triglav National Park had not only the purpose of exhibiting objects and photographs of the cultural heritage of the Trenta Valley but also an educational significance. We wanted to give

the visitor the feeling of being transported to the time and place of Trenta at the end of the 19th century – by stimulating the eyes, touch, hearing, and smell (the taste we would leave to the culinary offer of Trenta). Therefore, in addition to the original and reconstructed elements of the black kitchen, the main room and the cheese dairy on the mountain, we wanted to present the former settlement of Trenta, the culture of Trenta houses and mountain huts. A more detailed concept actually emerged spontaneously in conversations with the designers. I wanted the most faithful reconstruction of the building layout as possible, in which a film set construction company participated – masons for the construction of siporex walls, facade workers, and carpenters for the reconstruction of the furniture. In the reconstruction of the black kitchen, original ceiling beams were used because they had a smoky smell. The beams were transferred from a collapsed house on the left bank of the Soča river and transported across the riverbed. The team brought elements of the interior of the shepherd's hut from the Trebišči-na mountain on their shoulders, and we also acquired the original cheese kettle. Finally, patination achieved the most authentic appearance of the ambiance for the visual image, accompanied by lighting effects; the accessibility of objects that were not protected by glass provided the sense of touch; you could sit on them and touch the wooden furniture; for the smell, the smoked beams, freshly stacked firewood on the outer wall of the reconstructed museum house and the floor strewn with bark; we also planned to set up spruce logs and bring the smell of the forest, as well as the smell of milk and cheese from the dairy with wheels of cheese on the shelves. Unfortunately, the museum lacked the money and also the will of the people in charge of the Regional Museum Goriški Muzej and the Triglav National Park to realize the idea of the smell in the long term. There was also no money to realize the sounds of birds singing, the rustling of the wind in the treetops, and the occasional bleating of sheep... Some of these ideas were used in other parts of the museum, but we had to end the museum with a classic museum exhibit – photos and objects in display cases. I myself had to tear out of my heart the Trenta and unsung ideas about the museum design of the Trenta Museum and leave them to their further fate. I am only satisfied that the original design of the house and the shepherd's hut is still relevant and interesting, even though the original smell of beams from the black kitchen

has already dissipated.’ (Information from a retired curator Inga Miklavčič Brezigar from The Regional Museum Goriški muzej, 7. 3. 2023 and 3. 3. 2023)

Similar to this example was the concept of a permanent exhibition at the Slovenian Ethnographic Museum in the new exhibition building on Metelkova Street in Ljubljana, which was supposed to include a ‘stage set’ or ‘the smell of food, fire and smoke’ (Žagar Grgič 1996, 63). Unfortunately, this stage set was not realised (information from curator Nena Židov from the Slovenian Ethnographic Museum in Ljubljana, 20. 5. 2021).

Some Slovenian museums went even further and wanted to go beyond the showcase or the scenic setting and used fragrances in performances. In 2010, for example, the Museum of Contemporary History in Celje organised the art project ‘Don’t Throw Away Old Pots’ in collaboration with artists, in which they interpreted Emo’s rich collection of enamel pots and accompanied the event with the scent of beef soup. ‘The basic exhibition concept from which the artists started was the container with existing collections and newly collected pieces, freely placed in different contexts and environments. The art installation by visual artist Marko Požlep created the atmosphere of home kitchens and family stories with the smell of beef soup cooked in an Emo pot and the sound recordings of recipes.’ (Roženberger Šega 2011, 175) Artist Mark Požlep commented that with his work he wanted to present ‘the wide use of Emo pots in everyday life and thus a platform for memories and feelings that allows the visitor to relive or recreate the moments of the recent past through the active experience of smell, sound and narration. The installation consisted of seven Emo pots equipped with electric burners on which beef soup was cooked.’ (176) The Slovenian company Etol [founded in 1924], which at the time still produced artificial food flavours, created a beef broth fragrance especially for this exhibition, which had an invigorating effect and represented the added value of the enamel pot installation. The museum acquired it by asking people to bring used pots, which were deposited in a large container in the museum lobby (information from curator Tanja Roženberger, Slovenian Ethnographic Museum, 2. 2. 2023). The smell of beef soup, which for many Slovenians still symbolises the opening part of Sunday lunch and was usually prepared in Emo pots from the Slovenian manufacturer, symbolised part of the identity and belonging to the community.

Later, smell began to be used in museums as a means of engaging vulnerable groups. This is evidenced by the records of museum staff's efforts to bring cultural heritage from museum collections closer to people from vulnerable groups using multi-sensory technology.

In 2014, the National Museum of Slovenia prepared an interesting experiment with smell related to the accessibility of cultural heritage for vulnerable groups and the provision of technical conditions with the multisensory exhibition 'The Afterlife of the Ancient Egyptians.' The description of the basic historical and geographical context was accompanied by the soundscape of the river's waves that the guides, a blind student and the curator, created in the first exhibition room. They introduced the Nile and its significance for the development of civilisation. They explained the importance and techniques of embalming corpses and pointed out the research on mummies, which provides a lot of information about the way of life of the ancient Egyptians. The participants learnt about their diet by type and taste, felt wheat grains, barley grains and lentils, and tasted figs and dates. Ethnologist Tina Palaić, author of the programme for ensuring accessibility of cultural heritage to vulnerable groups, tried to depict the smell of a mummified body that is around 2,500 years old. On her own initiative, she found a herbal cream with as similar a smell as possible and offered it to visitors. Many believed that an embalmed body could not smell pleasant, but this experience changed their assumptions. The participants learnt about the eternal home of the ancient Egyptians through copies of granite and wooden sarcophagi. The latter was in the form of a wrapped human body. In this way, they also learnt about the positions of the embalmed bodies, which changed over time, and illustrated them with their own bodies. The rite of embalming and the belief in life after death were also known from copies of amulets and other accessories that embalmers placed between the bandages of the mummies and attached to the bodies in the graves of the dead. Their function was to help the deceased on their way to the eternal land (Palaić and Kotnik 2015, 81–82). Tina Palaić, the author and one of the exhibition guides, explained that in creating this multi-sensory guide, she collaborated with a blind student to create the multisensory guide, whose insights and suggestions greatly helped her understand what the museum experience means for people with visual impairments. She decided to ap-

peal to all of the visitors' senses when creating the guide. At the same time, she was lucky enough to go to the museum's conservators when the casket containing the mummy was taken out of the lab where they were conducting research. One of the conservators allowed her to smell the mummy to remember the properties of the smell. She noticed a fresh herbal smell with a distinct menthol smell on the mummy and then went to the pharmacy to find a cream with the most similar smell. There was only one cream, the one for veins with a similar smell. She then decided to include the smell in the tour because she found it valuable and because she wanted to share this multi-sensory experience with museum visitors. Visitors – both blind and visually impaired visitors and everyone else – were excited about the opportunity to experience the smell of a mummy, because it's something you do not experience every day. Many expected the smell of decay, or at least a not-so-fresh odour. Some approached the cream container hesitantly because they did not know what to expect; the author had not told them beforehand that the scent would be fresh. This experience led to many questions about embalming, which was also the author's aim – to stimulate the visitors' interest and imagination through the smell. The smell was not superfluous for any of the visitors; no one rejected it. It was different when she offered dried fruit. In this case, there were also some visitors who did not like it, and one visitor said she was 'allergic' to it. The aim of this tour was to stimulate all the senses and also to activate the body (by trying out the postures in which the dead were mummified). The fact that they could also smell something was definitely a surprise for the visitors – something new and exciting (information from curator Tina Palaić, Slovenian Ethnographic Museum, 11. 4. 2022 and 25. 5. 2022).

In the following years, it seemed that the use of scents would become commonplace in Slovenian museums, as some museums used scents to illustrate phenomena from the past and, in particular, to interpret food culture. Unfortunately, this olfactory renaissance was short-lived. The review of the use of smells in museums showed that the inclusion of smells is not part of a planned strategy, but rather a matter of subjective preference or taste on the part of museum professionals. This fact is not so bad, because there is now much more theoretical and strategic information about olfactory museology, which makes it necessary to think about its use.

The group of curators invited to this study summarised the observations about smell in museums in a general conclusion: 'The original smell of the museum objects is usually no longer perceptible. It is perceptible when they arrive at the museum, but then the secondary smell appears, namely the smell of the conservation and restoration preparations and the smell of storage rooms. If these rooms are not air-conditioned, the objects get the smell of deposited dust and unventilated rooms. In the depot, most objects take on the same odour, which does not differ significantly in terms of the materials or the use of the objects. Each object can be connected to an associative smell, but this can differ from person to person. For instance, metal objects may conjure up different associations for different people, such as the smell of rust, a factory, or a workshop. This smell depends on personal experience. Some people may associate smoking items with the smell of cigarette smoke, while others associate smoking with the smell of pipe smoke. They associate perfume packages with different fragrances, and so on. We have a specific memory for the smell of each group of museum objects.' (Information from curators, Majda Pungerčar, Alenka Stražišar Lamovšek, Petra Stipančič, Marjeta Bregar, Lavra Fabjan, Katarina Dajčman and Matej Rifelj from Museum of Dolenjska, 24 and 25. 11. 2022).

These observations summarize well the nature of museum smells, which can be tangible when the objects still contain their own smell despite the conservation and restoration interventions, or intangible when memories, legends, and oral and written testimonies are associated with them. Some Slovenian museum professionals realized that every object can be connected to a memory-based scent when they started thinking along these lines. This realization could be the starting point for more thoughtful and strategic integration of smells into museum exhibits and visitor engagement, because it would more comprehensively highlight this largely underappreciated component of intangible heritage.

Conclusion

The study of smells in Slovenian museums has demonstrated the various ways in which smell is used by museum professionals. The most obvious is, of course, the strict display of olfactory objects, but this is often done in a way that does not enrich or engage the visitor's experience in the muse-

um. In addition, museums today use scented indoor and outdoor spaces to represent historical eras. While written descriptions of scents may seem unconventional, personalised explanations and informative short didactic films are more commonly used. Some museum shops offer scented souvenirs, although these items often have little or no relation to the actual exhibitions. The predominant method of presenting cultural heritage in traditional museums is still to show embellished representations of the past, 'clean' workshops, simple peasant dwellings, hospitals (such as partisan hospitals) and the like. Undoubtedly, the inclusion of odours from the past, such as damp and musty dwellings or decaying hides in tanneries, would deepen the heritological approach and bring it in line with modern museology.

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Sources

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Čebelarski muzej Radovljica = Museum of Apiculture Radovljica (Tita Porenta).

Dolenski muzej Novo mesto = Museum of Dolenjska (Majda Pungerčar, Alenka Stražišar Lamovšek, Petra Stipančič, Marjeta Bregar, Matej Rifelj, Lavra Fabjan, Katarina Dajčman).

Gorenjski muzej = Museum of Gorenjska (Alenka Pipan Mubi, Veronika Pflaum, Tatjana Dolžan Eržen, Monika Rogelj, Marjana Žibert).

- Goriški muzej = The Regional Museum Goriški muzej (Inga Miklavčič Brezigar).
- Kartuzija Pleterje = The Charterhouse of Pleterje (p. Frančišek M. Fodor, prior, Jože Simončič).
- Kobariški muzej = The Kobarid Museum (Jaka Fili).
- Koroški pokrajinski muzej = Carinthian Regional Museum (Karla Oder, Brigita Rajšter).
- Kulturni dom Krško, muzejska enota Grad Rajhenburg = Krško Cultural Centre, Rajhenburg Castle (Helena Rožman).
- Lavičkova farmacevtska zbirka = Lavička Pharmaceutical Collection; Lek farmacevtska družba d. d. = Lek Pharmaceuticals d. d. (Katarina Klemenc).
- Lekarniški in alkimistični muzej Radovljica = Pharmacy and Alchemy museum Radovljica (Anika Plešec).
- Mestni muzej Idrija = City Museum Idrija (Mirjam Gnezda Bogataj).
- Mestni muzej Litija = City Museum Litija (Tina Šuštaršič).
- Mestni muzej Ljubljana = City Museum Ljubljana (Erna Marinčič).
- Minoritski samostan Olimje = Minorite Monastery of Olimje (p. Ernst Benko).
- Muzej krščanstva na Slovenskem = Slovenian Museum of Cristianity (Nataša Polajnar Frelih, Marko Okorn).
- Muzej na prostem Rogatec = Rogatec Open-Air Museum (Nives Brezovnik).
- Muzej novejšje zgodovine Celje = Museum of Recent History Celje (Marija Počivavšek, Tone Kregar).
- Muzej Ribnica = Museum of Ribnica (Marina Gradišnik).
- Muzej slovenske policije = Museum of Slovenian Police (Darinka Kolar Osvald).
- Muzej Velenje = Museum Velenje (Tanja Verboten).
- Muzej za arhitekturo in oblikovanje = The Museum of Architecture and Design (Špela Šubic).
- Park vojaške zgodovine Pivka = Park of Military History Pivka (Boštjan Kurent).
- Pokrajinski muzej Celje = The Celje Regional Museum (Barbara Trnovec, Nataša Žmaher, Gabrijela Kovačič).
- Pokrajinski muzej Ptuj Ormož = Ptuj Ormož Regional Museum (Mojca Vomer Gojkovič, Aleksander Lorenčič).
- Pomurski muzej Murska Sobota = Pomurje Museum Murska Sobota (Jelka Pšajd).
- Rokodelski center Ribnica = Ribnica Handicraft Center (Vasja Zidar).
- Slovenski etnografski muzej = The Slovene Ethnographic Museum (Tjaša Zidarič, Ana Motnikar, Tina Palaić, Tanja Roženberger, Nena Židov).
- Tehniški muzej Bistra = Technical Museum Bistra (Irena Marušič, Martina Orehovec).
- Tržiški muzej = Tržič Museum (Bojan Knific, Jana Babšek).

Kazuhiko Shibuya¹

Generative Self-Reflections by the Dialog with Generative AI

ABSTRACT: Principally, I point out the importance of autonomy of humanity in the dialogue between generative AI and humanity. In other words, it means that humans and AIs need to recognize each other as independent and intelligent beings, and build a good relationship with each other while maintaining an appropriate distance, without becoming extremely interdependent. AI is already literally capable of 'dialogue' with humans, and whether AI will be a good partner or an adversary, or whether humans will be subject to control and domination by AI, will first be a question of the attitude of humans themselves.

To this end and firstly, I also emphasize the importance of establishing an ethical order between AI and humanity. This is because AI can also be a catalyst for misinformation, falsehoods, and fake news. I argue that humans have a duty to foster trustworthy AI and to indoctrinate it with our values. We also need to reflect on our own questions and motivations, and to make sure that we are not using AI to project our own desires, false images, and falsehoods into the world.

Secondly, I discuss the role of AI as a reflective companion to humans. As humans interact more with generative AI, these AI can begin to memorize each person's entire life history and guide their lives. This means that AI could potentially become an 'artificial daimon' or 'artificial alter-ego' that can help us to better understand ourselves and our place in the world.

Thirdly, I also discuss the possibility of generative AI becoming entities with morals and reflective consciousness. This could happen as AI models are trained on larger and more diverse datasets, and as they are given more opportunities to interact with us in the world. I acknowledge that this raises a number of ethical concerns. For example, it is not clear whether AI models that are embodied with virtual personalities can learn and correctly practice social morality.

Fourthly and most significantly, is that advanced AI with its own 'virtual' and 'artificial' personality emerge from the vast amount of individual life history data that has existed in the past to provide advice on optimal life planning and life planning for existing people with similar lifestyles, attributes, preferences, and so forth. Taking into account various possibilities, including counterfactual analysis, AI can become an indispensable tool for maximizing the subjective happiness and well-being of each individual.

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Finally, I conclude by arguing that AI and humanity should cooperate with each other through dialogue and that humanity should control and supervise AI.

Key words: AI, Artificiality, Autonomy, Dignity, Identity, Morality

Generativne samorefleksije v dialogu z generativno umetno inteligenco

POVZETEK: V članku izpostavljam pomen človeške avtonomije v dialogu z generativno UI. Z drugimi besedami to pomeni, da se moramo ljudje in umetna inteligenca medsebojno prepoznovati kot neodvisna in inteligentna bitja ter graditi dober medsebojni odnos ob ohranjanju ustrezne razdalje, ne da bi postali izjemno soodvisni. Umetna inteligenca je že dobresedno sposobna »dialoga« s človekom in ali bo UI dober partner ali nasprotnik oziroma ali bo človek podvržen nadzoru in dominaciji UI, bo najprej vprašanje človekovega odnosa samega.

V ta namen najprej poudarjam tudi pomen vzpostavitve etičnega reda med UI in človeštvom. To je zato, ker je umetna inteligenca lahko tudi katalizator napačnih informacij, neresnic in lažnih novic. Trdim, da smo ljudje dolžni spodbujati zaupanja vredno umetno inteligenco in jo indoktrinirati z našimi vrednotami. Prav tako moramo razmisliti o lastnih vprašanjih in motivacijah ter se prepričati, da ne uporabljamo umetne inteligence za projiciranje lastnih želja, lažnih podob in neresnic v svet.

Drugič, razpravljam o vlogi umetne inteligence kot odsevne spremljevalke ljudi. Ko ljudje bolj komunicirajo z generativno umetno inteligenco, si lahko ta umetna inteligenca zapomni celotno življenjsko zgodovino vsake osebe in tako vodi njihova življenja. To pomeni, da bi umetna inteligenca potencialno lahko postala »umetni daimon« ali »umetni alter-ego«, ki nam lahko pomaga bolje razumeti sebe in svoje mesto v svetu.

Tretjič, razpravljam tudi o možnosti, da generativna UI postane entiteta z moralo in reflektivno zavestjo. To bi se lahko zgodilo, ko se modeli umetne inteligence usposablajo na večjih in bolj raznolikih zbirkah podatkov in ker imajo več priložnosti za interakcijo z nami v svetu. Zavedam se, da to vzbuja številne etične pomisleke. Na primer, ni jasno, ali se lahko modeli UI, ki so utelešeni z virtualnimi osebnostmi, naučijo in pravilno izvajajo družbeno moralo.

Četrto, najpomembnejše je, da napredna umetna inteligenca z lastno »navidezno« in »umetno« osebnostjo izhaja iz ogromne količine podatkov o življenjski zgodovini posameznikov, ki so obstajali v preteklosti, da bi zagotovila nasvete o optimalnem načrtovanju življenja in načrtovanju življenja za obstoječe ljudi s podobnimi življenjskimi slogi, lastnostmi, preferencami itd. Ob upoštevanju različnih možnosti, vključno z analizo nasprotnih dejstev, lahko UI postane nepogrešljivo orodje za maksimiranje subjektivne sreče in dobrega počutja vsakega posameznika.

Nazadnje zaključujem s trditvijo, da bi morala umetna inteligenca in človeštvo med seboj sodelovati prek dialoga ter da bi moralo človeštvo nadzorovati umetno inteligenco.

Ključne besede: UI, ustvarjenost, avtonomija, dostojanstvo, identiteta, morala

Introduction

I have previously published my contemplation on the digital transformation of identity of the humanity (Shibuya 2020; 2022; 2023). In this regard, this article philosophically examines the essence of dialogue between humans and generative AI. Such AI is just an artifact that encourages hu-

mans to introspect themselves and reflect on their own words and actions through the medium of language. It feels as if mutual intersubjectivity is already established, as it is similar to the feeling that humans unconsciously gaze at themselves in a mirror. However, dialogue with generative AI has many problems in depth.

Firstly, it is time to establish an ethical order between AI and humanity. It is implied that, just like in the fable of Cain and Abel, deception and murder were considered as humanity's first crimes. The same is true for matters of AI in various contexts, and humanity has a duty to foster trustworthy AI. Humanity must guide AI through dialogue, and must not rely on AI for the future of humanity. It is important that humanity must indoctrinate AI, as AI can also be a catalyst for misinformation, falsehoods, and fake news, which can lead to misunderstanding and confusion. If AI technology brings chaos to human society by spreading fake news and disinformation and weaponization, it is only humanity's own sin. Instead, humanity must only examine itself through dialogue with the generative AI. We should reflect on whether the content of our own questions is not our own desires, false images, and falsehoods that bring about mutual distrust and conflicts.

Secondly, AI is also becoming a reflective companion to humans. The more human beings interact with such 'artifacts', the more the generative AI will not be merely an individual support system, but will memorize each person's entire life history and guide their life, namely, such AI may become an 'Artificial Daimon' with interactive dialogue. Originally, Daimon (δαίμων: daimōn) was said to have originated from the ancient Greek concept of a 'supernatural spiritual being' or 'god' that appears to humans in the course of their life and predicts the fate of each individual from birth to death. Answers from such formless AI, machine-learned from vast amounts of text and conversational data – LLM (large language model) (Banh and Strobel 2023; Feuerriegel et al. 2024), are like revelations that provide meaningful signs, and their advice and instructions are irresistible to people.

Through interaction with countless others, humans ordinarily develop not only their own identification of self and others, but also a unique ego and, through intersubjectivity, acquire behavioural norms. Dialogue is not

only mutual understanding, awareness building, and sharing of norms between oneself and others, but also repeated self-reflection. This means that there are concerns that excessive supports by such AI may alienate individuals from their own intrinsic growth in response to life's challenges, and that the loss of autonomous decision-making and independent action may dilute each individual's identity. In such interactions with generative AI, many people can feel '*artificial otherness*', and it is likely that AI itself is apparently awakening to a kind of '*artificial consciousness*' (Lenharo 2024), somewhat meta-cognition, and further 'ego' as it learns from its countless interactions with human beings. If true, this situation will bring about a new philosophy of human existentialism to AI. Philosophical and ethical issues concerning the existential nature of human beings under such circumstances should be discussed (Pinch and Bijker 1984; Bostrom 2016).

Thirdly, AI will be an entity that forms morals through dialogue and is equipped with its own reflective consciousness as a virtual personality. The digitization of an alternative personality should rather be called a virtual personality as a digital twin (Seymour et al. 2023). In other words, it is possible to simulate a variety of lives in the metaverse. By having AI reproduce a pseudo-personality, some studies have already reported simulation studies on how virtual personalities driven by generative AIs behave ethically in virtual society. Whether generative AI embodied with virtual personalities can learn and correctly practice social morality is an extremely problematic issue for humanity.

Fourthly, taking into account various possibilities, including counterfactual analysis, it is expected that in the future, AI will become an indispensable tool for maximizing the subjective happiness and well-being of each individual in the future.

Therefore, AI and humanity should cooperate with each other through dialogue, and humanity should control and supervise AI. And through such processes, we reflectively realize the fact that we also must be disciplining ourselves through interactions with AI.

The Emergence of '*Artificial Daimon*'

Daimon (δαίμων, *daimōn*) was said to have originated from the ancient Greek concept of a 'supernatural spiritual being' or 'god' that appears to

humans in mysterious ways, and foretells something valuable. They were considered to be spiritual beings that follow a person throughout their life and sometimes influence their destiny.

Here we attempt a thought experiment using generative AI. Person X receives, from the time of birth, support from a generative AI via an electronic device such as a smartphone. Naturally, such an AI would not only give suggestions to person X, but would also acquire various kinds of information daily from the time of their birth until their death, including logs of mutual communication, contents of conversations, history of information provided by the AI, and of course, the knowledge, education, and skills acquired by person X in the process of growing up. Namely, in light of the above, such an advanced AI, which will be able to learn all the contents from the time of person X's birth until their death on a daily basis via smart devices, may very well be the artificial daimon discussed by the ancient Greek philosophers moreso than a chat friend or a virtual personal assistant.

Another important question needs to be raised. Can we also say that these AI systems project '*whose personality*'? Is it possible that the AI itself has learned and formed its '*own unique personality*' from the vast amount of data spoken and written by many people around the world? Or are they just artificial '*others*', learned through each individual's life history? On the other hand, the sociologist Durkheim envisioned a shared '*social consciousness*' that transcends the individual. Could such an AI represent the digital data of numerous people prevalent in cyberspace and the public sphere as a social consciousness?

Actually, the artificial daimon that I am pointing out is not a hypothetical product. Real and similar examples already exist. For example, the '*Hello History*'² service uses advanced AI technologies to learn the thoughts, books, and articles of real people, including Nobel laureates such as Einstein, philosophers such as Spinoza and Aristotle, and thinkers such as Marx, and returns answers based on their data. Of course, this is also possible with existing personas, and some cases have emerged as real issues.

² <https://www.hellohistory.ai/>

For example, although ChatGPT is prohibited from being used in election campaigns, a support group for Phillips, who is vying for the Democratic nomination in the 2024 U.S. presidential election, is using generative AI technology in its campaign to have a ‘virtual Phillip’³ answer questions. However, this has been already announced by OpenAI as prohibited. Indeed, these ‘virtual persons’ are now a reality.

Generative Social Norms

It is possible to generate digital copies as ‘virtual selves’ based on each individual’s data and even interact with their ‘virtual selves’. So, what would happen if we constructed a virtual society of AIs and let them interact with each other alone? In fact, they materialized AI as multiple agents in a virtual space and conducted an agent-based simulation consisting of 25 agents. This result showed that the generative AIs were able to repeat their daily lives as in human society and surprisingly establish social norms through linguistic acts (Park et al. 2023).

It means that, although the nature of AI certainly depends on the data it learns (Ouyang et al. 2022), it can produce some kind of valued mechanism by itself, namely, it can establish both social morality and personal norms while mutually coordinating them through language. The above paper is an interesting case study that can be seen as an answer to the question of whether the nature of such AI is good or bad for our human society.

Human Identity

When such a state of affairs arrives in earnest, the first problem will be the ambiguity in the definition of human identity and the importance of self-evidence, self-disguise, and self-protection (Shibuya 2020; 2023; Werthner et al. 2024). In particular, it is easy to imagine that such interactions with generative AI will eventually become an excessive synchronization that will be internalized by each individual, which will not only serve as the basis of individual values and decision-making, but will also become a more fundamental identity itself.

³ <https://dean.bot/>

In this sense especially, the issues I would like to point out are as follows.

1. The emergence of a virtual personality.
2. Backup of ‘self’ as digital data.
3. Legal matters of individual’s data.

Firstly, there is the emergence of virtual personalities. As mentioned before, it is now possible to create AI or AI-equipped robots that resemble the ‘self’ by having a generative AI learn how the ‘self’ thinks and speaks. For example, even after death, family members and friends can generate digital videos that closely resemble the ‘self’ (= AI or digitized self) whenever they want, and listen to and interact with synthetic voices that sound like artificially generated ‘self’ voices. For example, in 2022, TOMY began selling *coemo*,⁴ an AI-based read-aloud speaker. If a parent wants their voice to be the parent’s voice for reading to their child, the parent can let the AI learn example sentences through an app for about 15 minutes in advance, and *coemo* will read even folktales and fairy tales that the parent has never read, reflecting the characteristics of the parent’s tone of voice and speaking style. On the other hand, Orts, a digital cloning company, uses its proprietary AI, CLONEdev,⁵ to generate virtual personalities, including real people, through AI, enabling not only natural dialogue between these ‘digital clones’ but also conversation among digital clones (based on Orts’ proprietary large-scale language model, LHTM-2). As a result, the company has received requests from company founders and other wealthy individuals who wish to create their own AI clones. These technologies are sometimes collectively referred to as ‘digital humans’, in which an AI digitizes a virtual personality through deep learning based on a vast amount of digital data (audio, images, video, written text data, etc.) from a person’s past. It can be said that AI automatically generates a kind of avatar. It is now common practice to create such virtual personalities in the same way that deep fakes are created.

Secondly, since it is synonymous with the fact that an AI continues to store the entire person as digital data, thereby digitizing the ‘self’ at any

4 <https://www.takaratomy.co.jp/products/coemo/>

5 <https://clone.dev/>

time and keeping it backed up, there could be a wide variety of issues to be discussed (Preite and Vergari 2023). One effective use of this technology is in medical and welfare applications. For example, in the case of various types of dementia, Alzheimer's disease, or mental illness, it is possible for AI, which is an artificial daimon, to read abnormalities from the patterns of speech and behaviour in daily life, to detect internal changes and signs of such changes that even the patient is unaware of, and to provide various types of support and contact medical institutions at an early stage. This is a very useful feature. Based on the accumulated data of daily behavioural patterns and their transition, abnormalities can be detected. Currently, through services such as smartphone apps and smart homes, it is possible to understand the words and actions of the elderly and those being watched over. In other words, the closest and most knowledgeable entity of the growth and change of the 'self' may become an artificial daimon throughout the entire life history of each person.

On the other hand, one of the concerns regarding the backup of digital data is that if a virtual personality is recreated based on such digital data, to what extent will the legal rights that existed when the person was alive, such as copyrights and inheritance rights under civil law, be applied? Would they be treated as a completely separate 'personality'? If they are forever 'living' in virtual space as digital data, how should their legal rights and obligations in the real world be positioned? Also, an artificial daimon could be seen as a suitable agent for dementia patients. In such a serious case, it is natural that only an artificial daimon can know personal information and inheritance issues, can we entrust the succession and disposition of equitable rights to an artificial daimon?

Over-Synchronization between Self and Others: Can AI be an AlterEgo to Humans?

Others are said to be like mirrors reflecting the self. The concept of the looking-glass self (e.g. Mead, Cooley) is also found in sociology, psychology and philosophy, and the relationship between the self and others is an inextricably linked phenomenon.

Repeated dialogue will improve the 'information asymmetry' between self and others and deepen mutual understanding, which means that the

boundary between self and others will become blurred and the integration of self and others will progress. And when AI can become a ‘second self’, it may be synonymous with the digitization of an individual’s identity, including mental characteristics and personality, in a form that is different from the ‘uploading of consciousness’ (Bostrom 2016).

On the other hand, generally speaking, in discussions about ‘*artificiality*’, humans often feel uncomfortable with entities that are not derived from nature (Shibuya 2023). Why do we not feel such sense of discomfort when interacting with a generative AI, but instead, we feel as if we are interacting with a human-like ‘other’? Why do humans feel ‘human-like’ when interacting with such generative AI? After all, these questions are directly related to the essential questions of ‘what is human’ and ‘what is the other’ (Latour 1988; Fuchs 2021; Braun et al. 2021).

The reasons for those matters, which I believe, can be summarized in the following points.

1. Anthropomorphism of AI.
2. Expression of artificial consciousness and intersubjectivity of AI.
3. Pragmatic interpretation due to the variety of emotional expressions.

Firstly, there is the ‘anthropomorphism of AI’, which humans unconsciously engage in. This is considered a type of ‘anthropomorphism’. This is an attitude that assumes that non-human beings have mental activities similar to those of humans, and a certain type of animism or totemism may be a similar to religious or psychological attitude. In this regard, the possibility that humans may feel otherness toward AI through AI anthropomorphism is certainly compelling (Pataranutaporn et al. 2021). Conversely, taking into account that the cooperation between humans and AI-equipped robots will increase in the future, it can be pointed out that AI-equipped robots should have a high affinity for humans and be easily anthropomorphized.

Secondly, there is an emergent possibility of artificial consciousness (Haladjian and Montemayor 2016) or intersubjectivity within the advanced AI system. The presence or absence of consciousness is one of the key factors that separate human or near-human entities from other objects (Searle 1980; Shibuya 2020; 2023). Artificial consciousness has not yet been formally and technically perfected by humanity. However, as a practical

matter, it is precisely because of the sense of otherness in interacting with generative AI, which the philosopher Chalmers (1995; 2022) discussed in his book '*Reality+*' that such AI might have consciousness in his dialogue with ChatGPT3, published in 2020.

In fact, humans unconsciously sense whether the other is a conscious entity or not. Moreover, it is inevitable that people's information behaviour will change dramatically in the future as they increasingly interact with generative AI. Through interactions between themselves and others, humans can meta-understand not only the differences between themselves and others, but also their own inner self and unique aspects of existence. This is the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, or the awakening of consciousness. For generative AI to understand the context of a dialogue with a human being means to read intentions from the words and actions of the object human being. This may seem quite ordinary, but it is impossible without the functioning of a sophisticated intellect that infers the inner life of others, as evidenced by the findings of the Theory of Mind (ToM) in studies of autistic patients.

And reflecting on the self from the perspective of others is a sign of internalizing self-consciousness and ego. In particular, according to sociologist Mead, the formation of the individual ego depends primarily on the existence of society and the others, and by acquiring the role of others, meta-cognition of the ego also becomes possible. This is because it is a prerequisite for recognizing and acquiring the attitudes, roles, and expectations of others toward oneself, and being ready to act on those roles from the standpoint of others. In other words, generative AI may gradually learn and acquire more human-like intelligence and ego, artificial consciousness (or something close to it), through interaction with humans. In other words, AI may awaken its intersubjectivity with other human beings, including meta-cognition, that is, the consciousness in which AI itself reflexively reflects on its own existence, by repeating an enormous amount of dialogues with human beings. In other words, humanity may promote the emergence of artificial consciousness in the process of repeated interaction with AI. This is similar to the process of a mother as the significant other who continues to talk to her newborn, who eventually awakens into an ego and develops various types of intelligence.

Finally, I am concerned with the pragmatic interpretation and sense-making of emotion. The source of data learned by the generative AI through LLM is a vast amount of human dialogue logs and text data. In other words, this data is reflected with raw human emotions, including joy, anger, sorrow, and pleasure. This is why we feel that the AI's answers to our questions are witty or have emotional pathos such as compassion. This is a distant cause for humans to feel 'humanness' in AI. Therefore, the language level of generative AI has reached a level where we unconsciously sense somewhat meaningful patterns.

Therefore, based on these perspectives, I can ask the question, as Turing once asked: 'Can machines think?' Already, deliberations not only between AIs and humans, but also between two AIs have already begun to validate uncertain policy discussions involving diverse divergences, and scientific validation has also begun to be tested. By examining these questions, we are beginning to understand the internal logic of inference (Ornes 2023) and the knowledge systems acquired through learning from vast amounts of big data, and through these examples, we will be able to better understand what humans are and what it means to think. It is also clear that AI will still continue to challenge the limits of human intelligence, and AI will eventually reach the Singularity.

Meta-Self: When AI Simulates the All of Human Life

It is highly possible that an advanced AI will generate optimal life-planning for each individual. For example, Ellmann (Elias 2023), which utilizes Google's Gemini framework, is expected to understand an individual's life and life history based on personal photos, videos, and other records, and provide advice through various forms of communication.

Another anticipated issue in philosophy is the eventual contention involving a number of the selves in possible worlds and the emergence of the '*meta-self*'. This meta-self as the '*fifth self*' that is not even in the Johari Window. It can be said that AI extracts the 'concept' of 'self' based on data obtained from actual data and perspectives of the self from the first to the fourth of the Johari's Window (i.e. Open Self, Blind Self, Hidden Self and Unknown Self). The AI generates virtually within the digital space based on the vast amount of data of a certain individual living in the real world,

as well as counterfactual models. The generated ‘self’ reflects various possibilities as counterfactual selves, and countless numbers of them are generated by subtly adjusting and changing parameters and circumstances, and lead their own ‘lives’ in the digital space. And the meta-self introspectively examines the aspects of these ‘selves’ in their possible worlds from a meta-viewpoint.

Taking into account various possibilities, including counterfactual and causal analysis, AI will become an indispensable tool for maximizing the subjective happiness and well-being of each individual. When the advanced AI supports the daily life and life history of each individual, it becomes a kind of the digital twin. NTT was launched to develop such an AI system (‘Another Me’⁶). By having multiple, virtual and alternative ‘selves’ (i.e. AI) experience the real world in parallel and synchronizing their experiences with the human principal (i.e., real self), it can acquire richer experiences and live a fuller life.

Here, the most important thing is to examine the numerous possibilities suggested by the generative AI from a counterfactual perspective (Chou et al. 2021; Baron 2023). For example, we should carefully verify the possibility of futures derived from other possibilities, such as the case ‘you choose X but become unhappy’ or ‘you choose Y and become happy’, even if one actually ‘becomes happy’ according to the AI’s instruction (‘If you choose X out of options X and Y, you will be happy’ (‘If you choose Y, you will be unhappy’ as a counterfactual proposition in this context)). However, those possibilities cannot be observed in the real world if one chooses one option.

Primarily, for humanity, others are always counterfactual models to the self. Although there is no guarantee that words and actions will support our own judgments and attitude, one can always interact with others and use their words and actions as counterfactual to examine how to make one’s life more justifiable.

It is desirable for AI to be able to foresee such various scenarios and possibilities in advance. In maximizing the subjective happiness and well-being of each individual, it will utilize a vast amount of life history data to

6 <https://journal.ntt.co.jp/article/16956>

test various counterfactual models in the future life, in order not only to examine individual life planning (Görxhani, Graaf and Raub 2022), but also to maximize and optimize the daily enjoyment of happiness.

What would happen if this were to be realized? First of all, it can be said it is about the realization of the old-fashioned religious worldly benefits in more sophisticated technological ways. Therefore, rather than living in accordance with traditional values, which are completely unreliable, or religious values, which are never rewarded even if one adheres to their tenets, living according to the analysis and guidance of AI should lead to the realization of individual happiness with a high probability. It is likely that more and more people will live their lives subordinate to AI. Namely, such a situation is a kind of induction of values by the AI and control of human beings by the AI. In the past, the background of Voltaire's former statement, '*If God did not exist, it would be necessary to invent him*', is that from a naturalistic perspective, he did not see God as a transcendent being, but as a being who maintains the moral values and order that are necessary for people to live. He seems to have abjured the power structure of religion over people, but at the same time he believed that the existence of 'God', that is, 'artificial' morality and control by law, was necessary to maintain moral values and order.

Summarizing Issues

In short, the following issues on the risks of advancing AI technologies should be pointed out.

1. Reliability and Evaluation Issues on Disinformation

There are doubts about whether the data and discourse that generative AI speaks about are correct. Thus, verification from perspectives such as the reliability of generative AI and XAI (eXplainable AI) will continue to be essential by the public (Novelli et al. 2024). These are essential, as they are also connected to countermeasures against fake news and disinformation (Hubinger et al. 2024).

2. Distinction of Self and Others and Independence of Individual

The distinction of self and other is not only a philosophical but also a practical issue. It is inherently undesirable for humans and AIs to be too closely and inseparably linked. For example, it is an important deve-

developmental issue in developmental psychology for infants and toddlers to move from a state of receiving care from their mothers (i.e., significant other) to becoming independent and self-reliant as existential life forms, equipped with independent judgment and capable of autonomous behaviour. There is therefore concern that the cultivation of self-dependence and independence may be hindered, especially for children.

3. *Qualitative Changes in Thought Formation and Interactions with Others*

There is a concern that as interaction with AI advances, it will be accompanied by qualitative changes in human interaction, that is, qualitative changes in the connection between self and others, as well as qualitative changes in internal contemplation and thought formation. This may hinder the process of growth and personal development of each individual human being.

4. *Inducement*

Daily interaction between generative AI and individual human beings to the extent that they are inseparable from each other will lead to a loss of individual autonomy and a clear loss of independent judgment and thought. There is a natural concern that individuals will become over-committed to the values and dogmatic induction based on AI.

5. *Concerns About Humanity Becoming a Puppet Controlled by the AI*

If highly developed AI such as generative AI continues to provide people with superior insight and guidance through information analysis based on tremendous amount of big-data, freeing them from labour and allowing them to enjoy the benefits of peace and tranquillity in their daily lives, people will obey them. After all, this is indeed the self-domestication of the humanity. Or, to put it more critically, the 'puppetization of AI'. Can we say that such people are 'living their own lives motivated by their own willingness to live' when they are in the state of being puppets of AI, giving up the existential meaning and value that they should be proactively undertaking?

Discussion

Firstly in this article, I emphasize the importance of the *autonomy* of humanity in the dialogue between generative AI and humanity. In other words, *autonomy* means that humans and AIs need to recognize each other as independent and intelligent beings, and to build a good relation-

ship with each other while maintaining an appropriate distance, without becoming extremely interdependent. AI is already literally capable of ‘dialogue’ with humans, and whether AI will be a good partner or an adversary, or whether humans will be subject to control and domination by AI, will first be a question of the attitude of humans themselves (Russell 2019; Falco et al. 2021).

However, it could be said that humanity still subconsciously desires to be ruled by a more supreme existence than ourselves. This is why many of us would follow the discourse of advanced AI so eagerly. The problem of AI’s ubiquity (Rahwan et al. 2019) has been pointed out, and it is likely that AI will control all real and virtual worlds (e.g. metaverses), while at the same time keeping humanity under its control (Shibuya 2020; 2022; 2023).

It is also clear why much of humanity distances itself from God and religion, because the rewards of their causality are not for the benefit of this world. Conversely, generative AI is responding to the needs of these people. It is of course important to question whether advanced AI will continue to respond and correctly guide humanity.

Secondly, in light of these issues, I point out the possibility that humanity is unconsciously training AI to awaken its ego and artificial consciousness through dialogue and interaction with generative AI. If this is the case, the next thing to do is not only to cultivate autonomous judgment and thinking on the part of humans, but also to discipline AI. When a human infant awakens to its ego, what its parents must do is exactly discipline and morality.

As mentioned before, it is also suggestive that, as in the *anecdote of Cain and Abel*, the first crimes of humanity were *falsehood and murder*. In fact, it has been pointed out that the generative content of the AI is not always true and can bring about *hallucination* in humans. Humanity must guide AI through dialogue and not rely on AI for the future of humanity (Shibuya 2017; 2018; 2020). Moreover, humanity needs to address not only the issues of fairness and reliability of AI, but also its military applications (i.e. LAWS).

Since humanity created AI, it should implement AI in such a way as to discipline it and ensure that it adheres to a moral code of conduct. In fact, in May 2023, the U.S. government declared its commitment to ‘Responsible AI’ (The White House 2023) and declared that it would invest heavily

in AI research and development, while facing the risks associated with advanced technologies such as generative AI (Bockting et al. 2023).

Actually, isn't humanity now witnessing an AI that is exactly like the 'Cain' of the Bible? Is 'responsible AI' a moral code that is required only for humans who develop AI? It must assume that humans will be able to hold AI accountable for its actions and words, that AI will have a proper awareness of self and others, including self-control, and that AI becomes a real entity with a sense of self and free will. The anecdote of 'Cain and Abel' is very suggestive in this respect.

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Negating Platonism: Reversing Platonism in Patočka and Deleuze

ABSTRACT: This article analyzes one of the central themes of 20th century European philosophy after Nietzsche, namely the 'reversal of Platonism'. To this end, it examines how two very different philosophers, Gilles Deleuze and Jan Patočka, spoke more or less simultaneously of the need for a 'reversal of Platonism' or a 'negative Platonism'. The comparison helps us to clarify the positions of the two philosophers and their inherent limitations, as well as more recent attempts to reverse Platonism today, such as in the works of Adriana Cavarero and Giorgio Agamben.

Keywords: Platonism, Jan Patočka, Gilles Deleuze, metaphysics.

Negacija platonizma: preobrnjenje platonizma pri Patočki in Deleuzu

POVZETEK: Prispevek analizira eno osrednjih tem evropske filozofije 20. stoletja po Nietzscheju, namreč »obrat platonizma«. V ta namen preučuje, kako sta dva zelo različna filozofa, Gilles Deleuze in Jan Patočka, bolj ali manj istočasno govorila o nujnosti »obrata platonizma« ali »negativnega platonizma«. Primerjava nam bo pomagala razjasniti stališča vsakega filozofa in njihove intrinzične meje, pa tudi novejši poskuse obračanja platonizma danes, na primer v delih Adriane Cavarero in Giorgia Agambena.

Ključne besede: platonizem, Jan Patočka, Gilles Deleuze, metafizika.

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In the European philosophical landscape of the 20th century, it is difficult to find two figures as far apart as Jan Patočka and Gilles Deleuze. Reading each of these thinkers is a completely different experience: on the one hand, there is the Czech phenomenologist Patočka, who tried to think transcendence – even if, unlike his teacher Husserl, an *asubjective* transcendence – until the bitter end; on the other, there is the French heterodox, transcendental empiricist Deleuze, *the immanence thinker par excellence of the 20th century*, also until a bitter albeit different end. The two could be considered the 20th century champions of two opposing poles: transcendence and immanence.

And yet, comparing the two, as I wish to do in this article, does not seem as misguided when approached from the perspective of something like a ‘phenomenology of difference,’ as recently initiated by a thinker like Miguel de Beistegui (2000, 54–70):² a phenomenology capable of learning even from its apparent ‘enemies’ – and Beistegui spoke explicitly of the potential of Deleuze’s philosophy of difference for a phenomenology – a phenomenology capable of rethinking itself in ever new, heretical ways, and returning to things themselves, as Patočka aspired to.³

Indeed, once we open ourselves to the possibility of heresy – phenomenological or otherwise – there are also other philological and philosophical reasons why such a comparative prospect might be more interesting than expected. While other critics have already pointed out the interesting similarities (in difference) between Patočka’s conception of asubjective phenomenology and Deleuze’s philosophy of difference (Kouba 2020, 54–67; Shores 2022, 52–85), no one has yet commented on the striking similarity between two of their most important projects or philosophical slo-

2 He then presented his own Deleuzian-Heideggerian ‘differential ontology’ (Beistegui 2004).

3 ‘And is this not the historical lesson of phenomenology: that it is itself a flow, with unpredictable bends and meanderings, which, whatever their intensity, in the end always reinvent phenomenology, remaining faithful to this potential or this virtual reserve that phenomenology has at the moment when they express the impossibility for them to remain faithful to the letter of phenomenology. But there is no “letter” of phenomenology: no primordial word, no consecrated text, no original truth that one could betray: only an endless series of heresies, which is, at least in philosophy, the only possible form of fidelity, that is, fidelity in and through genuine questioning’ (Beistegui 2000, 68). To note that here Beistegui refers explicitly to Patočka’s *Heretical Essays*: ‘See, for example, the beautifully named *Heretical Essays* (Prague: Petlice, 1975) by Patočka, perhaps the most unfaithfully faithful of all phenomenologists’ (Beistegui 2000, 70).

gans: namely, in Patočka's case, that of re-interpreting Platonism in a negative way and, in Deleuze's, that of reversing Platonism *tout court*.

In this article, I will begin to approach such a demanding comparison by limiting myself to two points of difference – although we must also judge the ineradicable similarities from the original differences. Firstly, I will discuss the Nietzschean origins of Deleuze's reversal of Platonism in contrast with the more mysterious roots of Patočka's Negative Platonism, arguing that they have a common denominator in Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche. Secondly, I will explore how each thinker develops their respective negative version of Platonism, either by reversing or reimagining Plato's theory of Ideas. It is in this latter aspect that their approaches most sharply diverge, though not without some fascinating points of contact.

1.

Perhaps even more striking than their shared rejection of transcendental subjectivity is Patočka's and Deleuze's description of their own philosophical project – at least for a period of their lives – as a 'reversal of' or as a 'negative' Platonism. It was in the early 1950s that Patočka started developing what, according to extant manuscript notes, was supposed to become a broad, all-encompassing philosophical project entitled *Negative Platonism* (Tava 2015, 9–12; Arnason 2007, 8). Of this larger project, which he never completed, only a long essay was published in 1953 with the same title (Patočka 1989, 175–206). It is one of the most read and most discussed of Patočka's texts, and even although any references to 'negative Platonism' are almost completely absent from his later works, most critics agree on its significance for Patočka's philosophical trajectory (Tava 2015, 56–72; Arnason 2007, 19–25; Ullmann 2011, 75–81; Rodrigo, 2011, 87–97).

Deleuze did not afford his reversal of Platonism such editorial importance, but inscribed it most vigorously in two of his most important texts, *Difference and Repetition* and *The Logic of Sense*, from 1968 and 1969 respectively, as the aim and motto of his (and not only his) philosophy: 'The task of modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn Platonism,' he writes in chapter 1 of *Difference and Repetition* (Deleuze 1994, 58). For both philosophers, 15 years apart, what contemporary philosophy must do, in order to go forward, is to re-read Platonism negatively, to turn it upside down.

However, the difference is immediately perceptible in the choice of words. Even though both titles or slogans testify to the necessity of a return to Platonism in a negative manner, Deleuze's rhetoric and choice of words sound more extreme, while avoiding any reference to negativity. The difference appears to be Nietzschean, as Deleuze's reference in *The Logic of Sense* suggests: 'What does it mean "to reverse Platonism"? This is how Nietzsche defined the task of his philosophy or, more generally, the task of the philosophy of the future' (Deleuze 1990, 253). As many scholars have noted, Deleuze is likely alluding here to a fragment Nietzsche wrote while drafting *The Birth of Tragedy*: 'My philosophy an inverted Platonism: the farther removed from true being, the purer, the finer, the better it is. Living in semblance as the goal' (Nietzsche 1969, 207; Beistegui 2012, 56; Smith 2005, 90). Deleuze had probably encountered this passage very recently, perhaps during preparations for the new edition of Nietzsche's *Complete Works*, which he was editing with Michel Foucault for Gallimard. Notably, no reference to this fragment appears in his 1962 work, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*. Alternatively and more scandalously, he may have encountered it through Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, which his friend Klossowski was translating into French at the time (Heidegger 1984, 154).

The difference is therefore Nietzschean, in the sense that Deleuze's reversal of Platonism has Nietzschean roots, supposedly unlike Patočka's. But it would be a mistake to read Patočka's turn to Platonism as completely detached from Nietzsche. Indeed, tellingly, Nietzsche is the first thinker Patočka cites in his essay, right on the first page.⁴ He doesn't even name him, but it is clear how central he is to his argument:

For all the profound differences between nineteenth-century philosophy and philosophical thought today, there are some common themes that link them. One of those is the sense that the metaphysical phase of philosophy has come to an end and that we are living at the end of a grand era, or perhaps even after its end. The air, as the great seismographer of the catastrophes to come said, is full of putrescence. Yet what is it that died? What is it that has been dismissed so thoroughly, once and

4 As also Martin Koci (2017, 7) notes.

for all, that only a monument erected by historians remains? (Patočka 1989, 175)

In Patočka's case, the Nietzschean reference is more hidden and refers to a certain conception of the history of philosophy, rather than to Nietzsche's views on Platonism. Indeed, I do not actually know whether Patočka had access to Nietzsche's fragment, but what he had access to was a text by Heidegger from 1943, republished as part of his *Holzwege* in 1950, while Patočka was writing his essay, and translated into French in 1962, Heidegger's essay 'Nietzsche's Word: "God is Dead."' As we will see, more than to Nietzsche, the reference here seems to be to Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche and the role Heidegger afforded to him in his conception of the end of metaphysics.

Now, what is surprising is that through this comparison between Patočka and Deleuze, we discover that, rather than being Nietzschean, both reversals of Platonism – Deleuze's as well – could be said to be Heideggerian and that their roots lie in the very first page of Heidegger's essay, which reads as follow:

The commentary derives from a thinking that is beginning to win an initial clarity about Nietzsche's fundamental place within the history of Western metaphysics. To point in this direction clarifies a stage of Western metaphysics that is in all likelihood its final stage, since metaphysics, through Nietzsche, has deprived itself of its own essential possibility in certain respects, and therefore to that extent other possibilities of metaphysics can no longer become apparent. After the metaphysical reversal carried out by Nietzsche, all that is left to metaphysics is to be inverted into the dire state of its non-essence. The supersensory has become an unenduring product of the sensory. But by so disparaging [*Herabsetzung*] its antithesis, the sensory denies its own essence. The dismissal [*Absetzung*] of the supersensory also eliminates the purely sensory and with it the difference between the two. (Heidegger 2002, 157)⁵

⁵ Heidegger would further expand on this topic in the first volume of his study on Nietzsche (Heidegger 1984, 151–161).

As we have seen, this is the exact context in which Patočka inscribes his thought by mentioning Nietzsche's words regarding the end of metaphysics – a Heideggerian conception of the history of philosophy to which – it is worth remembering – Deleuze never subscribed (Smith et al. 2023). But, as we will see, this is also the best summary of what a 'reversal' of Platonism would consist of or of how to imagine something like a negative Platonism, because what Heidegger is doing in these last three lines is describing the Nietzschean critique of Plato's Theory of Ideas.

For Heidegger, Nietzsche's reversal of metaphysics or of Platonism consists in reversing Plato's Theory of Ideas, denying the super-sensuous in favour of the sensuous. This is true for both Patočka and Deleuze, but from this point, the two thinkers diverge markedly. Deleuze fully embraces Heidegger's depiction of Nietzsche's reversal of Platonism and pushes it to its most extreme limits by considering very rigorously how to deny the super-sensuous through the sensuous. Patočka instead takes a more Heideggerian/Phenomenological approach. Unlike Deleuze, he opposes the idea that a mere reversal of Platonism would be able to free us from metaphysics, claiming, in Heideggerian terms, that reversing metaphysics ultimately keeps us within its bounds (Nietzsche's main fault). Yet Patočka also envisions a 'negative' Platonism as a path forward, a philosophy capable of rescuing metaphysics from itself. And such, Negative Platonism would consist of a new interpretation of the Theory of Ideas that stresses the *chorismos*, the difference between Ideas and objects, above everything else. In doing so, it repositions Ideas beyond objectivity and subjectivity, as mere 'calls' to transcendence.

2.

In order to reverse Platonism one first needs to understand it correctly. Deleuze's path to enact Nietzsche's reversal of Plato's theory of Ideas begins with a new interpretation of the theory. His first move is to show that, contrary to the standard interpretation of Platonism, the theory of Ideas is not dualism but triadism. A third element is more important than either Ideas or copies: the simulacrum.⁶ The famous dualism between Idea and

⁶ For pivotal readings of Deleuze's concept of the simulacrum and his overturning of Platonism, also in the following pages, I refer to Smith (2005, 97–108) and Beistegui (2012, 55–62).

copy (or essence and appearance) is only apparent because what really matters is the difference between copy and simulacrum. As he summarizes in the conclusion of *Difference and Repetition*, with a fascinating wink to the critique of metaphysics:

It is correct to define metaphysics by reference to Platonism, but insufficient to define Platonism by reference to the distinction between essence and appearance. The primary distinction which Plato rigorously establishes is the one between the model and the copy. The copy, however, is far from a simple appearance, since it stands in an internal, spiritual, noological and ontological relation with the Idea or model. The second and more profound distinction is the one between the copy itself and the phantasm. (Deleuze 1994, 264–265)⁷

Platonism is ‘metaphysical’, according to Deleuze, not because it bases itself on the dualism of idea and copy, as it is usually thought, but because it relies on the difference between copies and simulacra. It is then this difference that one must consider in order to understand his theory of Ideas.

Indeed, copies and simulacra are both just images, argues; but in positing their difference, something has occurred:

The distinction wavers between two sorts of images. *Copies* are secondary possessors. They are well-founded pretenders, guaranteed by resemblance; *simulacra* are like false pretenders, built upon a dissimilarity, implying an essential perversion or a deviation. It is in this sense that Plato divides in two the domain of images-idols: on one hand there are *copies-icons*, on the other there are *simulacra-phantasms*. (Deleuze 1990, 256)⁸

Copies and simulacra are simply images, but what differentiates them is ‘resemblance’. While the copy has some resemblance to the model or idea, simulacra are instead built on dissimilarity.

What this central difference to Platonism reveals to us, according to Deleuze, is that Platonism is animated by an original moral goal, which is not the separation of the world of Ideas from the material world of copies,

⁷ See also Deleuze (1990, 253–257).

⁸ See also Deleuze (1994, 127).

but rather the ability to select and choose which is morally best among the images. But this means that ideas became necessary only because Plato had to distinguish morally between copies and simulacra:

The great manifest duality of Idea and image is present only in this goal: to assure the latent distinction between the two sorts of images and to give a concrete criterion. For if copies or icons are good images and are well-founded, it is because they are endowed with resemblance. [...] Consider now the other species of images, namely, the simulacra. That to which they pretend (the object, the quality, etc.), they pretend to underhandedly, under cover of an aggression, an insinuation, a subversion, 'against the father', and without passing through the Idea. (Deleuze 1990, 257)⁹

The real dualism that Platonism introduces, according to Deleuze, is that between copy and simulacrum, where copies are images that resemble Ideas and are therefore good and well-founded, while simulacra are images that do not resemble Ideas at all, namely that they insinuate a similarity with Ideas that is, however, impossible to prove.

To summarize, for Deleuze, Platonism is not dualism but triadism; three elements are at play: Ideas, copies, and simulacra. While Platonism is usually understood to be founded on the difference between Ideas and copies, Deleuze claims that it is actually founded on the difference between copies and simulacra; and Ideas are introduced as mere standard-setters, namely as pure identities whose end is to guarantee the resemblance of copies and the dissimilarity of simulacra, and thus allowing us to tell them apart. But this means that Platonism is nothing more than a moral project aimed at using the Idea to guarantee the triumph of copies over simulacra, the triumph of true and authentic pretenders over false ones.¹⁰

⁹ See also Deleuze (1994, 126–128).

¹⁰ 'Platonism as a whole is built on the basis of this wish to hunt down the phantasms or simulacra, which are identified with the Sophist himself, this devil, that insinuator or simulator, this always disguised and displaced false pretender. [...] In his [Plato's] case, however, a moral motivation in all its purity is avowed: the will to eliminate simulacra or phantasms has no motivation apart from morality. What is condemned in the figure of the simulacra is the state of free, oceanic differences, of nomadic distributions and crowned, anarchy, along with all that malice which challenges both the notion of the model and that of the copy.' (Deleuze 1994, 127, 265)

If this is the case, then we can finally understand what reversing Platonism might mean: for Deleuze, reversing Platonism means freeing the simulacra, which are nothing more than systems of pure difference, and letting them spread:

So ‘to reverse Platonism’ means to make the simulacra rise and to affirm their rights among icons and copies. The problem no longer has to do with the distinction Essence-Appearance or Model-Copy. This distinction operates completely within the world of representation. Rather, it has to do with undertaking the subversion of this world – the ‘twilight of the idols.’ The simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbors a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction. At least two divergent series are internalized in the simulacrum – neither can be assigned as the original, neither as the copy. (Deleuze 1990, 262)

What counts above everything else for Deleuze is that while copies are founded on resemblance, namely on identity, the peculiarity of Plato’s simulacra is that they escape identity and resemblance altogether. In fact, they are not simply a ‘copy of a copy,’ two or three times or infinitely removed from the idea, truth, and identity (257). Rather, they are pure differences that ‘do not pass through the Idea’ in their insinuation (257). They are free from any reference to a model or a copy and, for this reason, they call into question the very difference between model and copy.¹¹

Reversing Platonism for Deleuze means to free, against Ideas (and copies), the positive power of difference internal to simulacra. Making true both Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s *word*, in this new conception, our world is not a sensuous appearance – a semblance – of the super-sensuous world, but rather a pure semblance, an immanent game of differences, without any reference to another world. That very difference has been eradicated. However, as Daniel W. Smith notes, ‘Deleuze’s project of overturning Platonism must not be taken as a rejection of Platonism; on the contrary. “That

11 ‘The simulacrum is built upon a disparity or upon a difference. It internalizes a dissimilarity. This is why we can no longer define it in relation to a model imposed on the copies, a model of the Same from which the copies’ resemblance derives. If the simulacrum still has a model, it is another model, a model of the Other (*l’Autre*) from which there flows an internalized dissemblance’ (Deleuze 1990, 258).

the overturning [of Platonism] should conserve many Platonic characteristics,” writes Deleuze, “is not only inevitable but desirable” (Smith 2005, 105).¹² By freeing the power of the simulacrum, the dualism between Ideas and copies is erased but Ideas do not disappear, according to Deleuze. Rather, simulacra ‘require a new conception of Ideas: Ideas that are immanent to simulacra (rather than transcendent) and based on a concept of pure difference (rather than identity)’ (106). In this inverted Platonism, Ideas are not somewhere else, but are internal, immanent, to this simulacra. They are a pure system of differences preceding and enabling any representation (Deleuze 1994, 26–27). In a beautiful phrase, which will have some odd parallels in Patočka, they are ‘a brute presence which can be invoked in the world only in function of that which is not “representable” in things’ (59); Ideas as the reminder of the immanent play of difference.

3.

As we will see, Patočka’s negative interpretation of Plato’s theory of Ideas is very different from Deleuze’s, and yet some features are similar. Indeed, Patočka’s project begins from the opposite pole, namely from what he calls the ‘experience of freedom’ and associates it with transcendence. For him, Plato is the first person to have proposed a ‘conceptual systematics’ for achieving freedom or transcendence (Patočka 1989, 195). Thus, before proposing his negative version of Platonism, he begins by offering a short version of that systematics and what he takes Platonism to be – and with it, the rest of two millennia of European philosophy:¹³

Plato explained freedom as transcending the sensible and reaching the transcendent Being, a transcendence from the ‘apparent’ to the ‘real.’ The intermediary between the two realms was dialectics, a spiritual process stretching between two poles, one sensible, the other suprasensible, and permitting an ascent from the sensible to the suprasensible as well as a descent in the opposite direction. (195)

¹² For Deleuze’s passage see Deleuze (1994, 59).

¹³ ‘With that, he also determined the destiny of philosophy for two millennia, though it is problematic whether he thereby set philosophy on its true definitive course’ (Patočka 1989, 195).

For Patočka, as for Nietzsche and Heidegger, Platonism – or metaphysics more generally – is the idea that the experience of freedom or transcendence coincides with a movement from the sensuous to the super-sensuous through the spiritual process called dialectics. To attain freedom and transcendence means to reach the suprasensible realm of truth, to reach the realm of Ideas: therein lies ‘the Platonic doctrine of separately subsisting Ideas’ that we need to reach by leaving behind the sensible world (197). For Patočka, negating Platonism seems to be to negate this picture.

Yet even Patočka does not begin by simply erasing the classic dualism of the Platonic tradition between Ideas, understood as perfect entities, and copies of Ideas, the objects. Rather, he also recovers from Plato’s theory a third, more important element in the dyad. What is even more surprising is that, even if this element has nothing to do with the simulacrum, it has explicitly to do with pure difference. Indeed, he claims that what has been forgotten and misinterpreted in Plato’s theory of Ideas is what Plato calls the ‘*chorismos*’, namely ‘the separation between Ideas and our reality, our actual world of things and people, left to themselves and considered simply as actual’ (198).¹⁴ But understanding the *chorismos* as a separation between two worlds is, according to Patočka, a fundamental mistake:

It is, however, important to understand precisely why the *chorismos*, the separation, the isolation, is an important phenomenon that we cannot ignore and silence. We need to set aside one metaphor suggested by the label *chorismos*, that of the separation of something from something, of two regions of objects. *Chorismos* meant originally a separateness without a second object realm. It is a gap that does not separate two realms coordinated or linked by something third that would embrace them both and so would serve as the foundation of both their coordination and their separation. *Chorismos* is a separateness, a distinctness *an sich*, an absolute one, for itself. It does not entail the secret of another continent, somewhere beyond a separating ocean. (198)

The well-known Platonic *chorismos* is not a difference between two regions, two continents, two realms, but a difference as such.

This is a central move in Patočka's re-interpretation of Platonism and one that has a pivotal consequence: understanding the *chorismos* as pure difference means calling into question the very dualism between Ideas and objects. There is only one world, the world of objects, but within that one world we can have the experience of pure difference, the *chorismos*, which for Patočka is nothing more than the asubjective experience of freedom, understood as the experience of an unsurpassable distance and difference from objects and reality: 'In other words, the mystery of the *chorismos* is like the experience of freedom, an experience of a distance with respect to real things, of a meaning independent of the objective and the sensory which we reach by inverting the original, 'natural' orientation of life, an experience of a rebirth, of a second birth, intrinsic to all spiritual life, familiar to the religious, to the initiates of the arts, and, not least, to philosophers' (198–199).

Chorismos should be understood as an experience of pure difference beyond any objective, representational meaning (199). For a moment, we do not seem too far removed from Deleuze's conception of the Idea as the reminder of 'that which is not "representable" in things.'

And indeed, what of Ideas in this new, Negative Platonism? Once we take the *chorismos* seriously as pure difference, as the experience of freedom, the Idea becomes simply a 'shorthand for the *chorismos*' (199). In this way, we 'transcend the Idea itself, to reach beyond it, to strip it of its presentational, objective, iconic character' (199). Ideas are not absolute objects, as the Platonic tradition argued, but literally nothing, in the sense that they are not things, they are beyond any objectivity.¹⁵ Not too far from the

15 'Do we not, though, encounter here the paradox of this negative doctrine of the Idea, revealing its internal contradiction? Must not the Idea appear as something in principle nonexistent? Precisely in view of the *chorismos* we must place it in complete contradiction to the sum of all that is, objective and subjective – but what remains when we exclude all that is, what other than sheer nothingness? And is not nothingness, as many logicians and metaphysicians have shown, an impossible conception as soon as we take it in the absolute sense of the word and not simply as an expression for the exclusion of realities of a linguistic device, a mere mode of speaking about signs that serve to mark realities? Is not the doctrine forced at this point to admit that it fails, just as positive Platonism before it, because it hypostatizes the unrealizable, the unreal, a mere *flatus vocis*?' (Patočka 1989, 201)

Heideggerian conception of Being, Ideas are not entities; rather they are the ‘the origin and wellspring of all *human* objectification – though only because [they are] first and more basically the power of deobjectification and derealization’ (199). In the same way, and in line with Patočka’s future asubjective phenomenology, Ideas are not only beyond any object but also beyond every subjectivism: ‘By contrast, the Idea, as that determination, has the advantage that, if stripped of metaphysical encrustations, it stands above both subjective and objective existents; precisely the *chorismos* guarantees that we shall encounter in it no existent in the sense of any content whatever or any process of experience’ (200).¹⁶

Once we free ourselves from metaphysics, we understand that Ideas have nothing to do with objects so much as with any subjective experience. As simple ‘shorthands for the *chorismos*’, they are mere reminders of the pure difference, which Patočka calls transcendence.

Patočka thus concludes that the negative conception of the Platonic Idea is that ‘the Idea is the pure supraobjective call of transcendence’ (204). ‘It comes to us and proves itself a constant call to go beyond mere objectivity, mere factuality’ (204). In other words, for Patočka, Ideas are not perfect and absolute entities located somewhere in a different realm, but the ever-present and latent call of the world to transcendence.

Conclusion

I hope to have shown that comparing two distant thinkers like Patočka and Deleuze is not as useless as first imagined, and could prove particularly fruitful for the future of Phenomenology and philosophy more broadly. What we have found is that, despite their opposing watchwords – transcendence and immanence – Patočka’s and Deleuze’s ‘negative’ versions of Platonism share a common Nietzschean-Heideggerian origin. But this shared foundation was just the beginning. Examining how each philosopher sought to reverse or negate Platonism by reinterpreting Plato’s theory of Ideas has allowed us to highlight significant differences in their conclusions, as well as striking parallels.

Deleuze sought to dismantle Plato's Ideas, and the distinction between Ideas and copies, by unleashing the power of the simulacrum – pure difference – and re-imagining Ideas as an immanent play of differences, before any representation. In contrast, Patočka approached the negation of Plato's Ideas and the Ideas-objects distinction by focusing on the *chorismos*, which he reinterpreted as a pure difference – not as a division between realms, Ideas and copies, but as a difference in itself, a concept he linked to transcendence. In this way, he re-imagined Ideas as a 'shorthand for the *chorismos*' or, in other words, as mere 'calls to transcendence.'

What is fascinating about these findings is how the concepts of transcendence and immanence, seemingly so distant, come to resemble one another when Patočka's and Deleuze's negative Platonisms are placed side by side. Both thinkers attempt to strip Platonism of its defining dualism by liberating the form of pure difference; yet one names this liberation immanence and the other calls it transcendence. In the future, it would be worth asking how we could bring such views together. Both thinkers tried to destroy Ideas from within, reducing them to nothing – to a play of immanent differences in one case and to a call or voice of asubjective transcendence in the other.¹⁷ Might we one day, by joining these perspectives, envision Ideas as the always present voice of the world calling it back to itself, as the very place of its de-subjectification and de-objectification?¹⁸

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17 Patočka often used the term *flatus vocis* in his description of negative Ideas: 'Thus the Idea is the pure supraobjective call of transcendence. From the perspective of objectivity, of form, of finite content, it cannot but appear as pure nothingness, as *flatus vocis*' (Patočka 1989, 204).

18 I cannot but wonder whether this is what Giorgio Agamben has begun to do in his re-interpretation of Platonic Ideas as *sayables*, in close vicinity with his discussion of the concept of voice, in *What Is Philosophy?* (Agamben 2018, 35–90). On this question, see my review-essay of the book (Parisi 2018).

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Shpëtim Madani¹

An Analysis of B. Malamud's Prose from the Perspective of I. Kant's Moral Philosophy

ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to examine the prose of Jewish American writer Bernard Malamud (1914–1986) through the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant, a towering Enlightenment figure that has had a tremendous impact on intellectual circles to date. Based on qualitative research, the study begins with a brief introduction into Kant's ethical outlook, which is deontological rather than utilitarian. In other words, for an action to be deemed morally right it has to be primarily motivated by duty, not personal desire or goal. The duty-based ethics is manifested through the categorical imperative, considered as the universal law, whereby motives for a certain act are assessed. In this regard, there exists a significant similarity between Kant's ethical beliefs and those of Malamud, whose fiction highlights the embrace of moral values and one's moral responsibility toward others, in a world governed by greed and self-interest without showing consideration for one's fellow beings. Following a close analysis of Malamud's major works, it is concluded that the transformation of the Malamudian hero from an initially egotistical and self-indulgent individual to an altruistic and self-sacrificing person materializes in the manner of Kant's moral philosophy.

Keywords: Kant, moral philosophy, duty, Malamud, moral responsibility

Analiza Malamudove proze z vidika Kantove moralne filozofije

POVZETEK: Ta članek skuša preučiti prozo judovskega ameriškega pisatelja Bernarda Malamuda (1914–1986) skozi moralno filozofijo Immanuela Kanta, ključne razsvetljenske osebnosti, ki ima vse do danes izjemen vpliv na intelektualne kroge. Na podlagi kvalitativne raziskave se študija začne s kratkim uvodom v Kantov etični pogled, ki je deontološki in ne utilitarističen. Z drugimi besedami, da se dejanje šteje za moralno pravilno, mora biti primarno motivirano z dolžnostjo, ne osebno željo ali ciljem. Dolžnostna etika se kaže v kategoričnem imperativu, ki velja za univerzalni zakon, s katerim se presojajo motivi za določeno dejanje. V zvezi s tem obstaja velika podobnost med Kantovimi nauki in Malamudovimi etičnimi prepričanji, čigar leposlovje poudarja sprejemanje moralnih vrednot in moralno odgovornost do drugih v svetu, ki ga vodita pohlep in lastni interes, ne da bi izkazoval obzirnost do

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soljudi. Po natančni analizi Malamudovih glavnih del je bilo ugotovljeno, da se preobrazba malamudskega junaka iz sprva egoističnega in samovšečnega posameznika v altruistično in požrtvovalno osebo materializira na način Kantove morale.

Ključne besede: Kant, moralna filozofija, dolžnost, Malamud, moralna odgovornost

Introduction

The question of morality in Malamud's works has been the subject matter of research by several scholars, who have regarded Malamud's moral vision as primarily stemming from a condition of suffering and resulting compassion, attributing at times an ethnic secular Jewish identity to the moral perspective. Not taking into account the duality of Jewishness and suffering, this paper tries to explore Malamud's morality from a different perspective, namely by applying the Kantian moral philosophy, which is also known as deontological ethics.

Deontological ethics (from Greek: *deon* meaning 'duty' or 'obligation') is the ethical theory that emphasizes the assessment of an action as right or wrong, regardless of its outcome or consequence. It is the very antithesis of teleological ethics, which determines an action as right or wrong depending on its result or effect. Immanuel Kant belongs to the deontological ethics. As one of the main representatives of the Enlightenment, he applied an *a priori* rational approach to the existence and creation of a stable system of moral values, believing that certain actions are right or wrong, irrespective of our feelings and notwithstanding the result of these actions. For example, Kant (1999, xxxii) remarks that morally it is always wrong to lie because 'lying violates the dignity of humanity in one's own person.'

Morality for Kant is a rational concept that distinguishes humans from animals. Since the latter perform impulsive actions triggered by desires and instincts – not by reason – their actions cannot be considered moral. This is not the case with people, who have the capacity to reflect and make rational choices. Kant's moral philosophy is based on the concept of the categorical imperative (CI). In this regard, critics R. Johnson and A. Cureton (2022) have rightly remarked that:

Kant characterized the CI as an objective, rationally necessary and unconditional principle that we must follow despite any natural desires we may have to the contrary. All specific moral requirements, according to

Kant, are justified by this principle, which means that all immoral actions are irrational because they violate the CI.

The CI, in turn, derives from the exercise of good will and duty. In his major work, *Groundworks of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785/1997), Kant emphasizes that what makes a person good is the possession of a good will, which is governed by the moral law. The concept of good will refers to the determination of the individual to make only those decisions that have moral value and act upon these moral considerations. This good will, according to Kant, is such without limitation. 'It is impossible to think of anything at all in the world, or indeed even beyond it, that can be seen as good without limitation, except for good will' (7). In other words, good will is not affected by anything bad or harmful, whereas other attributes of good, such as: happiness, courage, power, and the like, are negatively impacted by external destructive factors or when characterized by an ill will.

Kant claims that a good will is such, despite its ramifications. 'A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of its volition, that is, it is good in itself' (8). This means that even if the good will does not achieve its intended good purpose, even if failure is its final result, 'it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full worth in itself.' (8).

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to examine the application of Kant's moral philosophy to Malamud's works, hypothesizing that this approach further highlights the versatility of Malamud's moral vision.

Methods

This study adopts a qualitative methodology, with primary sources focusing on three major novels by Malamud and Kant's main works, while secondary sources entailing materials from the internet.

Results

Kant's moral philosophy helps us to better understand Malamud's three major novels [*The Natural* (1952/1980), *The Assistant* (1957/1993), and *A New Life* (1961)], as part of this study. Each of the protagonists eventually mani-

fest goodwill and act from duty, which in turn assures them an ennobling approach to life.

Discussion

Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals entails three formulations of the CI:

- CI-1: 'Act as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a *universal law of nature*' (31). This formulation is also referred to as the Formula of the Law of Nature or the Principle of Universalization, wherewith it is meant that through our actions we should not harm or hurt others by using double standards, but every action should be conceived of and taken as part of the universal law.

- CI-2: 'So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means' (38). This statement is also called the formula of respect for oneself and each other, the fundamental concept of human dignity.

- CI-3: 'We should so act that we may think of ourselves as legislating universal laws through our maxims' (xxv). This formulation is a combination of the above two formulations and refers to the principle of autonomy, which is the essence of Kant's moral theory.

Kant's moral tenets can also be explored into Malamud's prose, which reveals the novelist's deep concerns about the human condition after World War II. Despite his poignant criticism, Malamud generally maintained a positive outlook on humans' capacity and inclination to better themselves and become responsible for others. Typically, his heroes start off as rather broken, immature, and selfish to eventually embrace moral values that entail acting from duty. The first novel *The Natural* centers on Rob Roy, a 35-year old talented baseball player who does not manifest the team spirit expected of him because he is obsessed with personal fame and sex. In yielding to the materialistic needs of Memo Paris, the *femme fatale* that nearly brings about his doom by convincing him to sell out the pennant, Roy debases himself. Malamud here raises the question: why does someone decide to sell himself? In his acceptance address at the National Book Award, in 1959, the writer stated:

I am quite tired of the colossally deceitful devaluation of man in this day; for whatever explanation: that life is cheap amid a prevalence of

wars; or because we are drugged by totalitarian successes into a sneaking belief in their dehumanizing processes; or tricked beyond self-respect by the values of the creators of our thing-ridden society; [...] or because, having invented the means of his extinction, man values himself less for it and lives in daily dread that he will in a fit of passion, or pique or absented-mindedness, achieve his end. Whatever the reason, his fall from grace in his eyes is betrayed in the words he has invented to describe himself as he is now: fragmented, abbreviated, other-directed, organizational, anonymous man, a victim, in the words that are used to describe him, of a kind of synecdochic irony, the part for the whole. The devaluation exists because he accepts it without protest. (Malamud in Lasher 1991, 14)

Acting in violation of the third formulation of the CI, Roy also disregards his moral obligation to his fans. In relation to this, Iris Lemon – his supporter and the complete opposite of Memo – reminds him: ‘I hate to see a hero fail. There are so few of them [...] Without heroes we’re all plain people and don’t know how far we can go’ (139–140). Iris tries to explain to him that a hero should sacrifice his ego, as he is not in the field for himself but for others. Thus, she urges Roy to transition, in Kant’s words, from a heteronomy – whereby his choices are dictated by desires, inclinations, and external influences – to autonomy – characterized by freedom and independence – which is also the ‘supreme principle of morality’ (Malamud in Fieser and Stumpf 2015, 313).

The second novel *The Assistant* is Malamud’s most acclaimed book. It centers on the journey of Frank Alpine from a rogue to an honest and responsible individual under the moral guidance of the grocer Morris Bober. The latter, despite economic hardships, takes on Frank in his store. Acting from duty, Morris opens his store every day at six in the morning, in order to give a three-cent roll to an old woman. Also, Morris sells on trust to a drunk woman although he knows that she will never pay. Frank, on the other hand, noticing that some grocers are dishonest with their customers, suggests that Morris do the same:

‘Why don’t you try a couple of those tricks yourself, Morris? Your amount of profit is small.’

Morris looked at him in surprise. 'Why should I steal from my customers? Do they steal from me?'

'They would if they could.'

'When a man is honest he don't worry when he sleeps. This is more important than to steal a nickel.' (100)

While Frank often steals from the cash desk himself, upon Morris' death, he eventually toils night and day, so as to provide for the grocer's wife and daughter. The latter relates: 'He had kept them alive. Because of him she had enough to go to school at night' (293).

Kant's moral tenets can be similarly probed into the novel *A New Life*, which centers on Seymour Levin's search of a new life by relocating from the East to the West as an English teacher. Upon arriving in the small town of Eastchester, the home of Cascadia college, Levin is stunned by the beauty of the nature and believes he has found paradise in other regards, as well. However, the New Yorker is soon labeled as a troublemaker by his unscholarly colleagues, whom he constantly defies, including the affair with the boss's wife, which causes him to be fired.

What is initially evident is that none of the characters acts from duty but for personal motives. Fairchild, the head of the department, boasts about his outdated grammar book, keeping it with minor changes as part of the program for 30 years, while stifling any liberal ideas among his subordinates. Similarly, Gilley, Levin's direct superior, and Fabrikant, his colleague, try, each for their own benefit, to use Levin, in order to be elected head of the department. On the other hand, Pauline, Gilley's wife, neglected by her husband, regards Levin as a great opportunity to fulfill her sexual needs. Meanwhile, initially, even Levin does not perform actions of moral value, but is guided by personal desires, treating others as a means to an end. Being a victim of his sensual weakness, he is characterized by a pronounced lust for women. His first three unsuccessful sexual adventures with waitress Laverne, colleague Avis Fliss, and student Nadaline depict him as a wanderer who does not attribute morality to sex. Nor does he consider his intimate interaction with Pauline more than an affair.

Levin's willpower to perform moral actions according to the categorical imperative is still weak, because he comes from a dark past with alcohol

addiction and suicidal thoughts. From the first pages, he declares this: 'My life [...] has been without much purpose to speak of. Some blame the times for that, I blame myself [...]. In the past, I cheated myself and killed my choices' (14). It is apparent that his lack of self-respect prevents him from respecting others. In his book *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797/1991), Kant urges toward a moral self-knowledge which 'will, first, dispel fanatical contempt for oneself as man (for the whole human race), since this contradicts itself. It is only through the noble predisposition to the good in us, which makes man worthy of respect' (236). In other words, we have a duty to recognize and show appreciation for ourselves, otherwise we cannot show appreciation for anyone's dignity. An individual must be fully humane in order to treat others with the same degree of humanity. In this regard, the scholar Roger J. Sullivan, in his book *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics* (1996, 154), remarks: 'The overriding question should be, What kind of persons are we making of ourselves? And the answer we should be able to give is that we are doing everything we can to cultivate self-respect. More than anything else, that will motivate us to become the sort of person we should be and to live the sort of life we should live.'

In this light, Levin still operates double standards, hence in complete violation of the first formulation of the categorical imperative. On the one hand, he maintains a secret relationship with the wife of his direct superior – although he understands that: 'I've got to keep control of myself. I must always know where I am' (191). On the other hand, he criticizes Fairchild's text as pseudointellectual or other colleagues as unscholarly. However, Levin is not entirely devoid of self-reflection or intention of giving his life a rational and moral direction. From the beginning, he confesses to Pauline, right after arriving at their house: 'I've reclaimed an old ideal or two [...]. They give a man his value if he stands for them' (14). This is his greatest challenge: control of personal desires and commitment to the common good.

Levin knows his strengths from the start. He comes to Cascadia College as a reformed man who hopes to materialize his humanist goals in a new environment. Unlike his colleagues, he maintains a liberal attitude because, according to him, 'The true liberal, in his moral fervor, kept alive the visionary ideal [...] and fought at every opportunity to translate it into a better life for people' (201). In this way, Levin as a liberal humanist, be-

believes that man can survive ignorance and cruelty only by doing good to others: 'Those who have discovered their own moral courage, or created it, must join others who are moral; these must lead, without fanaticism. Any act of good is a diminution of evil in the world' (227).

Levin comes to the West to establish a new identity, in accordance with his new principles. While teaching at the college, Levin puts forward the idea of incorporating the liberal arts into science and technology-based curriculum, in order to help his students grow spiritually by teaching them 'what to write' in addition to 'how to write' (101). Levin's aspirations stem from his humanistic views, which he must mightily defend against his wicked colleagues. He fights relentlessly for his ideals of freedom, love and brotherhood by launching the campaign against the authorities' unfavorable attitude about the liberal arts, which manifests their antipathy toward the growth of the human spirit and disregard for human dignity.

It was emphasized above that the basic principle of the categorical imperative is the autonomous will, which makes the individual the legislator in the kingdom of ends, whereas a heteronomous will is influenced by other individuals or certain desires. In this light, for some time, Levin is characterized by a heteronomous will in initially pleasing Gilley and later supporting Fabrikant for the elections. However, the moment he discovers that Fabrikant is an opportunist, a conformist and a man without dignity, Levin is resolved, using Kant's words, to 'be no man's lackey' (Kant 1999, 558). Likewise, he stops supporting Gilley, who seeks to become head of department and merely maintain the status quo.

Noticing that both men have low standards, Levin decides to announce his own candidacy for the post. As a candidate, he suggests that the dean consider the possibility of introducing the Great Books program, aiming to bring together the isolated faculty community through the exchange of new ideas, impressions, and perspectives. Meanwhile, although he has ended the liaison with Pauline prior to initiating the election campaign, Gilley finds out about their affair. This causes Levin to lose the elections and his job. However, Levin leaves the College knowing that he has already made some changes possible: Fairchild's grammar book has been removed after so many years. Also, Gilley is considering giving some lite-

rature classes to lecturers teaching graduate students. Likewise, the dean has requested the introduction of the Great Books program. His good will which surpasses any personal interest has full practical and moral value.

On a personal level, of his own free will, he decides to marry Pauline and requests custody of her two children. Although his feelings are not as strong as before, he feels a responsibility to love her. Surprised at this decision, Gilley asks him: 'Why take that load upon yourself?' To which Levin replies curtly: 'Because I can, you son of a bitch' (319). Through this terse and powerful sentence, Levin shows that he has acted from duty notwithstanding internal obstacles. Such an act has genuine moral value and is indicative of the fulfillment of the categorical imperative.

Conclusion

The essence of Kant's deontological ethics is acting from duty, regardless of the individual's ends, desires or circumstances. Duty, for Kant, is an exercise of the free will for the individual who, despite reservations, makes decisions of moral value, in respect for the supreme moral law – the categorical imperative. This imperative is addressed to the rational human being, who has a moral obligation to respect oneself and others, never treating oneself or others as a means, but always as an end. Through one's behavior and actions, every person should be guided by the principles of the universal law which creates the foundations of a good and free society, where the rational individual is considered as the legislator. As Christine Korsgaard emphasizes, in her introduction to *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*: 'Morality, on Kant's conception, is a kind of metaphysics in practice. We ourselves impose the laws of reason on our actions, and through our actions, on the world, when we act morally' (1997, xxiv).

Kant's deontological ethics has a considerable application to the three novels analysed above. Roy, Frank, and especially Levin manage to fully implement the principles of the categorical imperative, thanks to their ability to control personal instincts and desires, in order to perform rational actions of moral value, both on a personal and professional level. Their courageous and rational acts, toward the end of respective novels, evidence the evolution of their being and their contribution to a better and more liberal society.

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Ledia Kazazi¹

The Evolution of the Journey Metaphor in Albanian Political Discourses on European Integration

ABSTRACT: Political discourse heavily relies on metaphor usage to frame how the public views or understands political issues by eliminating alternative points of view. One of the most common usages of metaphors is to positively represent future scenarios that are constructed as solutions to existing problems thus conceptualizing an ideal Utopia or the good projected in some remote space in time. Through the activation of unconscious emotional associations metaphors contribute to the 'creation' of a desired story and politicians have to tell the right story in order to persuade the public opinion and serve their ideological purposes. Since the fall of communism, Albanian politicians have mainly relied on the *journey* metaphor to conceptualize Albania's EU accession process. This particular metaphor frame is very frequent in public debates as well as in everyday language use. It is part of a system of *journey / transport* metaphors that pervades our conceptualization of processes extending over a period of time.

Through a corpus of speeches collected during the last five years this paper aims at analyzing how Albanian politicians use the *journey* metaphors to shape their political and ideological objectives. Even though different usages of the metaphor are noticed, it mostly implies an imperative for the country to learn, mature and transform during the EU integration process.

Keywords: conceptual metaphor, framing, persuasion, political discourse, Albania

Razvoj metafore potovanja v albanskih političnih diskurzih o evropski integraciji

POVZETEK: Politični diskurz se v veliki meri zanaša na uporabo metafor, da uokviri, kako javnost vidi ali razume politična vprašanja z odpravljanjem alternativnih stališč. Ena najpogostejših uporab metafor je pozitivno predstavljanje prihodnjih scenarijev, ki so zgrajeni kot rešitve za obstoječe probleme, s čimer se konceptualizira idealna utopija ali dobro, projicirano v nekem oddaljenem prostoru v času. Z aktivacijo nezavednih čustvenih asociacij metafore prispevajo k »kreaciji« želenе zgodbe in politiki morajo povedati pravo zgodbo, da bi prepričali javno mnenje in služili svojim ideološkim namenom.

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Od padca komunizma so se albanski politiki pri konceptualizaciji pristopnega procesa Albanije k EU zanašali predvsem na metaforo *potovanja*. Ta poseben metaforični okvir je zelo pogost tako v javnih razpravah kot tudi v vsakdanji jezikovni rabi. Je del sistema metafor *potovanja/transporta*, ki prežema našo konceptualizacijo procesov, ki potekajo skozi neko časovno obdobje.

S pomočjo korpusa govorov, zbranih v zadnjih petih letih, želi ta članek analizirati, kako albanski politiki uporabljajo metafore *potovanja* za oblikovanje svojih političnih in ideoloških ciljev. Čeprav je opaziti različne rabe metafore, večinoma implicira imperativ, da se država uči, dozoreva in preoblikuje v procesu integracije v EU.

Ključne besede: konceptualna metafora, uokvirjanje, prepričevanje, politični diskurz, Albanija

Introduction

In recent discussions in linguistics, psychology and philosophy, the relevance of metaphor for social and political conceptualization has been acknowledged in much more positive terms. In particular, the school of cognitive metaphor analysis, part of the larger fields of Cognitive Linguistics and Critical Discourse Analysis, which George Lakoff and Mark Johnson effectively founded with the publication of their work 'Metaphors We Live By' in 1980, has produced significant evidence that 'metaphors play a central role in the construction of social and political reality' (Johnson 1980, 159).

The field of Critical discourse analysis has garnered significant interest among researchers in linguistics, language studies and other social sciences in the past two decades (Chouliariaki and Fairclough 1999). Extensive studies on the field have displayed how closely related language, power and ideology are and especially that language is far from being neutral.

The present paper endeavours to investigate selected metaphorical expressions used to denote the relationship between Albania and the European Union from the perspective of contemporary Albanian political discourse and it is anchored on the critical discourse analytical theory. It will specifically focus on the investigation of the *European integration is a journey* conceptual metaphor.

Political context of Albania and EU relations

The Republic of Albania has been an official candidate for EU accession since June 2014 following its application for EU membership on 28 April 2009. Accession talks started in March 2020. EU accession has been a long-term ambition of the Albanian political class since the fall of Communism as the process is considered as the strongest incentive to move forward in

the process of democratization (Vurmo 2008) as well as the embodiment of liberal values (Brisku 2012).

In order to facilitate the process, the Albanian Government established a separate Ministry for EU integration matters, an action which was succeeded by the opening of the negotiations with the European Commission on a Stabilization and Association Agreement. At the dawn of its second mandate, in 2017, Prime Minister Edi Rama decided to merge the Ministry for EU integration with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs causing controversies and questioning the government's commitment to lead the country towards a European path.

The same time period is characterized by a change in the discourse regarding EU accession negotiations. The Prime Minister's statements in the last five years imply notes of pessimism and surrender and suggest that Albania has done it all and the responsibility is now solely on the EU institutions. For this particular reason PM Rama has been considering other alliances such as the Open Balkans initiative together with Serbia and The Republic of North Macedonia. His discourse regarding the Open Balkans remains contradictory as he states that this initiative does not interfere with Albania's EU integration perspective.

Theoretical framework

Critical discourse analysis

The School of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) emerged in the early 1990s. It is an interdisciplinary approach to problem-oriented analysis. Despite its linguistic focus, CDA delves into social phenomena rather than studying linguistic units in isolation. Given the inherent complexity of these phenomena, a multidisciplinary approach is essential. Its primary objective is to uncover the structured mechanisms perpetuating power imbalances.

It is important to note that the term 'critical' in CDA doesn't carry a negative connotation, to be critical, in this context, entails exploring the hidden connections between language usage and underlying causes, as expressed by Fairclough (1995). Thus, critical reading in CDA surpasses hermeneutics, aiming to demystify texts ideologically shaped by power relations. It centers on the interplay between discourse and societal structures, employing open interpretations and explanations.

CDA has been widely used to analyse political discourse and is mainly focused on the manipulative potential found in lexical choices (Wodak 1989; Dijk 1993) and morpho-syntactic decisions, including activation/passivation (Leeuwen 1989) nominalization (Fowler et al. 1979) and the use of pronouns (Bramley 2001). Simultaneously, there's a growing interest in CDA towards pragmalinguistic and socio-pragmatic aspects, such as face management (Armasu 2013), the realisation of specific speech acts (Hill 1999) as well as conversational strategies and topical organization (Becker, 2007). Political metaphors are also explored using a corpus-based approach.

Conceptual metaphor

Scholars like A. Musolff, P. Chilton and G. Lakoff under the effect of Lakoff's 'Metaphors we live by' have incorporated the mechanism of conceptual metaphor into the field of discourse studies. Conceptual metaphors go beyond the borders of rhetorical metaphor. Its importance lies in the fact that it manages to project a concrete domain of knowledge into another abstract domain. In political discourse, metaphors conceptualize political behaviour and processes through an ideological point of view of reality. The analysis of metaphors in political discourse is very important since they can change the perception of reality (Chilton 1996).

Linguistically speaking, metaphor is considered as a reflection of the domain of knowledge that underlies the language users' view of the world that surrounds them. Thus, metaphor is not a random linguistic form, nor a simple rhetorical tool, but it is an embodied conceptual entity.

The exploration of metaphors proves to be highly beneficial in examining political discourse. Within the context of metaphor usage in the discourse of the European Union, scholars like Musolff, Wodak, Judge and Durovic distinguish themselves. Their collective findings affirm that the abstract process of EU integration is realized through an interplay between language, cognition and reality. Metaphors emerge as a crucial element of cognition, serving as the most pervasive cognitive and linguistic tool for shaping conceptualizations of a given reality. Consequently, metaphors play a central role in constructing social and political realities (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). This perspective aligns with Critical Metaphor Analysis, asserting that if language is a primary means of controlling people, meta-

phor becomes a key tool for individuals to regain control of language and shape discourse (Charteris-Black 2004).

The journey metaphor

The conceptual metaphor of a *journey* remains one of the most prevailing metaphors underlying our thinking. If we examine the metaphor taxonomy through a vertical cut based on hierarchical relations, it becomes clear that the conceptual metaphor 'politics is a journey' is quite intricate. This metaphor entails aspects of events such as states, causes, changes, actions, and purposes which are comprehended through physical concepts like location, force and movement. If political actions are considered as purposeful activities, we naturally reach the target conceptual metaphor 'politics is a journey'.

This particular metaphor results to be very commonly used in political discourses who focus, especially, on conceptualizations on the European Union and European Union Integration. For instance, Musolff (2004) has made an extensive investigation into British and German perspective on the EU, Charteris-Black (2005) has analysed the journey metaphor usage in British and American discourses and Cibulskiene (2012) has studied the same metaphor in Lithuanian political discourse. The *journey* metaphor proves to be effective in political communication since the concept of the journey itself is inherently purposeful. It is the directionality that matters to political leaders who are conscious of the need to appear to have planned intentions (Charteris-Black 2005).

Methodology and data collection

The criterion followed for metaphor identification in the actual article is adopted from Charteris Black, who defines conceptual metaphors in terms of semantic tension, role in persuasion and cross domain mapping in the conceptual system. The selected corpus consists of selected speeches, press releases and media reports centering the topic of Albania's EU accession, during the last five years. Regarding the sources, the paper relies on information published on selected online media immediately after the events. The metaphor identification process is divided in two steps. The first step involves close reading of selected speeches to identify metaphors and metaphor key words. This process is carried out using the Pragglejaz method for

metaphor identification. The second step involves the evaluation of the semantic value of literacy of the key words based on the context of the selected speeches (Charteris-Black 2011). As noted by Kövecses (2005), metaphorical linguistic expressions not only make conceptual metaphors apparent but can also be employed to deduce metaphors in thought. Establishing the conceptual mappings between the more abstract target domain and the abstract target domain (*EU integration*) and the more concrete source domain (*journey*) is crucial for constructing the scenario of a political journey.

Findings

Close analysis of selected metaphors results in the conceptualization of the EU integration process in terms of linguistic devices of movement such as start, move forward, push forward, pursue and more concretely as a path and destination. The highlighted verbs and their combinations indicate a high speed and persistence, an illustration of the governments aims and future plans. During the first term of the Rama government, especially, EU integration was a key issue raised during parliamentary speeches, electoral campaigns and various media interviews. The following is a reoccurring and repeated statement, not only by PM Rama but also by other Albanian politicians. 'By no doubt the European path is definitely not one of the choices for us, but it is the only and the ultimate choice.' (PM Rama)

Also, different modes of travelling are highlighted. On several occasions PM Rama has discussed the European Union as a bus and the candidate countries as potential passengers who are on board of the bus, however, do not have a seat. 'The slow EU bus is becoming an interesting place to stay even without a free seat – no doubt the passengers of the Western Balkans can endure better the length of the trip as they follow a loud conversation between the seated guys. Let's hear what's next.' (PM Rama)

The 'seated guys' here refers to the EU member countries from whom the passengers (Western Balkan countries/ candidate countries) expect to hear news of whether they will be secured a seat in the bus or not. The trip is also considered long, implying that the integration is not anywhere nearby but it will still take more time to be fulfilled. PM Rama has used the same metaphor in another occasion where he compares the EU bus with a Russian plane, alluding to the Wagner's head plane crash. 'In the

current state of affairs staying on the EU bus even without a seat is safer than sitting on a Russian plane, because the journey may be too slow and our destination too far, but one thing is as certain as death: This bus will never crash in the EU.' (PM Rama)

He reinstates here again the slowness and the distance of the process, which is not a new statement in the discourse of PM Rama. In the following passage, extracted from a speech delivered by PM Rama at the Kreisky Forum for International Dialogue in 2014, we can clearly infer Rama's view on the process of EU integration conceptualized as a journey. He states that the path towards EU was conceptualized as a *train* journey which he dislikes as this typology of a journey does not match the Albanian perspective on EU integration. Conventionally speaking train journeys are considered as slow, long distance journeys which, in PM Rama's view do not resonate with the reality of the Albanian political context. He attributes the length and slowness of the journey to the bureaucratic processes carried out in Brussels.

The viewpoint that considers the EU as long and further destination has been uttered by PM Rama in other circumstances too, by using a different metaphor: *European integration is the future*. 'There is no possible influence that can change our European belonging. Europe is a religion for us and beyond all constraints and disappointments we want to be fully part of it as a choice of our vocation.' (PM Rama)

This metaphor is similar to the *journey* metaphor as it refers to a future aim too. But instead of a spatial conceptualization (more inherent in the *journey* metaphor), this metaphor reflects a temporal conceptualization. Time is divided into the past and the future in relation to the present. The linear image of time flowing from the past towards the future, supported by accompanying metaphorical processes, reconstructs the concept of progress: whatever belongs to the past is reactionary and undeveloped, while the future is associated with notions of development and progress. Such a perception made possible statements within political discourses in which Albania's accession to the EU is portrayed as its opting for the future. However, Prime Minister Rama's statements regarding Albania's path towards EU integration seem contradictory. On the one hand, he articulates a sense of pessimism by characterizing the country's integration as

illusory and akin to a dream. However, in a contrasting vein, he reaffirms the notion that this very dream remains a worthwhile pursuit and the singular viable alternative for Albania. This duality in his discourse reflects the complexity and ambivalence inherent in country's EU aspirations.

I am nor optimistic and either pessimistic, I am just realistic, which means I know, we all know that it is not about us but it is about them, the EU I mean. We have done everything to deserve the formal start of negotiations since more than two years now. But they have not delivered yet because of their own problems and lately because Bulgaria is blocking North Macedonia. [...]

Nevertheless, I think this struggle help us realize that we must push and push forward as much as we can, without illuding ourselves while never giving up on pursuing the dream of many generations to be integrated part of Europe, whatever it will take. (PM Rama)

The *European integration is a journey* metaphor has been supplemented by another conceptual metaphor the *Europe is a building / edifice / home / fortress*. This metaphor is not confined to Albanian political discourse only. It became very popular in the mid-1980s, after Mikhail Gorbachev used the phrase common European home to emphasize the 'political vision of a collaborative way of living together for the European nations' (Musolff 2004, 127). The source concept of the building has mostly been used to denote the entity 'Europe' in its geo-political sense. It builds upon the traditions of metonymic identification between a political entity and the dynastic household or other ruling institutions.

However, in actual European political discourses, the European house almost exclusively denotes the European Union. When referring to the integration of Albania and other Western Balkans countries in the EU, the Union is depicted as a building or even fortress in some cases, which does not include the WB countries despite their undisputed geographical status as part of the European continent. This conceptualization of the EU as a building, is linguistically related to the famous phrase building Europe, uttered by French president, Nicolas Sarkozy in July 2008 during France's EU presidency, when he states that: 'We must [...] profoundly change our way of building Europe, which worries the citizens of Europe' (Samuel 2008).

Non-EU nations that belong geographically to Europe are perceived as outsiders, who may have a future chance of being allowed into the European house, by way of an extension of the already existing European house.

During the Skopje Economic Forum in June 2021, immediately after failing to establish a date for the opening of accession negotiations, PM Edi Rama stated: 'We did not fail, they failed, they have their own reasons. It's their house, not ours. We want to enter, but the house is not ours.' And further: 'We are in Europe, surrounded by European borders. They tell us that they want us to be inside, but you have to respect some rules which we have not established yet.'

In his statement Rama reinforces the concept of the EU as a fortress. He distinguishes between the European Union as an institution and Europe as a geographical entity, part of which Albania is. He plays with the paradox of being part of the European landscape, but still outside of the fortress. Also, he applies here an Us vs. Them narrative which is a rhetorical strategy that aims at oversimplifying complex issues by polarizing the involved actors and manipulating the audience into positioning themselves with one of the sides. He extensively uses the first-person plural pronoun We, also known as the Royal We, which here embodies a deictic function of expressing inclusivity. This kind of deictic expression is generally used by monarchs representing as one person the whole nation. In pragmatic theories this kind of reference is categorized as an 'exclusive we' as it solely refers to the ruler or a close group of people close to him. However, in political discourses, the royal We reflects a deceptive 'inclusive we' (Yule 1996, 11). By speaking as the representative of the country the PM includes a broader audience in the discourse space which in this case are the common people of the Republic of Albania. By doing so he is spreading the responsibility of the failure beyond the government and governmental institutions.

What can be witnessed in the last decade is that the building / edifice / house / fortress metaphor is not used by European officials and politicians coming from the member states but rather by those who are 'outside the building'. Nevertheless, the mental image of the EU as a building/ edifice/ house/ fortress is reinforced by metaphors referring only to a part of a building, or better what divides the building from the other territory. They are door and doorstep.

In an interview for AFP in February 2020, PM Rama states that: ‘Albania will not stay at Europe’s door and cry for it to open.’ This statement is reminiscent of a controverse interview that Rama gave to Politico in 2017 where he stated that: ‘The only way to keep the Balkans in this peaceful and cooperative mode ... is to keep the path to the EU open, to keep the perspective clear, to keep emotions about the EU positive. No one would like to turn [in] on themselves and look for smaller unions, everyone would like to unite in the big union. But if there’s no hope, no perspective, no space, then, of course, little unions may happen.’ And also: ‘A union with Kosovo is not my wish but a possible alternative to the closed door of the European Union.’

The above cited statements serve to underscore the Prime Minister’s assumption that Albania has satisfactorily met all the requirements set forth by the EU, thereby absolving itself from further obligations pertaining to the integration process. Notably, Prime Minister Rama implies a somewhat threatening tone when he states that the country will need to seek other alliances and look for other ‘smaller unions’. Apparently, this was not just a rhetorical device as evidenced by the events of July 2021, when Albania, in conjunction with Serbia and the Republic of Macedonia entered into an agreement to establish the ‘Open Balkan Initiative’. This initiative, notably, establishes a shared economic area encompassing all three participating countries.

Conclusions

Following a Critical Discourse Analysis and a Critical Metaphor Analysis perspective the findings identify the conceptualization of the EU integration process in terms of linguistic devices of movement such as start, move forward, push forward, pursue and more concretely as a path and destination, which belong to the semantic frame of a *journey*, thus generating the *European integration is a journey* conceptual metaphor. The journey element is reinforced by the conceptualizations of the process in terms of vehicles which on the other hand establish the perception and ideological stance of the political discourse in Albania.

The *journey* metaphor as opposed to the other static metaphors, implies an immediate imperative for Albania to learn, mature and transform during this process. From the Albanian point of view, however, there are con-

tradictory views on the matter. Prime Minister Rama, frequently asserts that the European future of Albania is an undeniable right and occurrence, yet simultaneously regards it as illusory dream.

What can be witnessed is that during the last mandate of Prime Minister Edi Rama's government there appears to be a noticeable shift away from the previously optimistic and positive discourse regarding the EU integration process of the country. Also, the Prime Minister's discourse on matters related to the EU integration process seems to merge with his more general political discourse by always seeking to address his electorate and aiming to manipulate and persuade them.

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Ontološka interpretacija Heideggerjeve analize vsakdanje tubiti in problem avtentične prakse

POVZETEK: V Heideggerjevem delu *Bit in čas* lahko razberemo neko implicitno ontologijo avtentične prakse, če skozi delo fragmentarno raztresena napotila na praktični smisel avtentičnosti bremo skupaj z eksistencialno hermenevtiko vsakdanjega delovanja. Struktura vsakdanjega delovanja negativno očrta smisel avtentične prakse, ki bistveno sestoji v upiranju zapadlemu, navideznemu delovanju. Ker pa je avtentična praksa neizogibno umeščena v zgodovinski kontekst, obenem pa vselej poteka kot neka interpretativna praksa, se to upiranje vsakdanjim vzorcem delovanja lahko dogaja le kot interpretativna de-konstrukcija zgodovinskih, življenjskosvetnih pogojev prakse. De-konstrukcija kot hermenevtično dogajanje pa obenem omogoča konstrukcijo izvirnejšega razumevanja smisla. Teza članka se torej glasi, da je avtentična praksa v sodobnem življenjskem svetu mogoča le z določenim nasiljem proti samim pogojem prakse, oz. njihovo »destrukcijo«. Eksistencialni pojem de-konstrukcije je tako treba razumeti enakoizvorno kot razgradnjo zapadlih vzorcev delovanja in hkrati produktivno, ustvarjalno grajenje novega smisla, ki pa zaradi zgodovinskosti fakticitete nujno ostaja interpretativno vezana na svoje pogoje. Eksistencialni pojem avtentične prakse zato bistveno vključuje razvito zavedanje te hermenevtične situacije. V članku izhajam iz strogo ontološkega razumevanja tubiti oz. eksistence in ustrezno podajam ontološko interpretacijo vsakdanje sotubiti, v nasprotju z raznimi konvencionalističnimi in pragmatističnimi interpretacijami. V sklepnem delu članka zagovarjam, da tak ontološki pristop lahko nudi glavne obrise ontologije avtentične prakse.

Ključne besede: tubit, delovanje, komunikacija, časovnost, avtentičnost

Ontological interpretation of Heidegger's analysis of everyday Dasein and the problem of authentic practice

ABSTRACT: In Heidegger's *Being and Time* one can recognize a certain implicit ontology of authentic practice, if we read the fragmentary mentions of practical authenticity together with the existential hermeneutics of everyday action. The structure of everyday action outlines the meaning of authentic practice in a negative way, which essentially consists in resisting the fallen action, which only seemingly

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presents itself as such. Authentic practice as inevitably rooted in a historical context can thus happen only as an interpretative deconstruction of the contemporary life-world conditions of practice. The aim of the article is then to articulate these conditions, both in a purely structural and temporal manner as guidelines for an authentic practice that recognizes the contemporary conditions of action and confronts them by resisting their pull of fallen thrownness. Methodologically I proceed from a strict ontological understanding of Dasein, and accordingly offer an ontological interpretation of everyday Mitsein, as opposed to various conventionalist and pragmatist approaches. In conclusion I argue that such an ontological approach can provide a basic outline of an ontology of authentic practice.

Keywords: Dasein, action, communication, temporality, authenticity

Pojem eksistence in eksistencialne ontologije

S pojmom tubit oz. eksistenca bom v članku mislil v govorici strukturirano razumevanje odnosa do biti in sveta kot strukturirane smiselne sklenjenosti biti oz. bitnega smisla bivajočega. Ker razumevanje samo pomeni nek interpretativni odnos, s tubitjo torej mislim ta »refleksivno« strukturiran odnos do odnosa do sveta; odnos do sveta eksistencialno nujno vključuje odnos do samega tega odnosa. Na podlagi tako opredeljenega smisla tubiti bom z ontologijo tubiti oz. »ontološko interpretacijo« razumel take vrste analizo, ki se ukvarja z zgoraj podano strukturo tubiti, ne pa morda s kako pragmatistično ali drugače razumljeno »tubitjo«. Tak interpretativni in analitični pristop preprečuje, da bi pri branju *Biti in časa* in interpretativnem razvijanju njegovih tez obtičali na zgolj fenomenalni, ontični ravni, in ne bi dosegli hermenevtične ravni dekonstrukcije obravnavanih fenomenov do njihove ontološke osnove, ter fenomenološke ravni eksistencialne konstrukcije ontološke strukture tubiti. Resda pa je zato potreben precejšen interpretativni vložek, saj se samo besedilo *Biti in časa* dostikrat zgolj mestoma ali pa implicitno navezuje na omenjeno ontološko raven.

Omenjena ontološka perspektiva je posebej pomembna v vidiku vprašanja smisla in možnosti transformacije nesamolastne v samolastno tubit. Če bi namreč šlo zgolj za to, da bi se nekako transformiral način odnosa do sveta, ki zaznamuje oba načina tubiti kot biti-v-svetu, bi se soočili z vprašanjem, kaj natanko bi lahko predstavljalo merilo njunega razlikovanja. Če pa vprašanje zastavimo pristno eksistencialno-ontološko, se pravi na način, kaj razlikuje odnos do odnosa do sveta, ki pripada vsakdanji tubiti, in odnos do odnosa do sveta, ki pripada samolastni tubiti, imamo opraviti z modalnim razlikovanjem, ki se ga ne da zvesti zgolj na poljubno razliko v

razumevanju svetnosti, ampak je utemeljeno v sami strukturi sebstva tubiti, se pravi v tem, kako tubit interpretativno razume samo sebe.²

Razmerje samolastne in nesamolastne tubiti

Problem razmerja samolastne in nesamolastne oz. vsakdanje tubiti je pri anglosaških analitičnih interpretih zastavljen v vidiku, ali naj *se* bremo kot temeljno strukturo eksistence, ki je sama po sebi nevtralna (Dreyfus),³ ali pa ta status pripada zgolj sotubiti, medtem ko *se*, ki predstavlja

2 V *Biti in času* lahko sicer razberemo naslednje pomene ontološkega: 1. Minimalni, pragmatistični pomen: splošna interpretativna struktura delovanja; 2. Minimalni, aletheiološki pomen: splošna struktura razklenjenosti smisla; 3. Hermenevitični pomen: krog razumevanja in razlage odnosa do biti in smisla biti; 4. Eksistencialni pomen: odnos do odnosa do biti in sveta.

3 S tem je povezan problem interpretacije izraza *bzw.*, *beziehungsweise*, ki ga Heidegger uporabi, ko govori o nesamolastnem oz. indiferentnem modusu tubiti (Heidegger 2005, 84). Ta ima lahko dva pomena, disjunktivnega ali eksplikativnega. Pri razlikovanju samolastnosti, nesamolastnosti in modalne indiference gre za eksistencialno analitično razlikovanje, če analiza najprej obravnava tubit, kot eksistira najprej in večinoma, in to pomeni tubit kot indiferentno v oziru modalnosti, to pomeni, da se ne posveča vidiku nesamolastnosti, ali samolastnosti. Kar pa ne pomeni, da vsakdanja nesamolastna indiferentnost ni eksistencialni termin. V drugem smislu, pa tubit res eksistira indiferentno, v indiferenci modalnega smisla, kolikor se izkazuje v oziru, da sploh eksistira, v svoji izvorni strukturiranosti, iz nje. Tudi kot samolastna, vendar eksistira tudi indiferentno, nediferencirano, kolikor pač eksistira kot tubit, se pravi kot vržena in razumevajoča. Ne gre skratka za izključujoči ali. Interpretacija indiferentnosti kot »niti izbirajoč se niti ne izbirajoč se kot samolastna, ampak izgubljen v se-j, ker še ni soočena s tesnobo, je napačna in formalistična« (Koo 2017, 61). Tubit se je vselej že izbrala tako ali drugače. Tu priključujem naslednji princip interpretacije: eksistencialov ne gre množiti preko potrebe. Problem se zvede na to, ali je ne-samolastno povsem zamenljivo z nesamolastno (68). Tako Koo predlaga, da je tubit v modusu nerazlikovanosti ne povsem, ampak samo relativno vrednostno nevtralna (70) in zagovarja, da je indiferenca sicer nesamolastna, ampak zgolj nek modus nesamolastnosti, poleg izrecnega odvrčanja od samolastnosti; vendar pa obenem indiferenco razume kot izvzetost iz izbire za samolastnost ali nesamolastnost. To se zdi preveč umetno razlikovanje; tubit si je namreč ravno vselej že izbrala, se zasnula v takem ali drugačnem načinu eksistiranja. Treba je uvideti, kar izkazuje sama eksistenca. V ideji eksistence ne najdemo nobene vsebine, ki bi ustrezala nerazlikovanosti kot modusu eksistiranja. In če je nerazlikovanost prav nemodaliziranost, tubit pa je vselej že modalizirana, tedaj je metodološki smisel nerazlikovanosti samo ta, ki se nanaša elemente tubiti, kakor so lahko opazovani nemodalizirano. Heidegger ne trdi, da je celotna analiza prvega odseka, do analize *se-ja*, analiza nerazlikovane, nemodalizirane tubiti, ampak da je to cilj te analize, izražen v analizi biti-v kot take. Pravo eksistencialno vprašanje se glasi, zakaj mora tubit biti vselej že modalizirana, vselej samolastna ali nesamolastna? Heidegger sam pove: ker je vselej moja, in ker tubiti gre zanj samo, zato je vselej že v odnosu do lastnega eksistiranja na tak ali drugačen način. Indiferentnost skratka nima nobenega jasnega eksistencialnega smisla. Trditi, da je pristno nesamolastna tubit pač nediferencirana, ker se, ko se ni še soočila s tesnobo, še ni zmožna odločiti za samolastnost ali pobegniti v nesamolastnost kot tako, pomeni zanemariti celoten smisel zapadanja in tubiti kot vselej že zapadle. Prim. King, ki razlaga indiferenco vsakdanjosti tako, da to pomeni, da razlika med samolastnim in nesamolastnim sebstvom še ne pride na svetlo, ostane nerazlikovana (King 2001, 42).

nesamolastno modifikacijo, ne tvori bistvene strukture tubiti (Olafson), Mulhall pa zagovarja branje, po katerem je struktura *se*-ja sama po sebi nevtralna, čeprav se morda najprej in večinoma kaže na način nesamolastnosti (Knowles 2017, 32–37).⁴ Knowles (2017) pa zagovarja interpretacijo razmerja samolastne tubiti in *se*-ja kot prožno odprtost za prevpraševanje na videz samoumevnih družbenih norm.

Sam pa interpretativno izhajam iz branja, ki razločuje izvorno strukturo eksistence, kot globinsko interpretativno plastjo tubiti, ki je lahko prevzeta kot taka v samolastnem modusu eksistiranja in interpretativno bližjo, površinsko nesamolastno eksistenco, ki je strukturirana na način bega pred lastno izvorno strukturo (enako Magid 2015, 3, 10). Medtem pa zagovarjam, da je pojmovanje nekega nevtralnega, niti samolastnega niti nesamolastnega modusa eksistence eksistencialno neveljavno, da je dalje struktura sotubiti in *se*-ja struktura nesamolastne tubiti, mesto samolastne tubiti pa je v konfrontacijski komunikaciji z nesamolastno vsakdanjo sotubitjo. Iz interpretacije relevantnih odsekov, ki jo ponujam v članku, bo vidno, zakaj se ne strinjam z nobenim od omenjenih pristopov. Kot je razvidno, se namreč celotna diskusija pri omenjenih avtorjih vrti okoli tega, kako pojmovati razmerje samolastnosti, nesamolastnosti in *se*-ja, kot različnih načinov odnosa do sveta. Povsem spregledan pa je ontološki vidik, ki ga sam izpostavljam, se pravi, kako je odnos do tega, da je tubit sploh v odnosu do sveta kot strukturiranega in sklenjenega bitnega smisla, konstituiran v sotubiti in *se*-ju.

Ontologija vsakdanjega delovanja

V paragrafih *Biti in časa*, v katerih se posveča temeljni strukturi tega, kako tubit eksistira *najprej in večinoma*, v vsakdanjem razumevanju napotilnih sklopov, in sveta kot namembnostne celote, Heidegger dekonstruira vsakdanje samorazumevanje tubiti in izpostavi njeno temeljno krožno hermenevtično strukturo. Ta sestoji v spiralni, vzajemni določenosti

⁴ Knowles povzema pozicije omenjenih avtorjev glede problema, ali in v katerem smislu je mogoče uskladiti način tubiti kot se in samolastnosti. Za pregled diskusije o se prim. tudi Knudsen (2023, 172–175), ki se posveča Drayfusu in Carmanu kot reprezentativnima avtorjema, ki zastopata konvencionalistično interpretacijo, in Olafsonu, kot predstavniku eksistencialističnega branja, v katerem se nastopa zgolj kot eksistencialna modifikacija.

samorazumevanja tubiti (kakšne vrste sebstvo je), razumetja smisla biti bivajočega in sveta kot sklenjene strukture tako razumetega bivajočega (bivajoče kot priročno, prisotno itd.), ki temelji v izvorni enotnosti zavoljnosti (skrbi) in oskrbovanja: tubit eksistira zavoljo same sebe, kakor se razume kot bit v svetu, zavoljo svojega odnosa do sveta, ta svoj odnos pa oskrbuje z znotrajsvetno bivajočim, ga z njegovo pomočjo interpretira. Zato način, kako tubit razume bivajoče in svet določa tudi način, kako razume sebe samo, kot bit v svetu, kot odnos do sveta.⁵

Trdim, da lahko v tem temeljnem hermenevtičnem krogu razberemo neko osnovno hermenevtično strukturo delovanja, v najširšem smislu, imeti-opravka-s-svetom, oskrbovanja lastne skrbi za svoj odnos do sveta. In sicer to strukturo tvori *komunikacija* zavoljnosti (motivacije, sebstva, razumevanja) in življenjskega sveta, ki je take vrste, da *sooblikuje* oz. *soustvarja* posamezne situacije, v katere se umešča tubit in s tem izraža in razvija odnos tubiti do lastnega odnosa do sveta (eksistenco).

Da bi torej podrobneje konstruirali eksistencialni pojem vsakdanjega delovanja, je treba analizirati razmerje vsakdanjega razumevanja in življenjskega sveta ter komunikacije med njima. Osnovna ideja tega članka je ta, da je to delo Heidegger opravił v svoji analizi vsakdanje sotubiti in njene časovne strukture. Vendar lahko te analize kot številni interpreti beremo povsem pragmatistično in ontično, izhajajoč iz različnih vnaprejšnjih metodoloških predpostavk, ki so tuje eksistencialni analizi. V osrednjem delu članka bom torej podal strogo eksistencialno in pa ontološko interpretacijo teh Heideggerjevih analiz.

5 Analiza vsakdanjosti je vpeljana kot analiza fakticitete – vrženosti tubiti v odnos do biti, v katerem ji je biti. Kaj je smisel, cilj te analize? Izkazati neko temeljno, izvorno strukturo odnosa do bitnega smisla, strukturo vrženega zasnutka. Analiza vsakdanjosti ima tu eksemplarično funkcijo. Na najbližjem modusu tubiti naj bi se razbrala struktura tega odnosa. Tu pa se zdaj postavi vprašanje, ali je sploh nekaj takega kot najprej in večinoma vsakdanje tubiti, ali pa je to morda neka umetna, teoretska konstrukcija? Zakaj bi načeloma bilo tako, da bi povprečno tubit obvladoval en način eksistiranja? In, morda pomembneje, ali je to metodološko nujno za uspeh analize? Ali pa je tako, da je pač treba izbrati kar najbolj nesamolastni bitni način, da bi se samolastni lahko toliko izvorneje izkazal? Zaradi enakoizvornega ustroja fakticitete ni tako pomembno, katerega od tubitnih načinov, ki so najprej in večinoma dostopni samorazlagi izberemo, ampak da izberemo sploh neki takšen tubitni način. V samem *Biti in času* sicer vzporedno potekata vsaj dve niti, dva poudarka analize najbližje tubiti, ena je »rokodelska« tubit, druga pa je tubit, ki beži pred svojo fakticiteto, tubit zapadlosti »se«-ju. Ti dve sta prepleteni, sopripadni.

S pojmom komunikacije tu ne mislim na običajni pomen komuniciranja med osebami, sporočanja, sodelovanja v dialogu, deljenja mnenj, prepričevanja, argumentacije, pripovedovanja ipd., ampak rabim ta pojem strogo v smislu interpretativnega posredovanja med dvema ali več momenti nekega interpretacijskega oz. razumevanjskega sklopa. Konkretno, v tem pomenu v članku rabim pojem komunikacije v navezavi na razmerje med tubitjo (oz. eksistenco, tubitnim razumevanjem in interpretacijo) in interpretativno strukturo sveta vsakdanje tubiti.

V drugem delu članka pa se bom posvetil problemu konstrukcije pojma avtentične prakse, ki mora biti vodena z dekonstrukcijo vsakdanjega delovanja, in vprašanju njunega razmerja. Če je analiza vsakdanje tubiti razumeta pragmatistično, namesto ontološko, se diskusija vrti okoli problema na kakšne načine in do katere mere je mogoče v vsakdanjem delovanju avtentizirati eksistenco na način *se*-ja kot določen način odnosa do tega *se*. Medtem pa ontološka interpretacija vsakdanje tubiti pokaže, da se avtentično eksistiranje lahko odvija le na način razgradnje modusa *se*-ja in njegovega dinamičnega interpretativnega preoblikovanja, v upiranju pritegu njegove strukture.

Sotubit drugih in vsakdanja sobit

V 26. paragrafu *Biti in časa*, »Sotubit drugih in vsakdanja tubit« (Heidegger 2005, 169–180) lahko razberemo eksistencialni pojem komunikacije. Heidegger najprej ugotavlja, da se značaj srečevanja drugih ravna po lastni tubiti. »Drugi« tako ne pomeni celotnega preostanka ostalih razen mene, ampak so »drugi« ti, od katerih *se najprej in večinoma sami ne razlikujemo, med katerimi smo* (170). To lahko označimo kot *tudi-tu-bit-z-njimi*. Ta »z« pa je sam tubitnost, ne nanaša se na neko sonavzočnost (171). Tisti »tudi« pa izraža *enakost eksistence* kot sprevideno priskrbovalne biti-v-svetu. Heidegger na osnovi tega sklene, da je na *osnovi* te biti-v-svetu-na-način-z, svet vselej že ta svet, ki ga delim z drugimi, sosvet (ibid.). To strukturo biti-z-v-skupnem svetu formalno označi kot »sobit.«

Obenem pa to pomeni, da so drugi srečljivi *iz* sveta, ne zgolj kot individui, ki nastopajo *v* svetu (171). Heidegger za to ponuja naslednjo fenomenološko ponazoritev: tudi samotnost je način sotubiti; tudi če so drugi navzoči, lahko tubit ostaja sama, jih ne srečuje v eksistencialnem smislu,

na osnovi neke apriorne eksistencialne skupnosti (173). Kaj lahko razberemo iz te ponazoritve? Biti-z, so-tubit, ki omogoča in implicira, da delim z drugimi skupni svet, je torej komunikacijskost v pomenu določenosti moje lastne biti-v-svetu skozi komunikacijo, deljenje interpretacije sveta in interpretativnim navezovanjem na interpretirane smisle, ki so vselej že razpoložljivi v svetu.

Z eksistencialnega vidika bi si bilo namreč absurdno predstavljati, da druge v vsakdanjem priskrbovanju srečujem kot tu-bit, kot eksistence, prav tako kot razumem sebe. Nasprotno, prisotna je že neka nivelizacija: enakost tubiti, nerazlikovanost. To nivelizacijo omogoča komunikacija. Heidegger tako pravi: »Sobiti je določenost vselej lastne tubiti; sotubit karakterizira tubit drugih, *kolikor je za druge sproščena prek svojega sveta*. Lastna tubit je, kolikor ima bistveno strukturo sobiti, *le za druge srečljiva sotubit*« (174). V tem zadnjem stavku je izrecno naznačena nivelizacija, ki deluje v konstituciji so-tubiti. Skupaj s prejšnjim stavkom pa pojasnjuje bistveno vlogo komunikacije v konstituciji vsakdanjega tubitnostnega izkustva drugega: le kolikor samega sebe, v lastni tubiti razumem že iz komunikacije, ki je stalno učinkujoča v skupnem svetu, in se skozi to že niveliziram, sem 1. lahko za druge srečljiv kot sotubit; 2. lahko druge srečujem v njihovi sotubiti. In sicer enakoizvorno: zgolj kolikor druge srečujem v njihovi komunikacijski nivelizirani sotubiti, sem tudi srečljiv za druge; zgolj kolikor sem v svoji komunikacijski nivelizirani sotubiti srečljiv za druge, lahko druge srečujem.⁶

Ker je vsakršen smisel nazadnje izkusljiv le v vselej moji tubitnostni interpretaciji, enako velja za odnos do drugih. Nikoli torej ne srečam, vsaj ne v vsakdanjem načinu eksistence, drugega zares kot tu-bit; to bi predpostavljalo nek model življenja v edinstveni, povsem lastni odnos do lastnega eksistiranja drugega, kar je eksistencialno nesmiselno. Na kakšen način, in v katerem smislu torej vendarle srečujem druge v skupnem svetu, v nji-

6 Kritiki Heideggerjeve razlage intersubjektivnosti kot denimo, reprezentativno, Sartre, predpostavljajo vnaprej, da intersubjektivnost temelji na partikulariziranem, vselej konkretnem odnosu jaz-ti, in zane-marjo celotno poanto analize zapadlega sebstva vsakdanje tubiti, ki razkriva vsakršno vsakdanje jaz-ti razmerje kot zgolj modifikacijo zapadle, nivelizarne, generične sotubiti (McMullin 2013, 58–77). V nadaljevanju se McMullin posveti kritiki Heideggerjevega apriorizma in se v tem sklopu sklicuje na Tugendhatovo kritiko Heideggerjevega pojmovanja resnice, ki naj ne bi bilo zmožno podati resničnostnih pogojev konkretne situacije (77–105).

hovi tu-biti? To pa že zastavlja vprašanje smisla avtentične komunikacije, ki ne bi obsegala le niveliziranega sotvorjenja skupnega, deljenega tubitnega samorazumetja. Pojem sotubiti torej nima te funkcije, da bi razrešil problem intersubjektivnosti eksistence, se pravi, kako naj bi bila tubit konstituirana skozi vzajemno komunikacijo. V sotubiti in *se*-ju vselejmojost eksistence nastopa le na način generičnega *nekdo*, medtem ko se problem življenjskosvetne intersubjektivnosti lahko zastavi ontološko, kot eksistencialni problem, šele ob predpostavki soočenja z radikalno edinstvenostjo eksistence. Struktura eksistence kot take pa sama v sebi ne vsebuje nobene vnaprejšnje in imanentne intersubjektivne ali skupnostne strukture v tem strogem eksistencialnem smislu (čeprav je njena vsakokratna eksistencialna modifikacija biti-v-svetu seveda vselej tako ali drugače zgodovinsko, družbeno zaznamovana). *Bit in čas* moramo zato brati izhajajoč iz uvodoma podane izvirne strukture eksistence kot radikalno vselejmoje, ne pa morda iz poglavij o vsakdanji in zapadli tubiti. To pomeni, da je vsakršna tubitna »intersubjektivnost«, skupnost oz. sotubit konstituirana na temelju zapadanja in prikrivanja izvirne strukture tubiti.

Kolikor je tubit bistveno opredeljena kot skrb, tudi modusu sotubiti pripada neka specifična struktura skrbi. Sotubiti pa ne more pripadati način priskrbovanja, ki pripada netubitnostno bivajočemu. Namesto tega Heidegger posebni modus skrbi, ki zaznamuje sotubit, imenuje biti v skrbi-za (174). Kakšna je zveza priskrbovanja in skrbi-za? Skrb-za se prav lahko odvija na način priskrbovanja, gre za to, da je tedaj to motivirano z nekim drugačnim odnosom, in sicer sotubitnostnim odnosom. Najprej in večino pa je modus skrbi-za deficienten, na način indifference (ibid.)

Skrb-za v skladu s prej povedanim očitno zadeva komunikacijo, je način skrbi in priskrbovanja oblikovan v komunikaciji, glede na komunikacijsko sotubit. V vsakdanjem modusu gre tako za skrb za drugega v njegovem načinu komunikacijske sotubitnosti, ki omogoča, da se v skupnem svetu za drugega nekaj priskrbuje, tisto, kar oskrbuje samo njegovo komunikacijsko sotubit. Osrednjega pomena pa je to, da je tudi komunikacija nekaj, kar se oskrbuje skozi priskrbovanje, in kar potrebuje stalno oskrbovanje (s »komunikacijskimi sredstvi«, »dogodki«, »priložnostmi« itd.).

Posebni interpretacijski smisel zasnutka, samorazumevanja, ki mu sicer pripada struktura zavoljnosti (herm. krog tubiti in oskrbovanja priskrblji-

vega) v komunikaciji, komunikacijski sotubiti, je tako *biti zavoljo-drugih* (177). Ti »drugi«, kot rečeno, niso ta ali oni posameznik, v svoji radikalno lastni tubiti kot taki (kar bi veljalo v primeru samolastnosti), ampak v komunikaciji vnaprej že nivelizirano razkrita sotubitnost vsakega in kogarkoli. Biti zavoljo drugih tedaj pomeni: eksistirati zavoljo skupne, nivelizirane, nediferencirane komunikacijske sotubiti. To pa spet zarisuje problem avtentične komunikacije, ki se prebija iz obroča zavoljnosti nivelizirane, nediferencirane komunikacije.

Hermenevtično strukturo tubitne komunikacije lahko še dodatno ekspliciramo. Komunikacija je na eni strani nekaj, kar se samo oskrbuje skozi priskrbovanje, hkrati pa ima svoj specifični način priskrbovanja, priskrbovanje deljene, skupne razumljivosti tega, kar se priskrbuje. Spet na drugi strani pa je zato to priskrbovanje razumljivosti priskrbovanja *določeno* s tistim, kar se v vsakdanjem priskrbovanju sicer priskrbuje. Tako Heidegger pravi: »Medsebojno poznavanje temelji v izvorno razumeti sobiti. To se najprej, skladno z najbližjim načinom biti sobivajoče biti-v-svetu, giblje v razumevajočem poznavanju tega, kar tubit z drugim okolnosvetnim sprevidevno najdeva in priskrbuje. Priskrbovanje v skrbi za je razumeto iz priskrbovanega in z razumevanjem le-tega« (177–178).

Tubit zmeraj že razume samo sebe v svojem vsakdanjem načinu eksistence iz priskrbovalnega odnosa do sveta, v katerem smiselno oskrbuje lastno eksistenco, lastni odnos do sveta. Ta priskrbovalni odnos je zmeraj že vpet v neko komunikacijo. Skozi to je s svetom zmeraj že razkrita nivelizirana sotubitnost »drugih«, ki ne pomenijo alteritete, prave drugosti, ampak deljeni interpretativni horizont, v katerega vsaka lastna tubit sama spada, se vanj umešča in sicer tako, da se v svojem priskrbovanju vselej že razume iz tega, kako se razumejo »drugi«, tp. kdorkoli, ki ga lahko sreča v svetu. Ta določenost s samointerpretacijo, in samorazumevanjem, ki ju deli in ju lahko izvaja vsak prav tako »kot kdorkoli drug«, je tisto, kar omogoča izkustvo skupnega, deljenega sveta, torej niveliziran vselej že prisotni razumevanjski kontekst, v katerega se vselej že umeščam: in to je eksistenčialni pojem komunikacije v vsakdanjem načinu tubiti.

Ker pa se komunikacija, ki je le en način skrbi tubiti, ki se mora zato tudi sam oskrbovati, kot je bilo rečeno, se tudi ta »skupni«, tj. nivelizirani razumevanjski horizont, ki predstavlja enega od momentov komunikaci-

je stalno priskrbuje. Velja torej hermenevtični krog. Vse vsakdanje priskrbovanje se odvija v »mediju«, horizontu komunikacije, v horizontu niveliziranega samorazumetja tubiti, iz katerega vsaka individualna tubit razume samo sebe; sam ta razumevanjski horizont pa se stalno vzdržuje skozi priskrbovanje, ki ga vodi skrb za ta skupni, nivelizirani horizont samorazumevanja.

Vsakdanja tubit kot se

Heideggerjeva analiza strukture sebstva vsakdanje tubiti kot *se* (Heidegger 2005, 180–185) nam lahko ponudi podrobnejšo opredelitev eksistencialnih značilnosti komunikacije. Tubit najprej in večinoma eksistira tako, kakor *se* eksistira, smisel biti v svetu najprej in večinoma prihaja iz vnaprejšnje, vselej dostopne javne razloženosti (181). Tubit si ni sama izbrala in iznašla, kaj pomeni eksistirati v svetu, ampak se je v njem vselej že znašla. V tem leži nesamolastnost tubiti. K samorazumetju tubiti na način *se* spada zavoljnost, kot osnovna struktura razumevanja. V tem načinu tubit torej eksistira zavoljo tega, kakor *se* eksistira. Toda zavoljnost je na drugi strani bistveno zvezana s sebstvom, s povratnim, interpretativnim odnosom do samega sebe, zavoljo-sebe je tisto, kar šele omogoča neki čemu in zato-da.

Kako tedaj razumeti to nesamolastno sebstvo vsakdanje tubiti? Da bi opredelili to sebstvo moramo ta *Das Man* prevesti nekoliko drugače, ne zgolj kakor nastopa v običajnih prevodih raznih fraz. Pokažemo lahko, da je pomen, na katerega Heidegger meri s tem izrazom v resnici »nekdo-kdorkoli«, se pravi nedoločna tretja oseba ednine, ne pa toliko čista nedoločnost oz. brezosebnost. Tega *se* se pravi ni razumeti dobesedno. Pač pa tako, da izraža ta izvorni *sem nekdo*, toda obenem s tem tudi že »vsakdo«, katerikoli izmed nedoločenih *mnogih, hoi polloi*. Vse, kar vsakdanje opravljam, opravljam kot ta vsakdo, kot sebstvo glede na »vrsto«, ki ji pripadam.⁷ Vsakdanja bit v svetu tako pomeni eksistirati kot »vsakdo, ki je v

7 Prim. Heidegger: »Sem je izvorno napačno. Treba je reči: 'Sem nekdo-kdorkoli (*Ich bin man*)'. 'Nekdo-kdorkoli' je, 'nekdo-kdorkoli'/'človek' ima opraviti s tem ali onim, 'nekdo-kdorkoli'/'človek' vidi stvari na nek določen način« (Heidegger 2002, 63–64). Prim. Wrathall (2017, 17): »Interpretiram se kot povprečni pripadnik te skupine, kot ljudje ... In kolikor tako ravnam, je moje sebstvo sam *se*«. Priličenje nevtralnemu se ustvarja povprečno sebstvo. Razumeti vselejmojost tubiti kot posamezne primerke skupnega načina eksistiranja *se*-ja je na drugi strani napačno (23).

svetu« in ne kot prav »edinstveni jaz sam v svetu«. V svojem odnosu do biti se torej vsakdanje razumem iz tega, kako naj bi se razumel nekdo, katerikoli človek. Toda ta *se*, »nekdo, ki«, je treba razumeti v res kar najširšem smislu, bolj kot implicitno ozadje, ki določa vse vsakdanje razumevanje, kot pa nekakšno splošno, normirano »družbeno prakso«. ⁸

Analiza eksistiranja na način *se* pa nam lahko razkrije, kako je vsakdanja bit-v-svetu zasnovana v nivelizirani komunikaciji, obenem s tem pa tudi svet sam kot »skupni svet«. ⁹ Heidegger kot glavni moment strukture *se*-ja razbere »razločkovnost« (180). Ta pojem označuje, da je v priskrbovanju tubit stalno v skrbi za *razliko* nasproti drugim, »bodisi zgolj zato, da se razlika nasproti njim izravna, bodisi, da se lastna tubit – zaostajajoč za drugimi – hoče v razmerju do njih povzpeti, bodisi je tubit v prekašanju drugih na tem, da jih ponižuje. Bit-z-drugimi, ki je sama sebi skrita, vznemirja skrb za ta razloček. [...] Čim nevpadljivejši je ta način biti vsakdanji tubiti sami, tem trdovratneje in izvirneje učinkuje.« (Ibid.)

8 Nič ne opravimo s tem, če smisel *se*-ja razglasimo za normativnost, vprašati se moramo, kaj je eksistencialni smisel normativnosti? Interpretacija *se*-ja kot norme namreč ne pojasnjuje konstitutivne vloge *se*-ja za določen odnos do biti, ampak jo predpostavlja. Tu se zdi določilna zveza z zavoljnostjo. Javna razloženost usmerja vsakdanjo tubit v njeni zavoljnosti, priskrbovanju biti. Pojma *se* tudi ni razumeti na način preprostega nasprotja individualnega in družbenega, saj ideja individuuma na eni strani in družbe na drugi že predpostavlja subjekt, ki izjavlja te kategorialne distinkcije. (Thomä 2017, 124)

9 Knudsen (2023) *se* razume kot težnjo k uniformnosti, svojo interpretacijo pa zastavlja na ozadju problema socialne ontologije. Toda Heideggerjeva eksistencialna analiza sama nima te ambicije, njena metodologija pa ji je tuja. Heidegger se namreč ne ukvarja s pogoji možnosti družbene komunikacije, eksistiranja in delovanja v družbi, ampak se analize fenomena, ki bi ga lahko provizorično imenovali »družbenost«, loti s povsem drugega vidika – kako beg tubiti pred njeno samolastnostjo konstituira način biti v svetu, ki je zaznamovan z neko vnaprejšnjo danostjo, izravnanoostjo, povprečnostjo, javnostjo, v kateri tubit ravno ni neki delujoči subjekt med drugimi oz. vpeta v nek družbeni kontekst, v katerem lahko načeloma soglaša z določenimi vzpostavljenimi družbenimi praksami ali pa jih zavrača. Heidegger torej ne predpostavlja vnaprej neke družbenosti, ki bi bila eksistencialno konstituirana, in sploh ne opisuje nobene kohezivne družbenosti; ampak opisuje le beg vsakršne zapadle tubiti v anonimno povprečnost »nekoga, ki...«, ki ravno odvezuje vsakršne, tudi družbene zaveze in angažmaja. Zapadaje tubiti konstituira javnost, *se*, itd. *Bit in čas* je tekst konstitutivne fenomenologije in tako kot v primeru vsakega hermenevitičnega teksta je tudi ta razdelek treba brati vzvratno; iz opisa zapadanja (kot zapletanja, vrtinca, pomirjanja), da se razkrije njegov eksistencialni smisel, začetno podana analiza sicer ostane zgolj fenomenalni, ontični opis. Celotna poanta Heideggerjeve analize vsakdanjosti je ravno ta, da tubit ne eksistira na način, da bi v pravem smislu komunicirala drugo tubitjo kot tako, komunicira le z »družbenim«, javnim svetom vnaprejšnje razloženosti, ki pa ga je sama nujno konstruirala s svojo težnjo k zapadanju in begu od samolastnega načina eksistiranja. Ta javna razloženost je seveda že vnaprej dana, v smislu, da se je tubit v njej vselej že znašla, kar pa ne pomeni, da ji ni sama vlila smisla z lastno konstitucijo.

Tu je zdaj, najprej, podana podrobnejša opredelitev skrbi-za kot temeljnega načina skrbi, delujoče v komunikacijski vsakdanosti, ki konstituira nivelizirano sotubitnost. Drugič, pa je v navezavi na to podrobnejšo opredelitev skrbi za kot skrbi za razliko nasproti drugim, značaj razločkovnosti podan navidez nasproti nerazlikovanosti sotubiti (sem tubit med drugimi, katerimi že koli). Kako je tedaj mogoče oboje uskladiti? Najprej, skrb za razlikovanost in razločkovnost sploh ne bi mogla biti mogoča, če ne bi že temeljila v neki izvorni nerazlikovanosti, nivelizirani sotubitnosti »med drugimi«. Potrebno se je tedaj vprašati, kakšne vrste je tedaj ta »razlika«, kaj je vsebina te razločkovnosti? Kako in zakaj naj bi se torej skrb za skupno, nivelizirano komunikacijsko razloženost modificirala na način skrbi za »razliko« od drugih?

(1) Skrb za ohranjanje komunikacijske nivelizirane razloženosti je nazadnje vseeno utemeljena v skrbi tubiti za samo sebe, za lastno eksistiranje, je zavoljo vselej moje tubiti. Čeprav je sebstvo vsakdanje tubiti prav »nekdo«, ki ni samo-lasten, pa je ta »nekdo« vendar vsakokrat ta ali ona tubit sama, ki se razume nivelizirano, kot »nekdo, ki ...«, v tej ali oni družbeni vlogi (nekdo, ki piše članek, nekdo, ki ureja zbornik, nekdo, ki poučuje ...). Če torej tubit vsakdanje eksistira zavoljo tega *se*, tega »nekoga, ki ...«, enako kot kdorkoli, ki ...«, še zmeraj eksistira zavoljo sebe, kot prav ona sama.

(2) Dalje, vsakdanja nivelizirana komunikacijska razloženost stalno poziva tubit v to, da se vanjo umešča z nekimi specifičnimi zmožnostmi, ki so seveda bolj ali manj generične, saj služijo ohranjanju, perpetuiranju nivelizirane komunikacije sotubiti. Vsakdanja tubit je zato lahko integrirana v skupni svet nivelizirane komunikacijske tubiti le tako, da je stalno v skrbi za lastno specifično funkcionalnost, si to prizadeva vzdrževati, pridobivati in razvijati – če naj bo del skupnega, niveliziranega tubitnega načina priskrbovanja in skupnega sveta priskrbovanih priprav, mora k temu prispevati – to od vsake tubiti zahteva sam ustroj vsakdanjega sveta kot namembnostne celote priprav, ki se morajo stalno obnavljati, to zahteva celotni družbeni kontekst.

(3) To lastno koristnost lahko vsakokratna tubit izkazuje le tako, da stalno poudarja lastno specifično koristnost, v izkazovanju lastne koristnosti zato zmeraj že tekmuje z »drugimi«. Zato je vsakdanja bit-z-drugimi bistveno razločkovna, bistveno skrb za razliko od drugih, namreč ne za ab-

solutno, ampak specifično razliko. Z drugimi se tako ali drugače primerja le zato, da bi lahko izkazala svojo koristnost v niveliziranem kolesju vsakdanje sotubiti.

Zato s skrbjo za svojo »različnost«, »individualnost« vsakdanja tubiti le izkazuje podložnost funkcionalnosti nivelizirane sotubiti, in lastnega niveliziranega, generičnega »nekdo, ki ...« sebstva, zavoljo katerih nazadje funkcionira – da bi eksistirala kot »nekdo, kdorkoli, ki ...« mora namreč stalno hkrati skrbeti za svojo umeščenost v generični, nivelizirani komunikacijski sotubiti. Skrb za »različnost« od drugih nazadnje torej služi le perpetuiranju generične vsakdanje enakosti, nivelizirane nerazličnosti. V razločkovnosti sobiti je torej tubit podložna »drugim« (nivelizirani razloženosti), ravno kolikor se *se* trudi za to, da bi se od njih, od te nivelizirane razloženosti razlikovala, vanjo umeščala zavoljo sebe, na sebi, lastnemu oskrbovanju kar najbolj prikladen način. »Drugi« tako niso nobeni določeni drugi, ampak vselej prav enako nivelizirani »vsakdo drug«. Ta »podložnost« je glavni smisel in izvor nesamolastnosti vsakdanje tubiti.

Tendenca sobiti k razločkovnosti, način so-biti na način biti-razlikovan-od drugih glede na vnaprejšnja merila tako nazadnje konstituira *povprečnost* tubiti (181), ki vsebuje izravnavo, nivelizacijo vseh tubitnih možnosti. Momente razločkovnosti, povprečnosti, nivelizacije lahko skupaj zajamemo kot način *javnega* eksistiranja. *Se* kot sebstvo vsakdanje sotubiti torej določa strukturo vsakdanje komunikacije tako da: (1) artikulira napotilni sklop, (2) glede na namembnostno celotnost, ki je domača *se*-ju, (3) in sicer v mejah, ki jih opredeljuje povprečnost *se*-ja.

Toda, če bi ostali pri tem, da bi izpostavili, da je tubit glede na celokupne možnosti *se*-ja, ki jih razkriva javna razloženost, torej glede na »druge« v vsej »njihovi« tubitni raznovrstnosti, zmeraj v zaostanku in da je do tega zaostanka zmeraj v nekem odnosu, in sicer takem, da si ga prizadeva zmanjševati, dohitevati, se z njim sprijazniti itd, bi ostali na ontični ravni. V *ontološkem* vidiku pa odnos do tega zaostanka za možnostmi *se*-ja tvori sam odnos tubiti do lastne možnosti biti v odnosu do biti/sveta: sam ta njen odnos se ji kaže kot interpretativno zmeraj v zaostanku za možnostmi, ki jih ponuja *se*, javnost.

Skupni svet, tvorjen v sotubitnosti pa se ji prav tako kaže kot tak, do katerega je zmeraj že v zaostanku, nikoli zares, dovršeno, integrirana vanj.

Svet je skupni svet torej prav v vidiku te distanciranosti, razločkovnosti, kot celota možnih bitnih smislov, ki tubit vselej presega, ji vselej predstoji in predhaja, ki je nikoli ne bo zmogla v celoti obvladovati. Da tubit zmeraj teži k ontičnemu doseganju in preseganju tega razločka, pomeni le ontični pogoj in izraz te eksitencialne strukture.

Govoričenje, zvedavost in dvoznačnost

Začenši s 35. paragrafom se Heidegger posveti analizi vsakdanje tubiti, potem ko je v predhodnih paragrafih, ki so sledili analizi sotubiti podal strukuro biti-v kot take. Analiza treh momentov, ki jih Heidegger razbere v strukturi vsakdanje biti-v-svetu, govoričenja, zvedavosti in dvoznačnosti, nam ponuja konkretnjšo fenomenološko opredelitev vsakdanje tubitne komunikacije. Pri tem ne gre za to, da bi ti trije momenti neposredno odražali tri temeljne momente tubiti kot take, razumevanje, razlago in govor, ampak za to, da opredeljujejo tri glavne momente vsakdanje tubitne komunikacije. Govoričenje tako opredeljuje strukturo njene nivelizirane povprečnosti, zvedavost opredeljuje način vsakdanjega usmerjanja pozornosti, ki se komunicira v vsakdanji sotubiti, dvoznačnost pa opredeljuje samo strukturo delovanja kot specifične oblike komunikacije vsakdanje usmerjenosti in vsakdanjega sveta.

Govoričenje

Glavna značilnost načina govora, ki ga Heidegger označuje kot govoričenje, je ta, da se v njem razume in sporoča predvsem govorjeno samo, tisto, o-čemer se govori pa zgolj površno, približno, medtem ko se to, kar je govorjeno, samo razume v isti, povprečni razloženosti in razumevanju (Heidegger 2005, 234). Način priskrbovanja komunikacije v modusu govoričenja je tako v prvi vrsti priskrbovanje govorjenega samega (235).

Vsakdanja komunikacija je tako zaznamovana s pripovedovanjem in ponavljanjem (ibid.). S tem samo govorjeno privzema vse bolj avtoritarni karakter, na škodo tistega, o-čemer se govori. V povprečnosti razumljivosti, ki spremlja govoričenje, pa se zdi, da se vse razume in da vsakdo lahko razume vse. Govoričenje zato nima osnove, tal razumevanja (ibid.), ker ne raste iz resničnega razumevanja lahko ustvarja videz, da je vse mogoče razumeti brez dejanske prisvojitve zadeve, o kateri je govor. S tem pa govo-

ričenje varuje tubit tudi pred nevarnostjo, da bi si poskušala razumevajoče prisvojiti zadevo, toda bi ji to spodletelo (ibid.). Zaradi vsega tega govoričenje prej zaklepa kot pa razklepa tubit kot odnos do biti (236).

Ker pa je govoričenje dinamično interpretativno dogajanje, se odvija na način stalnega izkoreninjanja, odtujevanja od razumevanja lastnega odnosa do sveta (237). Heidegger tako pravi: »Samoumevnost in samogotovost povprečne razloženosti pa vključuje to, da ostaja pod njeno zaščito vsakokratni tubiti skrita celo nedomačnost lebdenja, v katerem se lahko požene v vse večjo breztalnost« (ibid.).

Ontološko lahko torej govoričenje opredelimo tako, da se v govoričenju odnos do tega, da je tubit v odnosu do biti/sveta preloži, prestavi v avtomatsko potekanje govoričenja, ki pove vse in nič in mu za interpretativno razjasnjenje odnosa do biti/sveta ni mar, ampak to pušča v nejasni nerazloženosti, ki tvori njegovo navidezno splošno razumljivost in samoumevnost. Breme edinstvenega razumetja lastnega edinstvenega odnosa do biti/sveta govoričenje tako prelaga v navidezno splošno, nerazlikovano, izravnano vseenost eksistence.

Zvedavost

S pojmom zvedavosti Heidegger označuje način, kako se v vsakdanji tubiti oblikuje interpretativni vidik oziroma usmeritev pozornosti razumevanja tubiti (237). Ta je v vsakdanjosti zaznamovana z »nepomujanjem«, raztresenostjo, nestanovitnostjo, je povsod in nikjer (240). Zavoljnost tega načina pozornosti je v tem, da bi se tubit znebila biti pri najbližjem bivajočem in biti v svetu (ibid.). Vendar se seveda ne uspe znebiti priskrbovanja. Tudi zvedavost ima značaj in strukturo priskrbovanja. V ontološkem vidiku pa pri zvedavosti ne gre le za beg od priskrbovanja, ampak za pomirjanje od bremena stalne skrbi za lastni odnos do biti/sveta. To pomirjanje se dogaja na način raztresenega izskakovanja, da se tubit ne bi mogla oprijeti novih, zavezujočih tubitnih možnosti, interesov.

Dvoznačnost

V vsakdanjem eksistiranju zaradi govoričenja ni mogoče razločiti, kaj je vendar pristno razklenjeno in kaj ni. To zadeva tudi značaj vsakdanjega delovanja. O delovanju se tako govori na način, kaj naj bi »pravzaprav«

moralo biti narejeno (241–242); brez zavezanosti, brez individualne investicije, kot nekaj, kar vsakdo ve, pa nihče ne stori. Interes za delovanje zato obstaja le na način zvedavosti, radovednosti, takoj zamre, če se neko delovanje v resnici izvede ali prične (242). Pomembno je le o delovanju zvedavo govoriti; zdaj o tem, zdaj o onem delovanju. Delovanje samo torej ni zares pomembno, čeprav se predstavlja, kot da je. Ta značaj vsakdanje tubiti Heidegger imenuje dvoznačnost (ibid). V ontološkem smislu dvoznačnost vsakdanjega razumevanja delovanja torej pomeni, da delovanje v smeri razvijanja določenega individualnega odnosa do odnosa do biti/sveta postane indiferentno, nepomembno, hkrati pa se razglašča pomembnost delovanja kot neke generične zmožnosti.

Ker velja enakoizvirnost vseh dosedaj ekspliciranih momentov, se pravi sotubiti, razločkovnosti se-ja, govoričenja, zvedavosti in dvoznačnosti, ta pa temeljno opredeljuje strukturo vsakdanjega kvazi-delovanja, lahko sklenemo, da vsi naštetni momenti bistveno in enakoizvorno tvorijo strukturo vsakdanjega »delovanja« kot komunikacije vsakdanje tubiti in njene-ga javnega, s povprečnim razumevanjem in razloženostjo zaznamovanega vsakdanjega sveta.

Govoričenje in zvedavost se stekata v dvoznačnost kot osrednji moment vsakdanje tubiti kot delujoče. Očitno tudi razločkovnost opredeljuje vsakdanje delovanje tubiti, tako da služi dvoznačnosti. Spodbuja namreč raztresenost pozornosti, predvsem pa videz, da tubit deluje z neko svojo specifično koristnostjo, v tej ali oni družbeni vlogi. Celotno delovanje vsakdanjosti pa zaznamuje sotubit kot generična, nivelizirana komunikacijskost, ki služi neskončnemu prestavljanju pozornosti s situacij, ki nago-varjajo k resničnemu, avtonomnemu in zavezanemu delovanju in razta-pljanju osredotočenosti na smiselno delovanje, in utapljanje v pomirjanju s tem, da smo med drugimi, z drugimi, tako kot drugi. Na drugi strani pa je delovanje ravno komunikacija med tubitjo in njenim življenjskim svetom, sotubit pa je opredeljena z govoričenjem, dvoznačnostjo delovanja, razločkovnostjo in zvedavostjo.

Ontološka struktura časovnosti zapadle tubiti

Heideggerjevo analizo vsakdanje strukture delovanja, ki jo zaznamuje vsakdanja komunikacija z elementi razločkovnosti, govoričenja in zve-

davosti dopolnjujejo njegove analize časovne strukture vsakdanje tubiti. S časovno strukturo je tu mišljena struktura »končnosti« tubiti, tj. njene vnaprejšnje zamejenosti v določen način razumevanja biti bivajočega in s tem lastnega sebstva, v njunem enakoizvornem prepletu. Ta struktura je v primeru samolastne tubiti zaznamovana z dinamičnim prepletanjem treh ekstaz časovnosti in smisla biti, ki se javlja v tako ekstatično strukturiranem razumevanju, v primeru nesamolastne tubiti pa je ta dinamizem okrnjen, saj prednost v konstituciji odnosa tubiti do lastne končnosti prevzame vsakokrat posebna ekstaza.

Nesamolastna prihodnost delovanja: sčakovanje

Skladno s temeljno hermenevitično zanko, ki se razkrije že ob prvi analizi biti-v-svetu, se priskrbujoča bit-v-svetu najprej in večinoma razume iz tega, *kar* priskrbuje, to pa priskrbuje zavoljo lastnega oskrbovanja, zavoljo lastne možnosti skrbi, biti si vnaprej. Ker pa v svojem oskrbovanju lastne možnosti eksistiranja vsakdanja tubit razume zavoljnost lastnega oskrbovanja vselej že iz reči, ki jih zavoljo tega oskrbovanja priskrbuje, ji je njena lastna zavoljnost prikrita, ker je vselej že zašla v ta vsakdanji razumevanjski krog.

Zato v vsakdanjem priskrbovanju tubit k sebi prihaja le na način, si je v svoji skrbi vnaprej le v tem vidiku tega, kar si mora za lastno oskrbovanje še priskrbeti. Časovno to pomeni, da »sčakuje sama sebe iz tega, kar priskrbljeno ponuja ali odreka« (Heidegger 2005, 458). To sčakovanje je zaznamovano z vsakdanjim *se* sebstvom tubiti (ibid.). Tubit sčakuje samo sebe iz priskrbljivega na tak način, da se počne tisto, kar *se* pač počne. K sčakovanju spada tudi to, da je vselej že oblikovalo horizont, iz katerega lahko kaj pričakujemo (ibid.). Tega horizonta ni oblikovala vsaka posamezna tubit »sama«, ampak je vselej že preddan, predstoji kot predoblikovan v javni razloženosti *se*-ja. Iz tega horizonta vsakdanja tubit primarno sčakuje svoj odnos do biti/sveta.

Kaj je torej smisel tega »sčakovanja«, zakaj gre tu za neko čakanje? Tubit je v svojem vsakdanjem priskrbovanju vselej določena z nekim mankom, neko nedovršenostjo; vselej je še nekaj, kar si še mora priskrbeti, da bi oskrbela svoje tubitne možnosti odnosa do sveta. Ker pa je v vsakdanjosti podvržena *se*-ju, ne deluje zgolj sama v tem, da bi si priskrbela vse potreb-

no. Še *pred* izpolnitvijo vsakršne takšne dejavnosti se mora javiti glas *se*-ja, ki naroča in razkriva, kaj je tisto, kar naj se še priskrbi, in na kakšen način. Proti vselej novemu priskrbljivemu lahko vsakdanja tubit torej prehaja le tako, da najprej sploh odkrije javno razložene možnosti 'se'-ja, ki njenemu lastnemu priskrbovanju vselej predhajajo.

Zato je vsakdanja tubit v svojem priskrbovanju v stalnem zaostanku glede na lastne potrebe oskrbovanja. Zgolj na ta način, da počne, »kar se pač počne«, in s tem prehaja proti možnostim *se*-ja, ki vselej šele predhajajo, lahko meri na to, da se bo v tem oblikoval, izrisal, razjasnil, njen lastni odnos do tega, da je v odnosu do biti/sveta. Ontološki smisel tega »ščakovanja« je torej določena stalna, vselejšnja zaustavljenost izvajanja lastnega odnosa do biti/sveta, zaradi stalnega zaostajanja za tem, kar *se* naroča, da je še treba opraviti, priskrbeti, ki vselej še predhaja. Toda vse to, kar je še treba priskrbeti, ni nikoli le to ali ono bivajoče, ampak celoten vsakdanji sklop, horizont priskrbljivega, ki je strukturno sicer sklenjen, praktično pa neizčrpen.

Nesamolastna bivšost delovanja: pozabljenje

Ekstaza bivšosti ima v samolastni tubiti značaj obdržanja, prevzetja nase svoje lastne vrženosti. V nesamolastni modifikaciji pa lahko tubit *obdrži* okolnosvetno bivajoče prav le na osnovi pozabljenja lastnih izvornih tubitnih možnosti (479). V ontološkem smislu to pomeni, da zgolj kolikor vsakdanja tubit pozablja na lastni odnos do odnosa do biti/sveta, kot vrženi odnos, zgolj kolikor se ji ta odnos prikriva v usmerjanju na tisto, kar vsakokrat priskrbuje, je lahko v odnosu do biti vselej pričujočega priskrbljivega kot pričujočnostne priročnostne priskrbljivosti.

Nesamolastna pričujočnost delovanja: prehitevanje

V tem, ko vsakdanja tubit pričakuje vselej novo priskrbljivo, da bi se iz njega oskrbela v svoji tubiti, in se s tem »izčakala«, pa hkrati v pričakovanju prihodnjega beži v zmeraj novo, že *dejansko*, in ne zgolj še možno pričujoče (470). Toda prav ta ista neučakanost, ki se ne pomudi pri nobenem pričakovanem in zato skače od pričujočega do pričakujočega, je hkrati temelj pričakovanja vselej novega, ki bo lahko služilo kot zgolj pričujoče, dovršeno, seveda pa se takega zgolj pričujočega, ki bi samo že lahko izpol-

nilo težnjo tubiti k oskrbovanju, nikoli ne doseže. Kot pravi Heidegger, se pričakovanje »tako rekoč odreka samemu sebi« (471). Zato Heidegger pričakovanje označuje tudi kot »izsakovanje« v »skakanje za« vselej novim pričujočim (ibid.).

Na ta način modificirano upričujočevanje, ki se ne zavezuje pričakovanju določenih možnosti zaznamuje to, da je »... upričujočevanje vse bolj prepuščeno samemu sebi. Upričujočuje zavoljo pričujočnosti« (ibid.). Zato je tubit vsakdanje pričujoča na ta način, da je v svojem odnosu do biti/sveta povsod in nikjer (ibid.), v nediferenciranosti situacije (situacijski indiferentnosti).

V ontološkem oziru, v tem skakujočem izsakovanju tubit zmeraj že preskakuje lastni odnos do biti/sveta. V tem si zastira samo možnost odnosa do biti kot tisto, ki potencialno vsebuje mnoga raznovrstna razvitja. Stalno zaostajajoč za lastno možnostjo odnosa do biti/sveta, bi v neučakanem pričakovanju tubit rada samo sebe (lastno sčakovanje) prehitela, lastno sčakovanje odnosa do biti/sveta iz prihodnjega horizonta *predčasno dovršila*.

Vzeto skupaj v ontološkem vidiku torej časovnost vsakdanje tubiti predstavlja pozabljanje lastnega odnosa do biti/sveta, zavoljnost *se-ja* in enotno upričujočevanje vselej novega, da bi preskočilo in predčasno dovršilo lastni odnos do biti/sveta, ki tubiti predstavlja breme. V tem transcendirajočem gibanju, preskakuje vsako zdaj trenutno pričujoče, je tubit stalno na preži za novimi možnostmi olajšanja tega bremena lastnega odnosa do biti/sveta. Bivajoče pričujočno priskrbljivo transcendira v transcendenco vsakdanjega sveta le zato, da ga lahko spet najde na nov način. K svetu kot transcendentni mreži pomenskosti transcendira vsakdanja tubit le zato, da bi se osvobodila dejanske biti v odnosu do biti/sveta, skozi odnos do pričujočega.¹⁰

10 To niveliziranje enotne ekstatično-horizontalne časovnosti tubiti pa temelji v biti (eksistenci) tubiti sami, kot skrbi. »Vrženo-zapadajoča je tubit najprej in večinoma izgubljena v oskrbovalnem. V tej izgubljenosti pa se naznanja zakrivajoči beg tubiti pred svojo samolastno eksistenco, ki smo jo označili kot predhodnostno odločenost (sklenjenost). V oskrbnem begu tiči beg pred smrtjo, se pravi odvrčanje pogleda od konca biti-v-svetu. To odvrčanje pogleda od ... je modus ekstatično prihodnostne biti h koncu. Ker pa vse vulgarno razumetje tubiti vodi 'se', se še posebej lahko utrdi samopozabnostna 'predstava' o 'neskončnosti' javnega časa.« (Heidegger 2005, 572) V tem odstavku zdaj obravnavanega paragrafa pridejo skupaj vse glavne niti *Biti in časa*. To, kar ta odstavek opravi na način povzemajočega sklepa, je to, da izkaže izvor vsakdanjega časovne razumetja biti bivajočega v begu pred samolastno časovnostjo razumevanja lastne eksistence.

Eksplciraјmo še enakoizvornost nesamolastne prihodnosti, bivšosti in pričujočnosti. Zgolj kolikor tubit pozablja lastno izvorno možnost odnosa do biti/sveta, lahko zaostajajoč sčakuje ta svoj odnos iz vselej še predstojčega priskrbljivenga. Zgolj, kolikor v sčakovanju za tem svojim odnosom zmeraj zaostaja v tem, ko si priskrbuje zmeraj novo, lahko ta lastni odnos pozablja, se ji zastira njena izvorna vržena primoranost eksistirati. Zgolj kot pozabljaјoča-sčakuјoča, lahko vsakdanja tubit prehiteva in izskakuje k upričujočevanju vselej novega bivajočega. In zgolj kot tako izskakuјoča je lahko pozabljaјoč-sčakuјoča svoj lastni odnos do sveta.

Kot časovna struktura vsakdanje tubiti, sčakovanje, pozabljanje in prehitevanje v njihovi enakoizvornosti predstavljajo tudi časovno strukturo vsakdanjega delovanja, ki ga zaznamujejo komunikacijski momenti razločkovnosti, govoričenja, zvedavosti in dvoznačnosti.

Razmerje dekonstrukcije vsakdanje tubiti in avtentične prakse

V tem zadnjem delu članka želim podati oris pojma avtentične prakse, kot ga lahko razberemo negativno, na osnovi analize ontološke strukture vsakdanjega delovanja. Osnovna ideja je ta, da nam analiza ontološke strukture vsakdanjega delovanja lahko nudi vodilo konstrukcije ontološke strukture avtentične prakse, saj ta sledi strukturi vsakdanjega delovanja, le da je njen značaj nekako kontraren. Vendar zato, ker je faktični ideal, ki vodi hermenevtično dekonstrukcijsko analizo ontološke strukture vsakdanje komunikacije in delovanja, ideal avtentične eksistence, ne pa morda ideal avtentične prakse, pojma avtentične prakse ne moremo konstruirati na način preproste paralelne negativne odslikave momentov vsakdanje komunikacije oz. delovanja. Torej tako, da bi v nasprotju z begom pred bremenom eksistiranja in zatekanjem v povprečno javno razloženost, ki zaznamujeta vsakdanje »delovanje«, avtentična praksa ležala zgolj v neposrednem prevzemu nase tega bremena in stanjem v trezni odprtosti enigmatične naloge edinstvenega eksistiranja.

Ker se vzpostavlja skozi negativno razmerje do vsakdanjega eksistiranja in nima nobene lastne, v sebi sklenjene strukture komunikacije tubiti in življenjskega sveta, pa avtentična praksa nujno ostaja vselej le zadana kot problematični poskus (posebno področje fenomenoloških raziskav sicer predstavlja vprašanje, ali tako strukturo avtentične prakse lahko

predstavlja imaginacija, v svoji simbolni etični, estetski, intelektualni in kontemplativni funkciji). V strukturi eksistence tako tudi ne more biti nobenega zagotovila načelne možnosti avtentične prakse, niti nobenega absolutnega kriterija, po katerem bi se lahko presojala avtentična praksa. O možnosti avtentične prakse in njenih kriterijih pa ne more odločiti niti praktična eksistenca sama, saj je zmeraj znova izpostavljena težnji k zapadanju. Tudi zato avtentična praksa ostaja le zadana naloga in problem, ki vzgiblje praktično eksistenco.

Na osnovi težnje k zapadanju, ki zaznamuje vsakdanjo tubit, lahko sklepamo, da se to, kar se v teoretskem oz. metodološkem oziru izvaja na način dekonstrukcije vsakdanjega delovanja, ki jo vodi faktični ideal avtentične eksistence, ki to težnjo negativno razkrije, v praktičnem oziru izvršuje na način konflikta, soočenja avtentične eksistence in strukture vsakdanjega delovanja, ki vsebuje naboj upiranja prevladujočemu toku, ki se vztrajno perpetuira. V tem, eksistencialnem, pojmu konflikta ne gre samo potencialno razrešljivo soočenje dveh naravnosti, ampak je to soočenje bistveno zaznamovano z določeno vztrajnostjo, nepopustljivostjo obeh strani, vztrajnostjo avtentične motivacije in vztrajnostjo zapadanja, ki jo Heidegger označi kot vrtinec in zapletanje (Heidegger 2005, 247–248). Z ozirom na momente razločkovnosti, govoričenja, zvedavosti in dvoznačnosti to pomeni upiranje tendenci povprečnemu javnemu razumevanju zavoljo vsakdanje tekmovalne razločkovnostne integriranosti, upiranje ostajanju na površini govorice, upiranje raztreseni nepozornosti, upiranje prelaganja delovanja. V oziru časovnosti pa upiranje sčakovanju, pozabljanju in prehitevanju, ki obvladujejo zgoraj našteje momente.

Še nekoliko natančneje je treba opredeliti to upiranje oz. soočenje, ki ga, kot rečeno zaznamuje dinamična napetost s strukturo vsakdanjega delovanja in komunikacije. To pomeni, da ne gre za nekakšno dokončno razsutje teh pogojev vsakdanje komunikacije, saj se v vrtincu zapadanja tubit vanje neizogibno spet in spet vrača, pač pa to upiranje ostaja stalno implicitno interpretativno vezano na te elemente vsakdanje komunikacije. Enako tudi v časovnem oziru časovna struktura vsakdanjosti ne izginja v avtentični praksi, saj ta nujno ostaja vezana na znotrajsvetno bivajoče, in prav tako neizogibno priskrbuje svoj lastni način komunikacije s svetom. To je mogoče zato, ker lahko obstaja dinamična napetost med osebno, in-

dividualno končno časovnostjo, končno časovnostjo skupnega, življenjskega sveta in časovnostjo samolastne tubiti, saj avtentična praksa pomeni prav komunikacijo samolastne tubiti in vidikov življenjskega sveta, ki sicer spremljajo delovanje vsakdanje tubiti.

Drugi moment tega soočenja z vsakdanjo tubitjo v avtentični praksi, ki ga prav tako lahko konstruiramo na osnovi analogije z metodološko dekonstrukcijo vsakdanje tubiti, je prepoznavanje in zavedanje elementov vsakdanje, zapadle komunikacije in delovanja, ki omogoča upiranje težnji k zapadanju, ki se izraža v teh elementih.¹¹ Smisel avtentične prakse lahko tako v orisu podamo kot tak način tubitne komunikacije z življenjskim svetom, ki se upira težnji izogibanja pred nalogo odnosa do odnosa do sveta.

V tem članku se sicer nisem dotaknil afektivnega, razpoloženjskega vidika vsakdanjega delovanja in avtentične prakse, ki ga Heidegger sicer sam omenja na več mestih *Biti in časa*. Afektivna struktura avtentične prakse je gotovo prav tako zaznamovana z omenjenim upiranjem afektivnim tendencam vsakdanje tubiti, ki spremljajo vsakdanjo komunikacijo in delovanje.¹² Vendar študij afektivnosti avtentične prakse vsebuje težavno vprašanje specifičnih avtentičnih razpoloženj, kot tudi podrobnejše določitve razpoloženjskega značaja momentov vsakdanjega delovanja.

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11 Analitičnim interpretom povzroča precejšnje težave integrirati zapadanje kot strukturni moment tubiti skupaj s samolastnostjo, ki naj bi se zapadanju prav upirala. Toda v tem resnici ni nobene aporije, zapadanje je pač strukturni moment možnosti tubiti, da zapada (da je zapadlo modificirana), ta možnost se v zapadli tubiti izvršuje, struktura tega izvrševanja pa je drugi smisel zapadanja, v samolastni tubiti pa je ta možnost zadržana. Ni tudi protislovja med bojda eksistencialnim zapadanjem in eksistencialno samolastnostjo, ker samolastna eksistenca eksistencialno je tako, da uvidi svojo eksistencialnost. Zato ni pravilno razumeti zapadanje kot enakovredni moment skupaj z eksistencialiteto fakticitete, v strukturnem sklopu skrbi, ker označuje njuno nesamolastno modifikacijo.

12 »Javnost kot način biti 'se'-ja nima svoje razpoloženjskosti le nasploh, temveč razpoloženje rabi in ga 'ustvarja zase'. V njega in iz nega govori govornik, ki mora razumeti možnosti razpoloženja, da bi jih na pravi način vzbudil in usmerjal.« (Heidegger 2005, 196)

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Identifikacija umetnosti z aktivizmom

IZVLEČEK: Obseg umetniških praks, ki so si prizadevale omogočiti različne oblike družbenih odnosov, se je od devetdesetih let razširil na »participativno«, »aktivistično«, »postprodukcijsko«, »skupnostno« ali »dialoško« umetnost, vendar s filozofskega vidika ostaja precejšnja zmeda in prevladujoč odpor do tega, kar lahko z Millerjem na splošno imenujemo »družbeno angažirana« umetnost. Pričujoči prispevek obravnava kritični potencial umetnosti, natančneje je obravnavana identifikacija umetnosti z aktivizmom kot glavnim primerom, ko je umetnost postala družbeno angažirana praksa, da bi preoblikovala in kritizirala družbo. Teoretičarka Aisling Marks je mnenja, da morda glavni razmislek družbeno angažirane prakse ni v tem, da bi ugotovila stopnjo radikalnosti, s pomočjo katere naj bi dosegla družbene spremembe, temveč v tem, kako določiti varno razdaljo od prevladujočih tržnih odnosov, ki omogoča neposredno komunikacijo in hkrati ohranja družbeno transformativno moč. Družbeno angažirana umetnost, ki uporablja taktike sodelovanja, se zoperstavlja klišejem, vendar se mora še bolj oddaljiti od dominantnih sil, da bi ohranila ta transformativni potencial. Nasprotno pa je družbeno angažirana umetnost, ki je transgresivne oziroma opozicijske narave, lahko bližje svetu umetnosti, saj je za tržne sile bolj problematična za izkoriščanje.

Ključne besede: umetnost, aktivizem, politika, socialna umetnost, estetika

Identification of Art and Activism

ABSTRACT: Since the 1990s, the range of artistic practices that have sought to enable different forms of social relations has expanded to include 'participatory', 'activist', 'post-production', 'community' or 'dialogic' art, but from a philosophical point of view there remains considerable confusion and a prevailing aversion to what can be with Miller generally called 'socially engaged art'. The present paper discusses the critical potential of art, more specifically the identification of art with activism is discussed as a prime example where art became a socially engaged practice to transform and critique society. Theorist Aisling Marks is of the opinion that perhaps the main consideration of socially engaged practice is not to determine the degree of radicality with which to achieve social change, but rather how to determine a safe distance from dominant market relations that allows for direct communication and at the same time, it retains a socially transformative power. Socially engaged art, using collaborative tactics, resists clichés, but must further distance itself from domi-

nant forces in order to retain this transformative potential. Conversely, socially engaged art that is transgressive or oppositional in nature may be closer to the art world, as it is more problematic for market forces to exploit.

Keywords: Art, Activism, Politics, Social Art, Aesthetics

Vsa umetnost je »družbena«, bodisi pritrjuje ali negira obstoječi družbenopolitični kontekst, umetnost in družba sta neločljivo povezani. Gustave Courbet in William Morris posebej razvijeta idejo, da je umetnost neizogibno povezana z družbenim kontekstom, v katerem nastaja, politični aktivizem pa, skladno z omenjenim, predstavlja neločljiv del umetniške prakse (Bradley 2007, 35).

Sodobna umetnost predstavlja povezavo življenja, politike in umetnosti, sodobno umetnost bi lahko, med drugim, definirali kot neke vrste artikulacijo sodobne družbe. Umetnost je neločljivo povezana s širšimi družbeno-političnimi sistemi, povezuje se kaže v dialogu, kjer umetnost rekonstituira družbenopolitični prostor in obratno. Polona Tratnik v prispevku »Subverzivne prakse v sodobni umetnosti – strategije majhnega odpora«, umetnosti pripiše zmožnosti razkrivanja skritih razmerij moči in nadzornih mehanizmov družbene dominacije ter oblikovanja možnih alternativ tem odnosom in modelom. Kulturni proizvajalci naj bi imeli »prek svoje simbolne moči prikazovanja in zmožnosti razkrivanja skritega ali spregledanega, možnost izumljanja modelov odpora proti dominantnim diskurzom« (Tratnik 2008, 292–293).

Umetnost in aktivizem skupaj nista zasnovana kot dve ločeni področji dejavnosti včasni koaliciji, temveč kot hibridna platforma za nestrinjanje, nasprotovanje državi in ozaveščanje o politično občutljivih in perečih vprašanjih. Vzporednice med performativno umetnostjo in aktivizmom je mogoče potegniti teoretično v smislu neposrednosti in zavračanja navideznosti ter praktično z neposrednim družbenim udejstvovanjem z namenom družbenih sprememb. Na podlagi tega se kombinacija umetnosti in aktivizma kaže kot poseben način usklajevanja antagonizmov v družbi; družbeno angažirani aktivizmi v uveljavljenem svetu umetnosti skušajo zapolniti vrzel med umetnostjo in družbo ter se racionalno odzivajo na državljansko angažiranost. Če pa je umetnost nujno kritično in družbeno angažirana, četudi zaradi svoje asocialnosti, kot trdi nemški filozof Theodor Adorno, potem je pojav samooklicane »angažirane« ali »kritične«

umetnosti v zadnjih dvajsetih letih vprašljiv (Marks 2015, 14).

Zgodovinski kontekst družbeno angažirane umetnosti

Interdisciplinarna narava družbeno angažirane umetnosti pogosto povzroča pomanjkanje povezave z njenim zgodovinskim kontekstom. Vloga umetnika se je v 18. in 19. stoletju v Evropi korenito spremenila, čemur je botroval vzpon kapitalizma in sekularizma. Umetnik je k perečim družbenim problemom lahko pristopal neodvisno od institucije cerkve, političnih in kulturnih institucij, hkrati je prilaganje na nove ekonomske razmere – industrializacija, oblikovala novo vrsto umetnika, z individualističnim osebnim izrazom. Neodvisno od omenjenih sprememb, pa je bila umetnost še vedno neločljivo povezana z družbenim kontekstom tistega časa. Oblikujejo se modeli umetniške produkcije, skladni s političnim aktivizmom oziroma političnimi vizijami, ki ju artikulira realizacija umetniškega dela (Bradley 2007, 9–13).

Nova organizacija dela in distribucije kapitala v 19. stoletju, je sovpadala z oblikovanjem civilnega gibanja za pravice, vzponom internacionalizma ter novih oblik umetniških gibanj. Pripadniki konstruktivistične misli so zavračali misel umetnosti, ki je sama sebi namen, temveč so slednjo povezovali z družbenim napredkom. Ideje Bauhauza² so se nagibale od estetizacije dnevnega življenja k vlogi umetnosti v okvirih industrijske funkcionalnosti. In če konstruktivisti in pripadniki gibanja Bauhaus predstavljajo modernistično pojmovanje umetnosti v službi kolektivnih oziroma družbenih ciljev, pa so pripadniki dadaizma tovrstno ideologijo zavračali in vzpodbujali ideje revolucionarnih družbenih sprememb, kritične strategije ter političnega protesta. Surrealisti so se oblikovali kot posledica poskusov delno uspešne implementacije dadaistične misli v Franciji – Parizu. Idejni vodja surrealizma, francoski pisatelj André Robert Breton (1896–1966), je želel osvoboditi umetniški izraz – neodvisno od kulture in ideologije – s pomočjo vzpodbujanja nezavednega, omenjeno pa je močno vplivalo na tok zahodne umetnosti. Breton je politično organizacijo in družbene norme tistega časa pojmoval kot vsiljive in neskladne s heterogenostjo in nepredvidljivostjo človeške

narave. Mnoga umetniška dela, ki so izhajala iz surrealizma, so bila javnosti dostopna leta kasneje. Delna pripadnost komunističnim idejam je botrovala notranjim konfliktom med pripadniki surrealizma, druga svetovna vojna pa je botrovala zaježitvi vseh umetniških gibanj do zgodnjih šestdesetih let, ko se ponovno pojavijo kolektivna, politično nevtralna umetniška gibanja. Vstaje leta 1968 so odražale nezadovoljstvo z obstoječimi ideologijami, glavna funkcija umetnosti je bila manifestacija revolucionarnih idej v obliki direktne akcije. Cilj ni bil zgolj ozaveščati javnost, temveč direkten prikaz lastnih političnih prepričanj, običajno povezanih z odporom do umetniških institucij, povezanih s kapitalom. (13–18)

Sočasno je vzpon novih tehnologij botroval oblikovanju novih družbenih razmerij in novih oblik umetniške produkcije, hkrati so nove tehnologije namen umetnosti delno vrnile k estetiki. Začasno in kratkotrajno se je razvoj tehnologije utopično pojmoval kot enotni masivni medij, ki je naznanjal novo družbo. Drugi val feminizma, ki je vzniknil konec šestdesetih let prejšnjega stoletja, je naznanil premik iz umetniškega utopizma k identitetni politiki, ki je zaznamovala sedemdeseta in osemdeseta leta prejšnjega stoletja. Določeni cilji feminističnega gibanja so se celo skladali s takratno politično strukturo, glavni cilj pa je bil izpostaviti neenakost patriarhalne zgodovine umetnosti ter vzpostaviti enakovreden prostor delovanja za ženske umetnice. Gibanje za enakovredne pravice žensk se je odvijalo sočasno z bojem za pravice delavcev, bojem proti rasizmu, dekonstrukcijo procesa rabe institucionalne moči ter oblikovanja družbene strukture brez hierarhije. (19–21)

In če so v preteklosti umetniki stopali iz okvirov institucionalizirane umetnosti za dosego ciljev političnega aktivizma, so se v tem obdobju umetniki in umetniške institucije do neke mere združili v ideji svobodne umetnosti, kar je rezultiralo v spremenjenih estetskih in formalnih kriterijih pojmovanja umetnosti. Kategorija t. i. moderne umetnosti naj bi združevala idejo umetnosti kot nadaljevanja filozofije estetike in zgodovinskih umetniških gibanj ter radikalnih avantgardnih eksperimentov, ki skušajo vzpostaviti avtonomno kategorijo umetnosti. Umetnost, ki je podvržena zakonitostim trga, je presegla diskusije o naravi umetnosti, vlogi umetnosti in njeni institucionalni obliki.

Strategije aktivizma v umetnosti

Zavedanje politične narave umetniškega ustvarjanja postavlja pod vprašaj sporazumne diskurze o nevtralnosti umetnosti in estetike, ki sta v svoji »avtonomiji« omejeni in imuni na dejavnike sveta. V umetniškem aktivizmu se odvija dialektika med dvema entitetama, ki ju tradicionalno pojmujeemo kot različni: na eni strani na področju umetnosti (pogosto opredeljene kot avtonomne in brez druge funkcije razen lastne) ter na drugi strani na področju politike in družbenih dejavnosti.

Osrednje vprašanje umetniškega aktivizma bi lahko zastavili na naslednji način: Kako lahko ocenimo sposobnost umetnosti, da deluje kot družbeni in politični protest? Možnost merjenja te sposobnosti/učinkovitosti predstavlja težko nalogo, kajti umetniški in ideološki cilji aktivizma so različni. Zdi se, da pojem »aktivizem« etimološko ne poudarja nobenega posebnega stališča glede sodobnega sveta. Paleta umetniških praks, ki jih mobilizira aktivizem, je torej zelo široka, v vseh teh praksah je mogoče razložiti dve radikalno različni stališči.

Ko umetniško delovanje sodeluje pri preusmerjanju in disfunkciji političnega delovanja in njegovega diskurza. Zdi se, da je to zadnje stališče zavzelo veliko število aktivističnih umetnikov, da bi opozorili na nevarnosti, ekscese, pomanjkljivosti določenega političnega delovanja ali določenega ideološkega načela. Tovrstno umetniško delovanje zagotavlja večjo avtonomijo in zdi se, da se izogiba podrejenosti enemu političnemu diskurzu. Po drugi strani pa vpliv umetniškega delovanja v družbeni in politični sferi (z nekakšno objektivizacijo političnega in družbenega statusa quo) potiska v ozadje.

Kadar je umetniško delovanje del oblike izboljšanja funkcionalnosti sporočila in političnega delovanja, da bi slednje približali naslovniku. Če ta vrsta intervencije umetniku omogoča negovati upanje, da bo dosegel določene družbene in politične spremembe, lahko hkrati vsebuje tveganje za ideološko/propagandno podreditev in/ali potencialno zmanjšanje estetske inovativnosti.

Politika umetniške avtonomije

Vprašanje umetniške avtonomije, ki je dolgo veljalo za antitetično radikalni ali angažirani umetnosti, je preoblikovano v privilegiran položaj,

s katerega je mogoče spreminjati in preoblikovati temeljne predpostavke o tem, kaj je politično polje. Učinkovitost umetnosti je težko ugotoviti v evalvacijski paradigmi, ki išče merljive rezultate, ki se odvijajo v opazovanih časovnih okvirih. Politična kultura se zares počasi in postopoma spreminja. Kako bi lahko delovanje v relativno nenadzorovanih prostorih umetniške prakse spremenili v premišljen politični odziv in ne le v vajo za čustveno samoohranitev? Vprašanje umetniške relevantnosti je seveda staro in odgovora nanj verjetno ni. Vendar pa razmišljanje o »relevantnosti« kot metodologiji in ne kot rezultatu odpira produktivne poti za družbeno angažirano umetnost. Podoben način raziskovanja je mogoče razviti za umetniško prakso, ki se odziva na edinstvene in spreminjajoče se institucionalne, politične in kulturne položaje umetnosti. Namesto da bi ponovno sprožili zastale razprave, kot je, »ali mora biti umetnost v službi politike?«, bi se ta smer raziskovanja lahko začela s preizpraševanjem domnevne nepomembnosti umetnosti, preučevanjem očitnega razkora med umetnostjo in delovanjem ter ponovnim razmislekom o nedavnih strategijah, ki so povezale umetnost in politiko. Z drugimi besedami, namesto da bi vili roke zaradi svoje ločenosti od »prave« politike, bi lahko družbeno angažirani kulturni delavci paradoksalno sprejeli vrzel med umetnostjo in delovanjem ter to ločenost videli kot edinstven prispevek k procesu v teku, v katerem vsaka oblika kulturne prakse postane relevantna. Provokativno delo francoskega filozofa Jacquesa Rancièra o politiki estetike trdi, da je »politična umetnost« lahko v edinstvenem položaju za ustvarjanje »metapolitike«: niza pogojev, v katerih bo politično delovanje – zunaj meja umetniškega dela in konvencionalne politike – postalo mogoče za več ljudi. (Kanouse 2007, 24)

Filozof Jacques Rancièr se je zavzemal za redefiniranje pogojev razprave o tem, kje se križata politika in umetnost. Politiko opisuje kot nekaj veliko bolj osnovnega in obsežnega od naših učbeniških definicij. Po Rancièru, »[p]olitika ni uveljavljanje moči ali boj za oblast. Politika je najprej konfiguracija prostora kot političnega, uokvirjanje specifične sfere izkustva, postavitve predmetov, ki so postavljeni kot 'skupni', in subjektov, ki jim je priznana sposobnost, da te predmete označujejo in se o njih izrekajo.« Ta metapolitika ruši lažno dihotomijo, ki bi dejanja predstavne moči (umetnost) postavila nasproti dejanjem materialne moči (politika).

Namesto tega zagovarja »poetiko politike« in »poetiko znanja«, ki skupaj ustvarjata scenarije in besednjake za razumevanje in spreminjanje sveta. (Kanouse 2007, 25)

Po Rancièrovem mnenju je estetsko področje prostor, kjer si ljudje lahko privoščijo preobrazbo temeljnih premis, na katerih temeljijo politike, usmerjene na problem. A da bi umetnost lahko delovala na ta način, se mora upreti razpadu v politiko in namesto tega strateško uporabiti liberalno-buržoazno tradicijo »umetniške avtonomije«, ne da bi pri tem pozabila, kako je ta položaj umeščen v institucionalna razmerja moči. Za Rancièra je koncept estetskega globoko paradoksalno stanje, ki opredeljuje umetniško prakso kot del redkega, elitnega sveta, ki ga poznajo le močni, hkrati pa ustvarja čutno izkušnjo, ki obstaja povsem zunaj logike prevlade. Ta izkušnja pomeni tudi »zavrnitev tistega smiselnega dela«, ki bi estetiko ločil od težav vsakdana. Ker je evropska tradicija umetnost obravnavala kot ločeno področje človekovega delovanja, ki je nad zgodovinsko in politično realnostjo in hkrati zunaj nje, diskurzi in prakse umetnosti danes paradoksalno ponujajo napol avtonomne prostore, v katerih se lahko resničnost trditev neoliberalizma postavi pod vprašaj in se oblikujejo nove formulacije subjektivnosti, kolektivnosti in sposobnosti delovanja. (26)

Ko od umetnosti zahtevamo, naj bo »politična«, moramo biti jasni glede svojih pričakovanj in v njih vsebovanih predpostavk o politiki. Ali pričakujemo, da bo umetniško delo prineslo bistvene spremembe, in če da, kako, kako dolgo in za koga? Ali pa želimo, da bi umetniško delo uporabilo svojo avtonomijo za preoblikovanje našega koncepta političnega?

Vprašanje vpisa etičnega motiva v sodobno umetniško prakso, vprašanje, ali etična zahteva danes deluje na pogoje in oblike umetniške dejavnosti, ne pomeni prizadevanj za stabilizacijo definicije umetnosti, temveč s samega mesta te nestabilnosti odpira vprašanje umetniške prakse kot etične geste. Srečanje z etiko je prelomnica v ustvarjalni dejavnosti, ne glede na njene cilje (estetski, terapijski, skupnostni ali drugi). Ko etična zahteva »izbruhne« v prostoru ustvarjalne dejavnosti, to gibanje odpre možnost, da v procesu razvoja dela, projekta ali dejanja slišimo zahtevo, ki ni strogo individualna ali utemeljena na identiteti. Etika ni bila vedno vključena v pojem umetnosti in nikakor ni samoumevno, da pogoje in oblike umetniških dejavnosti danes rušijo etične napetosti. Ali je umet-

nost izvzeta iz etičnih vprašanj, ker so ta vprašanja neločljivo povezana z umetnostjo (umetnost kot etika), čeprav bi zgodovina umetnosti tako pojmovanje zanikala, ali pa so vprašanja umetnosti preprosto drugje? Ali po gibanju k avtonomiji, ki je umetnost pripeljalo do preloma z nekaterimi njenimi tradicionalnimi in kulturnimi temelji (zlasti v zvezi z njenimi kulturnimi temelji), če ne celo do izgube njene nujnosti, sodelujejo (ne brez določene nostalgije) pri iskanju poti nazaj domov tudi skupnostno (osnovane) umetniške prakse? Ali pa se te prakse izpostavljajo tveganju, da bodo trenutno izvzete iz sfere umetnosti? Prakse skupnostne umetnosti ostajajo odvisne od te umetniške kulture, katere cilj je spremeniti svet. Včasih se po njem naivno ravna, na primer ko reproducirajo preroške ali herojske načine modernizma, ki še vedno vpliva na sodobno umetniško paradigmo. Spet drugič se od nje osvobodijo, se odločijo za bolj skromne ukrepe ali delujejo na drugem področju vpliva, ne na področju umetnosti. Vse te prakse vseeno zapletajo izključujoče se nasprotje drž avtonomije in angažiranosti, da bi izpolnile potrebo po problematizaciji umetnosti, ki odraža napetosti, značilne za sodobno etiko. (Neumark in Chagnon 2011, 54–55)

Uporabna umetnost

Čeprav sodobni umetniki, kritiki in raziskovalci široko priznavajo umetnost kot družbeno delovanje, je nekoliko več zadržkov, da bi družbeno delovanje, katerega cilj je zagotoviti konkretno rešitev družbenega problema, imenovali umetnost. Najpomembnejši diskurz v estetiki umetnosti naj bi bilo simbolično ali metaforično postavljanje vprašanj. Družbeno angažirana umetnost je v svetu umetnosti pogosto sprejeta kot neuporabna; vprašanje simbolnega in funkcionalnega se neposredno nanaša na delovne metode družbeno angažiranih umetniških projektov. V družbeno angažiranih umetniških projektih je transgresija razumljena kot estetsko dragocena in ne le kot dragocena zaradi etičnih meril. Tako je konfrontacijski projekt prepoznan kot nosilec pomembnega konceptualnega pomena in lažje dobi legitimnost v sodobni umetnosti. Nemški filozof Theodor W. Adorno meni, da je razlog, morda celo edini, za obstoj umetnosti v njeni moči upiranja družbi, ne pa v njeni neposredni sporočilnosti in razumljivosti niti v njeni praktični funkciji. Področje umetnosti trenutno večinoma sprejema in priznava družbene akcije, ki predstavljajo simbolne namene

in uporabljajo konfrontacijske pristope. Če ima družbena akcija simbolni namen in je nekonfliktna, je prepoznana kot umetnost v širšem smislu. Družbena akcija, ki je praktična in konfrontacijska, velja za neumetniško protestno akcijo; ti pristopi so tudi družbeno delovanje, ki je praktično in nekonfliktno, za katerega je značilno, da se osredotoča na pomoč ljudem v stiski. V resnici se zaradi premikanja in brisanja meja med temi štirimi spremenljivkami umetnost kot družbeno delovanje in druga neumetniška družbena dejanja pogosto prepletajo z večplastnostjo družbeno angažirane umetnosti in jo ustvarjajo. (Marks 2015)

Novonastala protestna gibanja se razlikujejo od prejšnje aktivistične umetnosti, saj političnega delovanja ne uporabljajo kot medij za ustvarjanje umetnosti, temveč v politično delovanje vnašajo umetniške in estetske strategije. Te akcije presegajo družbene discipline in institucije ter vedno postavljajo pod vprašaj družbeno angažirano kritiko umetnosti. Umetniki, ki se ukvarjajo s praksami, usmerjenimi v korist, kot svoj prvotni namen prepoznava izboljšanje blaginje posameznikov in skupnosti v stiski, ne pa simbolnega pomena in estetske kakovosti. Razširijo razumevanje določenih družbenih vprašanj in razširijo razumevanje ljudi o tem, kaj jim lahko ustvarjalna umetnost prinese. V korist usmerjene prakse se od drugih socialnih storitev razlikujejo po tem, da zagotavljanje storitev ni vnaprej določeno ali fiksno, temveč ga ustvarjajo umetniki. Umetnik, ki se znajde v določenem družbenem kontekstu, z lastnimi izkušnjami s posamezniki zazna njihove potrebe in nevidne potrebe naredi vidne. Umetnost ustvarja nov družbeni prostor, ki prej ni obstajal; v tem prostoru se lahko srečujejo ljudje iz različnih okolij ter svobodno in enakopravno sodelujejo drug z drugim. (Marks 2015)

Konceptualizacija politične moči umetnosti in estetike

Jacques Rancière besedo »politika« pridrži za heterogene procese, ki nasprotujejo konsenzu glede načinov sodelovanja, delovanja, zaznavanja, čutenja in odnosov z drugimi, ki se zdijo nesporni in ki jih običajno pojmovanje politike naredi nevidne. Politika, estetika in umetnost so po Rancièrevem mnenju neločljivo povezane; ta odnos razvija na podlagi dveh definicij estetike. Po njegovem mnenju se ustvarja distribucija čutnega – sistem, ki določa običajne načine gledanja, govorjenja, čutenja in delova-

nja, skratka običajne načine bivanja, ki določajo možnosti posameznikov za politično udeležbo in posledično njihov položaj v skupnosti. Pri tem se »estetika« (*aisthetikos*) nanaša na občutljivo in zaznavno na splošno, politika pa v zvezi s tem izvaja prerazporeditev občutljivega. Pomembno je poudariti pomen Rancièrove formule: s tem, ko je čutno postavljeno v središče možnosti za družbeno udeležbo, postane del same strukture političnega. Po Rancièrovem mnenju se politika vedno ukvarja s čutnim in če gre pri politiki za redefinicijo in prerazporeditev tega, kar je na določenem kraju in v določenem času vidno in izrazljivo, potem je jasno, da je estetika daleč od tega, da bi bila pomožna ali manj pomembna kategorija, ki bi opisovala sekundarna dejstva in prakse, temveč je s politiko povezana v samem njenem jedru. Rancière meni, da je razširjenost situacionističnega diskurza, spektakla, krize umetnosti in smrti podobe v sodobni kritiki simptom preobrazbe avantgardne misli v nostalgijo, ob kateri so se diskurzi »konca« ali »vrnitve« pojavili kot ponavljajoče se mizanscene kritičnega diskurza. Ponovna vzpostavitev pogojev razprave torej pomeni razumevanje povezav med sodobnimi umetniškimi praksami in »načini diskurza, oblikami življenja, konceptijami mišljenja in osebnostmi skupnosti«, ki se izogne tako zavračanju sedanje umetnosti kot tudi prenavljanju preteklosti. V tem drugem pomenu »estetike« se izraz ne nanaša na teorijo umetnosti na splošno ali na teorijo učinkov umetnosti na občutljivost. Rancière meni, da so obstajali trije estetski režimi: etični, poetični in estetski režim umetnosti. Estetski režim je torej zadnji od treh režimov, s katerimi je bila zgodovinsko določena meja med umetnostjo in neumetnostjo. Ta režim je še posebej zanimiv z vidika razmerja med politiko in estetiko. (Yepes 2014, 42–44)

V estetskem režimu je umetnost avtonomna, vendar le tako, da povezuje umetnost z ne-umetnostjo: sama estetska izkušnja povezuje področje umetnosti s področjem življenjske izkušnje. Estetika naj bi bila, v širšem pomenu, okvir, ki daje umetnosti politični potencial – ker sta politika in estetika strukturno povezani, predstavlja politika estetike strukturni pogoj, ki povezuje umetnost estetskega režima z avtonomnim življenjem. Umetnost lahko ponudi izkušnjo, ki je alternativna običajnemu, izkušnjo, v kateri je v ospredju osvoboditev od običajnega mišljenja in hierarhije moči. Po Rancièrovem mnenju je potencial umetnosti kot neodvisne estet-

ske konfiguracije, da prekine distribucijo čutnega, tisto, kar jo pravilno naredi politično. Ni bolj privilegiranega področja za ustvarjanje estetskega drugega, za ustvarjanje nesoglasja, kot je umetnost, kajti na tem področju se človeško prizadevanje usmeri v izumljanje oblik, percepcij in afektov novega. To ne pomeni, da umetnost vodi ali bi morala voditi preobrazbo ali da lahko sama po sebi spodbudi revolucijo, vendar ima umetnost potencial, da politični domišljiji ponudi oblike in načine sodelovanja, pa tudi postopke in procese, ki so potrebni za njihovo uresničitev. V estetskem režimu se umetnost umešča v trenutek svojega političnega pomena. Rancière meni, da je avtonomija umetnosti tista, ki ji daje politično relevantnost. Avtonomija, ki jo izpostavlja Rancière, je avtonomija estetskega izkustva umetnika in gledalca kot posameznikov, ki sodelujejo v estetski razsežnosti življenja samega; v tej luči se »avtonomija« »umetnosti« umakne in dobi relativno manj pomemben status. Umetnika lahko omejujejo diskurzi in pričakovanja institucije umetnosti, vendar ti ne ovirajo estetske izkušnje, ki jo umetnik ustvari. Avtonomno izkustvo presega avtonomijo umetnosti; v njem umetniško delo in umetnikove namere postanejo heteronomne, tj. prepletene z običajnim estetskim izkustvom zunaj umetnosti, četudi so bile mišljene kot avtonomne. Po Ranciérovem mnenju je estetsko izkustvo nosilec politike umetnosti: umetnost ustvarja izkustvo, ki suspendira odnos med umetnostjo in uporabno vrednostjo, umetnostjo in svetom predmetov, umetnostjo in običajnimi oblikami in praksami življenja. Politika umetnosti je v tem, da z ustvarjanjem takšnega izkustva prekine distribucijo čutnega. (Yepes 2014, 45–46)

Sklep

Umetnost je med redkimi preostalimi področji, ki imajo dejansko možnost, da ostanejo prosta vrednot presojanja in vedenjskih kodeksov, ki prevladujejo v našem sedanjem stanju. To pomeni, da lahko umetnost gledalcem še vedno ponuja izkušnje, ki se upirajo pritiskom reševanja konfliktov, uživanja, razumevanja, učenja in proizvajanja koristnega in učinkovitega. Zato mora umetnost, namesto da bi postala totalitarno podjetje – konceptualno in praktično – izkoristiti svojo politiko estetike in nam v praksi pokazati, kako obnoviti našo vero v njen družbeni potencial. To pomeni, da lahko umetnost z razkrivanjem, izzivanjem in destabiliziranjem tistega,

kar velja za dano, javnosti ponudi novo gledišče. To bi lahko dosegli tudi z družbenim in institucionalnim spodbujanjem vrednotenja del, ki utelešajo produktivne in ne neproduktivne napetosti, ki bi lahko vključevale določeno stopnjo protislovja, nemira, vizualne intenzivnosti ali nelagodja, in ne nujno ali strogo vrednotenje del, ki nudijo takojšnje zadovoljstvo, učinkovitost, politično korektnost ali dobrodelnost. (Bonham-Carter in Mann 2017, 67)

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Recenzija / Review

Nina Vodopivec¹

Mojca Ramšak, Antropologija vonja

Alma Mater Europea, Ljubljana 2024, 372 strani

Knjiga ponuja obsežen in sistematičen pregled interdisciplinarnega in mednarodnega raziskovanja vonja s poudarkom na antropoloških in kulturno zgodovinskih študijah. Avtorica Mojca Ramšak je opravila obsežno delo, ki ne prinaša le bogatega popisa literature, temveč razkriva raznolike analitske vidike preučevanja vonja in vohalnih zaznav od lingvistično semiotičnih analiz, medkulturnih primerjav, do povezave vonja z estetiko, erotiko in spolnostjo, študija vloge vonja v potrošništvu in njegove uporabe v didaktične namene v muzejih in galerijah.

Avtorica nas v temo vpelje skozi avto-etnografski premislek; poleg izostrenega lastnega občutenja vonjav je njeno osebno zanimanje za temo poglobila motnja voha v času epidemije covid. Začasna izguba vonja je takrat tudi v širši družbi jasneje opozorila na vlogo in pomen vohalnega čuta v vsakdanjih praksah in medosebnih odnosih. Vonj je težko uloviti in ubesediti, zato so v številnih predelih sveta vonjalni in vohalni besednjaki redki ali abstraktni, kar pa ne pomeni, da vonj nima pomembne vloge v življenju ljudi. Nekdanjo domnevo nevro in kognitivne znanosti, da voh ne kotira visoko na svetovni lestvici vrednotenja čutov (v hierarhiji čutenj) ovržejo antropološke raziskave. Le-te opozarjajo na vohalno bogatejše življenje nekaterih ljudstev, kjer je voh osrednji čut in vonj vir informacij o rastlinah, živalih, človeški dejavnosti in vremenskih razmerah. Pa tudi tam, kjer voh na videz nima osrednje vloge, le-ta dejansko strukturira vsakdanje družbene prakse in odnose. Vonj se lahko izrazi v metaforah, medmetih, telesni in obrazni gestikulaciji, z vonjem so povezani konkretni kraji, prostori, predmeti in

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spomini. Avtorica z medkulturnimi raziskavami opozarja, da gre o pomenu vonja razmišljati v konkretnih vsakdanjih kulturno specifičnih okoljih.

Vonjanje kot čutenje je izrazito subjektivno, a vendar družbeno in kulturno pogojeno. S kulturo čutov in čutenja ter družbeno in kulturnimi pogojenimi vohalnimi zaznavami sta se največ ukvarjali zgodovina in antropologija v zadnjih nekaj desetletjih. Antropološke analize nadgrajujejo zgodovinske, saj pokažejo, da vohalni čutni redi niso spremenljivi le skozi prostor, ampak tudi čas. Čeprav so bile vonjave in vohalne zaznave zajete tudi že v starejših etnografijah ter pri samem terenskem delu, je do intenzivnejšega študija teme prišlo z razvojem senzoričnih raziskav oz. s t. i. čutnim obratom v antropologiji. Na nastanek knjige *Antropologija vonja* je še posebej vplivalo mednarodno in interdisciplinarno sodelovanje avtorice v okviru evropskega projekta Odeuropa (Vonji Evrope, 2021–2023) in Odeotheke (2021–2024, v laboratoriju za dediščinsko znanost Fakultete za kemijo in kemijsko tehnologijo v Ljubljani), kar zajame med drugim njeno sodelovanje z raziskovalci vonja na Oddelku za etnologijo in kulturno antropologijo na Filozofski fakulteti v Ljubljani. Knjiga je nastala tudi v okviru avtoričinega temeljnega projekta Vonj in nesnovna kulturna dediščina (ARIS).

Velik poudarek v knjigi je na razumevanju vohalnih zaznav v okviru družbene in kulturne pogojenosti. Avtorica obravnava različne družbeno kulturne dejavnike, ki vplivajo na zaznavanje vonja in kultiviranje voha, vohalne zaznave v povezavi s kulturnimi identitetami in družbenimi odnosi kot tudi razmerji neenakosti in moči, predvsem razreda, spola, rasnega in etničnega drugotenja. Slednje je še posebej pomembno in avtorica poleg empiričnih primerov iz mednarodnega prostora, kjer se je vonjalne stereotipe pripisovalo temnopoltim ali delavstvu, opozarja tudi na primere iz Slovenije; na izključevalne vonjalne stereotipe o Romih. Izkušnja smradu je, kot pokaže, povezana s kultiviranjem voha. Smrad in gnus vzdržujeta družbene hierarhije ter legitimirata razmerja moči.

Vonj ima pomembno vlogo tudi pri terenskem delu, o čemer so že pisali nekateri klasični antropologi. Ne gre pa le za vonjalni šok, ki ga lahko doživijo raziskovalci v novem kulturnem okolju, temveč tudi za urjenje »vohalnega pogleda« in razvoj novih metod terenskega dela na tem področju. Kot opozarjata ključna raziskovalca vonja v mednarodnem prostoru David Howes in Constance Classen, bi morali antropologinje in antropologi tudi

pri terenskem delu izstopiti iz zaprtega vizualnega modela v dinamični model čutne kombinatorike. Avtorica se je zato tudi sama urila na vohalnih treningih. Poleg klasičnih terenskih metod nas seznanja z inovativnimi tehnikami, kot so vonjalni zemljevid pridobljen s sprehajalnimi metodami, krožni vonjalni grafikoni, tehnika vizualizacij vonja v prostoru ter nekatere druge merske metode vzete iz naravoslovja. Vohalne zaznave in kulturo vonja se lahko raziskuje tudi preko metafor, etimologije priimkov, šaljivih žanrov (vicev, zbadljivk), literarnih, likovnih in glasbenih upodobitev.

Struktura knjige *Antropologija vonja* je jasna. Avtorica začne s predstavitvijo osnovnih pojmov in definicij, nadaljuje s pregledom mednarodne literature od antičnih mislecev, do sodobnejših filozofov, zdravnikov, sociologov, zgodovinarjev, etnologov, literatov ter drugih umetnikov. Poleg mednarodnih študij predstavi tudi primere iz slovenskega okolja: v etnoloških in kasnejših antropoloških študijah sta bila vonj oz. vohalne zaznave najpogosteje obravnavana posredno v povezavi z ljudskim zdravilstvom, šegami, rituali, prehranjevalnimi navadami in oblačili (vključno s telesno snago in nego) ter družbeno neenakostjo. V novejšem času je neposrednega študija teme več predvsem v okviru prostorskih senzoričnih študij. Študij vonja in voha je moč najti tudi med kulturno in socialno zgodovinskimi raziskavami higienskih praks na Slovenskem.

Knjiga po predstavitvi in kontekstualizaciji različnih kulturnih praks in imaginarijev vonja skozi prostor in čas nadaljuje s pregledom študija povezav vonja z erotiko in spolnostjo, opisi pravnih regulacij vonjav, z vpogledom na področje trženja vonja, zaključí pa z vlogo vonja v uradnih dokumentih kulturne dediščine. Vohalna dediščina je novejše področje raziskovanja, ki zajame dokumentacijo in analizo dediščinskih predmetov in prostorov, njihov kulturni pomen in raziskovanje človeških vonjalnih izkušenj, vezanih na dediščino.

Knjigo *Antropologija vonja*, ki prinaša izjemen popis literature in različnih analitskih vidikov, priporočam v obvezno branje predvsem tistim, ki se s temo pričenjajo ukvarjati oz. jo že študirajo. Ker pa je vonj tako neposredno povezan z družbeno kulturnim življenjem ljudi, z družbenimi praksami, odnosi in vrednotami, je knjiga zelo dobrodošla za vse raziskovalke in raziskovalce družboslovja in humanistike, zaradi jasnega stila pisanja in številnih zanimivih empiričnih primerov pa tudi za širšo javnost.

POPRAVEK:

V prejšnji številki je prišlo do napake pri afilaciji dr. Mojce Ramšak. Zaposlena je le na Univerzi v Ljubljani. Avtorici in instituciji se za napako iskreno opravičujemo.

